Military Intelligence

October-December 1985

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Features

Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Departments

Staff

Cover Design
by Sp4 Donald L. Nelson

from the
Commander

by Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

The ultimate goal of each professional intelligence specialist, officer or enlisted soldier, must be an insatiable desire to reduce, to a minimum, the risk that is accepted by his commander in the execution of his mission. This concern is shared by each of us, whether in strategic or tactical assignments, regardless of whether the commander is a lieutenant colonel maneuver battalion commander, commander-in-chief of a theater of operations, or ultimately the President of the United States.

Every TRADOC school shares in the responsibility of reducing these concerns by executing an effective training program. Simply stated, it is my mission to ensure that the Intelligence Center and School, at all our campuses, provides its students the training needed to ensure mission accomplishment in their MOS or specific organizational position.

Our training strategy has continued to evolve to meet the demands of Army commands worldwide and to keep pace with the training activities and operational requirements. It focuses not only on Active Component training requirements, but those of the Army Reserve and National Guard as well.

Our singularly focused team effort to provide training in battlefield collection and the production of multidisciplined, all-source intelligence requires the synchronization of our quad-campus configuration and the total integration of our multi-echelon intelligence training mission. My goal is twofold: First, to ensure that each graduate of the Intelligence Center and School is prepared to take his or her place beside fellow soldiers, airmen, sailors, and/or marines and share the burdens and exhilaration of being a professional in the U.S. Army; second, our graduates must possess the technical knowledge necessary to perform at their appropriate skill level and grade. In addition to leadership capabilities, graduates of the Officer Basic Course must have a complete understanding of the intelligence cycle and must be capable of executing each portion of it in a tactical environment. These are the criti-

cal tasks for Military Intelligence officers regardless of the echelon of assignment. Our Advanced Individual Training graduates must be technically proficient to execute their entry-level skills in SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT specific assignments in tactical or strategic units. Each soldier must have an awareness of the team effort that is essential to be successful in battle, and he should be fully aware of the potential contribution that he can make to his unit.

All follow-on training for officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers is geared to expand and improve upon the leadership, tactical, technical, and training skills. At the Intelligence Center and School our training only establishes the foundation in soldierly and technical skills. Subsequently, it is the responsibility of the leaders in our field commands to continue to improve training development of our MI soldiers. Therefore, a critical aspect of our education program is to train the trainers, i.e., the Basic and Advanced Course graduates who are assigned to platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps level duties. I encourage you to maintain open channels of communications (two-way) with the schoolhouse to ensure that the Center and School's goals and objectives are correct and that we are meeting the intelligence training requirements of our biggest customer—the United States Army. *Toujours en avant*—**Always Out Front!**

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

from the
CSM

by CSM Robert H. Retter

Today we are serving in the most exciting and progressive period in the annals of military history. High technology has both refined and accelerated procedures for performing in each and every MOS. Personnel and budget constraints legislated by Congress have demanded that we produce more with less. The Army of Excellence doctrine has streamlined the force and manned our organizations with the highest calibre of soldiers. These realities make it imperative that the MI Noncommissioned Officers of 1985, and beyond, be fully cognizant of the interrelationship between leadership and management if they are to effectively function in the conduct of everyday business.

When we juxtapose leadership responsibilities alongside personnel and resource management requirements, we can readily see that they are inseparable. For example, we cannot counsel subordinates on their performance and productivity without first examining our existing productivity methods and procedures. We cannot provide soldiers with materiel and equipment to do their jobs without continually enforcing a viable supply conservation program. We cannot expect subordinates to work in a high stress environment without prior awareness of potential stress reactions and measures we can take to enable them to cope with that stress. In sum, we must consciously apply tried and proven principles of management to the same degree we apply leadership principles in getting the job done!

A few of us are under the misconception that the art of managing is restricted to senior personnel at higher echelons or reserved for project managers. This is not true. Management consists of planning, organizing, coordinating, supervising, and controlling resources—all of the things that any NCO does on a daily basis. The only difference is the scope and degree of involvement in those processes. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding regarding management skill applications at the lowest echelon has indirectly dissuaded NCOs

from actively pursuing training in management with the same enthusiasm with which they seek leadership training.

Of the aforementioned actions, controlling resources is where MI NCOs can make the most money for their unit. We accept the fact that soldiers are the most valuable resource, followed closely by time. We employ leadership skills to control our subordinates, care for them, and influence them to accomplish their mission. Concurrently, by allocating sufficient time and providing our soldiers adequate materials to do the job, our ability to persuade them to put forth their best effort is greatly enhanced.

Additionally, to be successful in either leadership or management, we must approach each with the same high ethical and moral frame of reference. We must be intellectually honest when dealing in human issues and we can be no less honest when managing any of the resources entrusted to us. By working within these parameters, we create the foundation needed to build a solid and credible organization.

I encourage all members of the MI NCO Corps to make routine use of available publications which deal with leadership, management, and human behavior. If we take a methodical approach to decisionmaking and problem solving, and possess a solid knowledge of the abilities and limitations of our soldiers, we virtually guarantee a productive and contented section. In today's Army, MI NCOs must wear three hats—that of a skilled manager, a fiscally responsible and conservation-oriented assistant to the commander, and a concerned leader of troops. If each NCO in every unit accepts and executes these responsibilities with all their implications, the unit will indeed be the best unit in the Army.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Behind the Lines

One of the great burdens intelligence analysts have had to overcome is the perception by commanders that "intelligence personnel are in their own little world doing things which they alone believe to be important." Today, the Military Intelligence Branch enjoys the confidence of the combat arms commanders because the intelligence field is geared toward responding to the needs of the commander; nonetheless, this confidence had to be earned, and must still be earned each and every day by intelligence analysts who serve at all levels, from the national level to those who work directly for the battalion commander. If each individual member of the intelligence team did not do his or her part, then the phrase, "intelligence is for the commander," would have a hollow ring indeed.

One way that the intelligence analyst of 1986 might fall into the traps of yesteryear is by confusing the process with the desired end of that process: if we fail to view the intelligence process as a means for providing the commander with our best estimate of enemy intentions, then we might become so caught up in that very process that we would blind ourselves to the commander's needs and thus end up with a useless result.

Trainers must be constantly on guard; otherwise, they might place too much emphasis on form and fail to instill in a student a real appreciation of the purpose of any given process.

In an age where attempts are underway to quantify just about every human process or activity, we must not forget the importance of the qualitative dimension. As author Ralph Peters points out, the ability to think critically, to ask the right questions, and to be creative cannot be completely quantified, no matter how hard we try to do it. The individual who can discern the means from the end is an individual who can think clearly and who can best serve the combat commander. Thinking leads to creativity and innovation. Author Anthony Kendail provides some interesting insights on the creative process, a process which is sometimes very much at odds with the military way of doing things.

Perhaps the best example in this issue of comparing the process with the end is the juxtaposition of our two feature articles: the one on the theoretical application of IPB to low intensity conflict and the other on the actual application of IPB principles to a contemporary situation in El Salvador.

If we keep in mind the distinction between the process and the end, whether it be in the technical areas of intelligence or the human intelligence arena, we will guarantee that we will continue to move forward. If we do not, we risk becoming hopelessly muddled in the process itself.

Stephen P. Aul

Editor

FEEDBACK

Editor:

The 522d Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI), 2d Armored Division, recently tested the feasibility of using a high-powered radio jamming system to broadcast air defense early warning information. Non-air defense units, road marching in a tactical formation, are vulnerable to attack by enemy aircraft. Although air defense units receive air defense warning data over AM radios, many maneuver and support units don't receive this information directly. If these units receive this information, they can execute the following actions:

• Passive security measures, such as moving into concealment, "popping smoke," etc.

• Active security measures such as employing organic crew-served and individual weapons against the aircraft.

• Integrated passive and active measures.

To permit maneuver and support units to receive timely air defense warning information, the 522d MI Battalion employed a high-powered radio jammer to broadcast early warning information on the division's "FM" air defense frequency. The radio jammer team monitored the air defense "AM" warning broadcast frequency using one of the several portable AM receivers organic to the battalion. One operator monitored the AM broadcast and immediately passed along the information to the radio jammer operator, who immediately transmitted the information on the preselected "FM" warning frequency. The entire process took place in a few seconds. Divisional units down to company level were able to monitor that FM broadcast.

Using the high-powered radio jammer set to broadcast the early warning broadcast on the FM frequency has the following advantages:

• Increased transmitted power of the jammer sends the signal farther, permitting wider dissemination of the warning to divisional elements moving forward.

• No additional radios are required. Each battalion or company can designate certain elements to "monitor" the warning net using an R-442 receiver, RT-524 transceiver, or other VRC-12 series equipment.

• The jammer employed somewhat to the rear in an "overwatch mode" can compete with any enemy jammers attempting to jam the FM warning frequency.

Any division, using organic high-powered radio jamming equipment, can transmit critically needed air defense early warning to non-air defense units. Implementation of this concept in a particular theater may require further refinement, but using all available resources to accomplish the mission and to conserve resources is a practical concept.

Maj. John D. Skelton
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Board
Fort Huachuca, Az.

Editor:

"The battle of Suomussalmi" (**Military Intelligence,** April-June 1985) was indeed "Finland's Small Stalingrad," made all the more remarkable by the fact that Finland in 1940 was a country of three million people defending themselves against the giant Soviet Union, and not 30 million, as Capt. Garcia states in his article.

Capt. Christine Bendas
Instructor, U.S. Army Signal School
Fort Gordon, Ga.

Editor:

The article "MID(S)" by Col. Tata and Col. Simard (**Military Intelligence,** April-June 1985)was read with enthusiasm and interest. Its publication came at a perfect time.

With the rash of terrorist incidents over the past few years (specifically, the takeover of TWA Flight 847, the truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon, and the many endless worldwide incidents), many individuals in the hierarchy of the U.S. political ladder now acknowledge the necessity for a strong, working, intelligence gathering system—even in peacetime. These individuals were inclined to feel this type of work was peculiar to a wartime climate. Little did they realize that the military intelligence system contains a two-pronged attack, designed and organized to be useful at all times, if properly fielded: First, as reconnaissance for the battlefield intelligence system during wartime and secondly as a civil intelligence gathering network during peacetime.

The need for more current, complete and accurate civil intelligence cannot be emphasized enough. It is of the utmost importance, especially in this fast-paced world of the twentieth century.

As Col. Tata and Col. Simard stated, "detailed information about people, issues, and places is another vital element . . . . "

The spokesman for the TWA hostages, Allyn Conwell, repeated again and again the appalling fact that most Americans had little knowledge of the Middle East. Until the recent crises, many Americans did not know where Lebanon, Syria and Iran were geographically located. Even less was known and understood about their needs and culture.

The United States is understandably very proud of its high technology and almost limitless advances into varied fields of economic and scientific endeavor. Its arsenal of sophisticated weapons is unmatched. In view of this endless array of knowledge, terrorism, which is used to satisfy or obtain the most basic of human needs, has little place. Living in an educated, affluent society, Americans are often unable to identify with terrorism as a means to an end. However, in an uneducated, poverty-stricken society, this is often considered the only means available. Sheik Ibrahim al Amin, chief spokesman of the extremist Shiite faction Hizbullah, stated in **Newsweek,** July 8, 1985: "[The truck bombers] fought these people in the only way they could. These people don't have the same strong quality of weapons as the enemy . . . . "

New Doctrine for a New Challenge

By 1st Lt. Joshua J. Novak and CW2 John W. Stanley Jr.

The AirLand battlefield of the future will be highly fluid, brutal, and brief. The commander will have to react quickly to threats and opportunities. He will need constant updates on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action—in short, immediate and concise intelligence!

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing and evaluating the terrain, weather, and enemy for a specific geographic area. It is the cornerstone of effective intelligence operations and the commander's scheme of maneuver. IPB greatly influences the allocation and employment of collection assets, is the basis for situation development and target development, and establishes the basis for target value analysis. Through the coordinated efforts of IPB and target value analysis, high value targets and high payoff targets are identified.

Although IPB was initially designed within a mid- to high-intensity context, the current and urgent interest in low intensity conflict (LIC) compels us to examine its applicability on this distinct battlefield.

IPB is especially important in LIC because of the imprecise and unpre-dictable nature of that battlefield. IPB operates the same in LIC as it does in higher intensities in that it is a continuous, analytical evaluation process which graphically portrays the intelligence estimate to the commander. However, since IPB is a concept applied to the integrated battlefield, the process becomes much more complicated on the LIC battlefield because there are a greater variety of unconventional "weapons systems," such as psychological operations and civil affairs, to be integrated.

Even before LIC became a pressing concern, the new offensive orientation of AirLand Battle doctrine provided the initial impetus for a re-examination of the IPB process. With the new emphasis on LIC, it became clear that IPB in its previous context required revision. Consequently, the IPB process was restructured so as to retain doctrinal consistency, while applying a more logical approach. This required only minor modifications, which resulted in the five-step pyramidal process being changed to a five-function cyclic process, with certain steps in each function.

Battlefield Area Evaluation

The first function of the new IPB process is battlefield area evaluation. This function has two main objectives: determination of the battlefield area (the areas of operations, influence,and interest); and evaluation of this area in terms of climate, local conditions, and demography. This represents the beginning of the IPB data base effort and, therefore, serves as the logical starting point for all IPB analysis. Indeed, there is no way to accurately evaluate the enemy without first identifying the battlefield area.

Battlefield area evaluation is the beginning of the process that determines the areas of operations, influence, and interest for each commander. These areas are viewed in terms of height (airspace), width,

IPB PROCESS

ANALYSIS

THREAT EVALUATION

BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION

THREAT INTEGRATION

WEATHER ANALYSIS

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

EVALUATION

BATTLEFIELD AREA
WIDTH AND DEPTH

depth, and time—with time being the most important. In LIC, the criteria for determining the areas of operations and influence are similar; however, since both can often be found in urban areas, distinct mission planning is required. With this in mind, a closer examination of the battlefield area follows.

The area of operations is a geographical region assigned to a commander, for which he has responsibility and within which he has the authority to conduct military operations. Each area of operations is assigned using the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T).

The area of influence is determined by the commander and is based on available systems under his command and control. The size of the area is constantly changing since it reflects actions being planned against the enemy, systems available, and the effects of weather, terrain, and time on those systems. It is within this area that the commander is directly able to influence operations. In fact, the commander's ability to attack the enemy by fire and maneuver is one of the factors considered when determining the area of influence.

Under some circumstances an area of influence can be extended beyond the conventional context. Certain internal defense and development operations (psychological operations, civil affairs, and population resource control), when used successfully, can influence enemy action at a very long range.

The area of interest is also determined by the commander and is based on the METT-T factors. It includes the area of influence, adjacent areas, and areas extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This also includes areas occupied by enemy forces which could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.

In LIC, it would be impossible to depict a unit's area of interest on a 1:50,000 scale map. The S2 must, therefore, be familiar with activity taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away, including border areas, neighboring countries, and other areas in the region. He must also be aware of public and political opinion in the home country (the deepest part of the LIC rear battle). Weapons movement, insurgent training, political decisions, general unrest, and refugee movements within these sometimes far-flung areas can have a profound effect on the S2's area of operations.

It is during this initial effort to develop the IPB data base that maps and climatological studies are collected, and local conditions and demography are analyzed. Thus begins the massive effort to fulfill basic intelligence requirements by analyzing political, economic, social, geographic, and military conditions, as well as the current status of insurgent movements. This basic intelligence is then tailored to conform to the specific battlefield area.

IPB has been described as the "homework" of the tactical intelligence officer. However, when preparing for LIC missions, the homework must be much more detailed and much wider in scope than is required in mid- and high-intensity conflicts. This process is complicated even further, since the very nature of LIC is such that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop a threat model.

Terrain Analysis

Terrain analysis, the second function of the IPB process, identifies natural and man-made terrain features that could aid or inhibit combat by either friendly or enemy forces. The results of this analysis determine where enemy forces can move, shoot, and communicate.

Operating at division level or higher, a specially-trained engineer terrain analysis team collects, processes, and disseminates terrain intelligence in conjunction with the all-source production section at the division tactical operations center (DTOC) support element. This team, normally headed by a terrain analysis technician, develops studies and overlays depicting obstacles, cross-country movement, percent of slope, vegetation, soil, and line of sight aspects of the terrain.

The combined obstacles overlay is particularly important since it incorporates all battlefield obstacles into one display. All obstacles are cross-hatched and blank areas indicate where enemy (and friendly) forces can move. This clearly identifies battlefield avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

In an LIC environment, the S2 begins the detailed analysis of the population, which is essentially **the key terrain**. All other terrain factors are secondary to population. The purpose of this analysis is to place the population residing in the battlefield area into groups that share common interests. Group affinities within the conflict must then be evaluated. Although conventional factors and products of terrain analysis may be useful in phase III of an insurgency (see fig. 1), in the earlier phases, cover, concealment, and logistic sustainability (food, water, shelter, medical supplies,

etc.) are vital. When population status and insurgent terrain are evaluated jointly, the most likely areas of insurgent activity and influence emerge.

Three Phases of Insurgency:

Phase I.   Latent and Incipient:
Subversive incidents but no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority.

Phase II.   Guerrilla Warfare:
Subversive support with organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

Phase III.   War of Movement:
Subversives organized into larger, more conventional units which directly confront the established authority.

Ref: FM 100-20

Figure 1

Weather Analysis

Weather analysis is the third function of the IPB process. However, it is essential that the weather's effects be incorporated into the terrain analysis; therefore, terrain should not be analyzed without considering weather. Unlike terrain, which can be physically inspected, weather must always be measured. At division, the staff weather officer and the Air Force weather team provide forecasts, studies, and overlays which are based on an historical data base.

Weather effects overlays and products multiply the value of raw weather data by applying them directly to the commander's data base. Weather affects troops, equipment, weapon systems, trafficability, and, yes, intelligence and electronic warfare operations. For example, rain produces radar clutter and obscures echoes; and freezing temperatures channel radio signals which can result in receivers picking up signals at one elevation but not at another.

Weather analysis in LIC also has its own special considerations. The effects of weather on civil affairs projects, psychological operations media, amounts of accessible food (crops and livestock), storage of explosives, and mass demonstrations are just a few examples. Additionally, insur-

gents can be expected to operate in the worst possible weather.

Clearly, the effects of atmospheric conditions on the battlefield require more than just the traditional analysis of weather information that is received. The commander needs intelligence on the specific effects of weather so as to be able to tailor the scheme of maneuver. There is no other way!

Threat Evaluation

Thus far, the IPB process has examined in detail the battlefield area, including terrain and weather. These factors must be analyzed before evaluating the enemy force since the battlefield area remains relatively constant. On the other hand, enemy forces are always changing. Leadership, equipment, and tactics are constantly in a state of flux, since today's friend may be tomorrow's foe. IPB is a structured analytical process; therefore, it focuses first on the known, then on the unknown.

Threat evaluation, the fourth IPB function, involves the study of the specific forces that affect the outcome of the friendly mission. This systematic approach requires developing a threat data base, evaluating threat capabilities, and constructing doctrinal templates. Developing (or adding to) the threat data base begins with the nine order of battle factors (see fig. 2).

Order of Battle Factors:

1. Composition
2. Disposition
3. Strength
4. Training Status
5. Tactics
6. Logistics
7. Combat Effectiveness
8. Electronic Technical Data
9. Miscellaneous Data

Ref: FMs 34-1 & 34-3

Figure 2

This data base parallels the latest understanding of enemy formations, leadership, and doctrine, using both open and classified sources.

In mid- to high-intensity conflict, once the threat data base has been developed, enemy capabilities can be

evaluated. Primarily, this correlates to the enemy's capability to perform a particular mission with available assets. For example, to perform a river crossing, the threat force must have the proper engineer assets available; if not, the capability does not exist. The threat data base and capabilities are the foundation for doctrinal templates. These are graphic illustrations of enemy force structures, deployments, and capabilities drawn to scale without the battlefield constraints of weather and terrain.

In LIC, threat evaluation should always be conducted simultaneously with other functions and must begin early, since long periods of time are often required to determine the nature of the threat (organization, tactics, goals, or capabilities). Rarely will it be feasible to develop doctrinal templates during phases I and II of an insurgency; skilled insurgents and terrorists simply do not provide the predictable patterns of organization and tactics needed to develop doctrinal templates.

During phase III, however, when insurgents begin to take on the structure of a conventional force, doctrinal templates may be developed for specific units in specific areas attacking specific targets. These are known as "doctrinal/situational" templates and are designed to reduce uncertainty and to aid in the analysis of insurgent indicators within the specified region.

Threat Integration

The nucleus of the IPB process is threat integration. This last function integrates all the previously evaluated data into products useful to the commander and his staff. Threat integration is accomplished through direct coordination between the G2, G3, fire support officer, and others, as needed. By orchestrating situation, event, and decision support templates, the commander can allocate scarce assets to defeat the enemy.

Situation templates, which are normally constructed in threat integration, are hypotheses of how enemy forces might deploy, based on doctrine, terrain, and weather. This is the analyst's best estimate. Using terrain and weather analysis and knowledge of enemy doctrine, the analyst deduces the logical options that are available to the enemy commander. Thus, uncertainty is reduced using

these "snapshots." However, since LIC is, to a great extent, situationally dependent, the situation templates are actually developed during the threat evaluation function.

From these situation templates, indicators of activity can be established. Intelligence collection on the indicators (or potential indicators) occurs through the use of named areas of interest (NAI). Depicted **only** on the event template, NAI are areas or points, usually along a mobility corridor, where activity (or the lack of it) will either confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Additionally, the depiction of NAI is enhanced through the use of time-phased lines.

vation for collection assets. During a conflict, the NET/NLT times would first be predicted, then adjusted by actual observations from collection assets targeted against enemy movements. Thus, the event template and the event analysis matrix are **vital** to the intelligence collection effort—they specify where to look, when to look, and what to look for.

In LIC, pattern analysis overlays are equivalent to event templates. Since information in LIC rarely becomes obsolete, all information taken from the current situation map is portrayed on one or a series of pattern

of collection assets.

Another graphic aid which is useful in determining NAI is the target analysis overlay. At the onset of insurgent activity, this overlay displays all potential targets (people and places) within the area of operations. As more information becomes available on the methods and goals of individual insurgent groups, potential future targets can be isolated. When the target analysis overlay is compared with pattern analysis overlays, additional NAI can be pinpointed.

Although the event analysis matrix has little application in LIC, the correlation between the type of events, groups, and historical dates remains an important analytical tool. Historical date-time line analysis reveals the importance of dates in insurgency movements and can provide another tool for limited prediction, which could help the commander anticipate and defeat future enemy actions.

The ultimate objective of threat integration is to provide time-phased options which the commander can use to defeat the enemy. The decision support template is, as its name implies, developed specifically to aid the commander in making decisions.

Through effective staff coordination, the target areas of interest, decision point clusters, and time-phased lines are graphically portrayed on the decision support template. A target area of interest is an area or point, usually along a mobility corridor. It can also be an engagement area where the interdiction of enemy forces by fire, maneuver, and/or jamming will negate or reduce a particular enemy capability. This interdiction point can also cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action, or to require the use of unusual support to continue operations. In the latter option, target areas of interest must be terrain dependent to inhibit or deny movement.

A decision point cluster is a series of decision points equating to critical areas where a commander can make a decision to engage enemy forces. These engagement options may be in the form of maneuver or may involve the use of electronic warfare (jamming), field artillery fire, air support, or naval fire.

A time-phased line is depicted as H+1, 2, etc. across a mobility corridor or avenue of approach, and is based

Event Template

H
H+1
H+2
H+3
H+4
H+5
H+6

35
30
10
20

Map Sheet Name
Map sheet Number
Map Sheet Series
Map Scale
Prepared By:

LEGEND

Bridge/Overpass

NAI .... ①

CLASSIFICATION

ally, the depiction of NAI is enhanced through the use of time-phased lines.

The event analysis matrix is used in conjunction with the event template. Using the terrain-based rates of movement, estimated times during which the enemy will activate NAI can be computed. The no earlier than (NET) and no later than (NLT) times are used to establish windows of obser-

analysis overlays. Information can be maintained by the type of actions, insurgent groups, or by date-time groups. Pattern analysis provides the S2 a tool for limited prediction of future insurgent actions, their possible targets, and boundaries of operation and influence. As patterns begin to emerge, NAI can be designated, which results in the most efficient use

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

H
H+1
H+2
H+3
H+4
H+5
H+6

35
30
10
20

5.0.

Map Sheet Name
Map sheet Number
Map Sheet Series
Map Scale
Prepared By:

LEGEND

TAI ....◁

Decision Point ....☆

Time Phase Lines ......H+1 ∿

Subsequent Objective .. ⬡ 5.0

NO GO Terrain............

CLASSIFICATION

location where these decisions **can** be made by the commander in order to exploit tactical maneuver options. Decisions must be made early enough, preferably in the area of interest, so that they can be implemented in time to achieve the desired results. However, decisions cannot be made until there are indicators that certain battlefield events have occurred and that locations have been accurately determined.

Thus, decision points relate friendly reaction times to specific points on the battlefield, and the time-phased lines indicate probable enemy locations based on rates of movement modified by terrain and weather constraints.

In phase III of LIC, the decision support templates are quite similar to those used in conventional warfare. In phases I and II, however, the decision support template will look substantially different since it must reflect the level of intensity in the conflict. Generally, this template displays:

• Areas of likely insurgent activity and influence, including insurgent-controlled terrain (the results of the terrain analysis function).

• Potential future insurgent targets and objectives (the results of pattern and/or target analysis during the threat integration function).

• Target areas of interest.

Pattern analysis overlays and target analysis overlays will also help identify target areas of interest, the interdiction of which may cause the insurgent to abandon certain courses of action or significantly reduce the ability to continue operations. The discovery of critical caches of supplies and the identification of insurgent training facilities are two good examples of how combat in an LIC environment is supported by effective intelligence. Population groups can also be target areas of interest. They can be "interdicted" through the use of psychological operations or other internal defense and development operations which may reduce the insurgent support base and, thus, the ability to continue operations.

LIC target areas of interest need to be specifically designated to describe the type of target and the LIC "weapon system" likely to be used by friendly

on enemy rates of movement as modified by terrain and weather constraints.

Through event templating and the use of event analysis matrices, areas on the battlefield are identified where significant events and activities are likely to occur and where targets can be located. Decision support templates identify those areas where enemy or terrain targets can be attacked to support the commander's concept of the mission. It also relates projected battlefield events and targets to the commander's decision-making cycle so that integrated combined arms teams using maneuver, artillery, close-air support, jamming, or other resources can be deployed.

The identification of target areas of interest is a joint effort between intelligence, operations, and the field artillery fire support coordinator. The intelligence staff evaluates enemy

forces and develops the recommended target list. The operations staff considers the availability of combat resources and establishes mission priorities. And, based on this combined analysis, the fire support coordinator aids in the establishment of targets.

Following the selection of target areas of interest, decision point clusters are identified. The location of decision point clusters is largely influenced by the availability and capability of friendly fire and maneuver systems; therefore, their selection is primarily a G3 or S3 function. However, this task also requires the coordinated efforts of the G2/S2 and the fire support coordinator. **Every** target area of interest must have a series of decision points or a decision point cluster.

Decision points identify those battlefield events which require tactical decisions and indicate the time and

Tactical Intelligence in

Low Intensity Conflict

by Capt. Geoffrey B. Demarest

The following article is based on observations by the author during a temporary duty tour as intelligence trainer to the 4th Salvadoran Infantry Brigade from August to December 1984. The 4th Brigade is headquartered in El Paraiso, Chalatenango Department, in northern El Salvador. Chalatenango has been one of the most contested zones during the Salvadoran war.

Units of the 4th Infantry Brigade operated in an area fixed on the north by the Honduran border and guided on the south, west, and east by the River Lempa and its large reservoir, Embalse Cerron Grande. Chalatenango covers approximately 2,000 square kilometers and has one urban center, Chalatenango City. Battalions were commanded by captains and first lieutenants and had no staff officers or staff sections. Any comparison to U.S. unit organization is, therefore, more appropriate between the Salvadoran brigade and the U.S. battalion. On the other hand, the brigade is the largest Salvadoran unit and in many ways is better equated in its role to a U.S. division. The brigade could count on dedicated artillery support of at least one battery of

105mm howitzers. Other Salvadoran units would often participate in operations within the zone. The exact number of enemy was not well established and often depended on whether or not the *masa* (camp followers, families, etc.) were included.

The type of combat which the Salvadorans experienced probably falls within current U.S. military definitions of low intensity conflict. No mechanized or armor units were employed. Nevertheless, the Salvadorans applied all the military resources available to them, maneuvering battalion-sized elements in order to close with and destroy organized enemy units in the field. While the army was oriented toward eliminating enemy units, the guerrillas could attack any form of property, public or private, and claim such acts as evidence of their strength relative to the government security forces. The guerrillas also had the unattractive willingness to use civilian populations, including their own *masa*, as hostages for protection against indirect fire.

While there were many other factors which are worth noting, the battlefield, as briefly described above, forms the general context for the

following statements on tactical intelligence. The overall lessons might be summarized as follows:

- Human intelligence deserves emphasis in low intensity conflict. The current efforts to incorporate more low intensity conflict subject matter at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School will be profitable.

- CEWI units may face requirements to ready more MI teams for attachment directly to brigade S2 shops.

Information Processing

Establishment of a tactical operations center (TOC) through which all operational radio, telephone, and radio-teletype traffic flows is a solid doctrinal practice. This is especially evident when watching a brigade-sized unit attempt to manage information without a TOC. The 4th Infantry Brigade was in the process of putting together a well-protected TOC at the headquarters in El Paraiso. Before this was accomplished, incoming information entered the *cuartel* at multiple points.

When maneuvering larger units in certain parts of the zone, it was necessary to use forward command

posts; but the bulk of tactical communications to and from the brigade was generally controlled at the *cuartel*. Although the commercial telephone switchboard was to remain in a separate building, the TOC would also become the message center, making it much easier to coordinate and process information.

Information management begins with the continual use of a daily staff journal or log. The form used by the brigade was almost exactly like our DA Form 1594 and, when maintained, works perfectly as a summary, index, and audit document for tactical information. The form doesn't need to be typed, but if there is a slow period (during the night shift, for instance), it should be. This ensures that someone is actually trying to make sense out of every written item. It is a good idea to use a two-color ribbon, using one color for incoming and the other color for outgoing messages. When message traffic is heavy, there is nothing wrong with filling in two forms at once. They can be put back together later. However, everyone must be equally competent in comp'eting the form, and the shift leader must make sure the separate forms stay together.

There are probably dozens of good ways to post the map. The best rule of thumb is to start by asking the commander what he wants to see. By itself, the commander's input may not be enough, since he is probably not totally aware of what kind of presentation is actually possible. The following paragraphs describe one method of displaying information.

Prepare the base map by highlighting grid coordinates and permanent boundaries, etc. On the plastic which covers the base map put fixed or semifixed friendly locations. Prepare an order of battle overlay which shows all known enemy camps. The enemy probably moves from camp to camp fairly frequently, using some camps much more often than others. Display the camps in which enemy presence was last known or suspected in red. Camps currently considered inactive display in beige. Small press-on adhesive signal dots work very well. They stay on, are easy to see, and keep the overlay clean. Unit symbols can also be drawn on the order of battle overlay to summarize what is known about the enemy in those camps marked in red. Key supply

routes, known storage locations, unit boundaries, and other semipermanent aspects of enemy presence can also be shown. Information should be removed from the order of battle overlay when it is considered no longer relevant. Also prepare a current intelligence overlay showing any incidents, enemy sightings, or enemy activities such as ambushes, propaganda dissemination, tax collection, etc. (see fig. 1). The same red dots used on the order of battle overlay

can be used for these current activities.

On either overlay, the red color highlights to the commander the most recent or most likely enemy presence. Letters, such as A for ambush and P for propaganda, can be placed on the dot to indicate the type of activity. A specific unit designation may never accompany a report on enemy activity of this type, but if the enemy unit size or designation is known, such information can be displayed on the cur-

---

SUGGESTED SYMBOLOGY FOR ORDER OF BATTLE AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OVERLAYS

1. **BASIC COLORS ON ORDER OF BATTLE OVERLAY.**

   a. LOCATION OF ACTIVE CAMPS .... RED
   b. LOCATION OF INACTIVE OR UNCONFIRMED CAMPS .... BEIGE
   c. RECENTLY ACTIVE LOGISTIC ROUTE .... RED
   d. INACTIVE LOGISTIC ROUTE .... BEIGE
   e. ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAMS AND EXPLANATIONS................................. BLACK

2. **BASIC COLORS ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OVERLAY.**

   a. ENEMY ACTIONS AND SIGHTING .... RED
   b. ENEMY ACTIONS AND SIGHTING REPORTED WITHIN PAST 24 HOURS .... ORANGE
   c. EXPLANATIONS................................. BLACK
   d. SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS .... GREEN

3. **BASIC SYMBOLS FOR ORDER OF BATTLE OVERLAY.**

   a. COMBAT UNITS.................................
   b. MASS ORGANIZATION OR POLITICAL UNIT........
   c. BASE CAMP ....
   d. LOGISTIC CENTER ....
   e. LOGISTIC ROUTES ....
   f. CACHES... C

4. **BASIC SYMBOLS FOR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OVERLAY.**

   a. LOCATION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY ....
   b. SIGNIFICANT ENEMY MOVEMENT ....
   c. HARASSMENT, ATTACK ON CIVIL POPULATION ..... H
   d. TAX COLLECTION, ROBBERY .... T
   e. PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.......................... P
   f. AMBUSH, FIREFIGHT .... A
   g. KIDNAPPING .... K
   h. RECONNAISSANCE .... R
   i. SIGHTING, INCLUDING SIGINT .... S

Figure 1

rent intelligence overlay. Try displaying information which has reached the TOC within the last 24 hours in a different shade of red or in orange. This way it is easy to see what is new, and it shows how well the intelligence collection effort is going. For instance, when there are no orange marks, it may visually indicate loss of contact with the enemy. After 24 hours, orange entries should be changed to red. Dots on the current intelligence overlay should not be dated and items should be cleaned from the overlay after some fixed length of time based on experience with the

flow of information. Three weeks may be a good trial period or it may be preferable not to clean any items from the current intelligence overlay but instead to start new sheets every few weeks. This way a visual history of activities can be created and might be used to spot trends. A periodic photo snapshot of the overlay might also be useful for visualizing trends, and this would preclude the necessity of starting over or copying entire overlays.

When the two overlays are put together, they will suggest a relationship between enemy camps and current

activities. Unit size designations may seem a problem since there will probably be a number of semiautonomous guerrilla organizations which use their own size designations. A section may be smaller or larger than a detachment, and a battalion may range in size from what we would call a small company to a small brigade, if *masa* are included. There may be separate unit designations for groups of *masa* and for political units. For clarity, use size designators and symbology equivalent to U.S. units. For instance, indicate a unit of 40 combatants to be a platoon, then include in parentheses, or somewhere else, the designator used by the enemy. To differentiate a political or support unit from a combat unit, it may be handy to use a different shape symbol (see fig. 1 also).

A grid coordinate register, such as the one described in FM 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*, is a necessary tool for keeping track of detailed tactical information.[1] The register is easy to organize as it follows the map grids. It provides a file for reconnaissance photos, and the squares can be put together to form larger area studies. A single 1km grid at 1/5000 scale fits a normal size sheet of typing paper, and several copies of the grid sheets can be put in each folder labeled with a 4-digit coordinate. The tactical area of responsibility for a brigade-sized unit may be too large to maintain a folder for every 4-digit grid. Begin with those grids for which a red dot is displayed on the order of battle overlay. For U.S. operations, the grid coordinate register may be best kept at battalion level with the brigade using a 3x3km or 5x5km grid system. A gazetteer should be obtained or established to cross-reference common names with the coordinate system used in the file. The grid coordinate register keeps the situation maps from being cluttered. If the commander asks for an elaboration of information indicated on the sitmap, the S2 will be able to quickly find whatever additional information is available. The coordinate register will not be suitable for information on population centers such as the name of the current mayor or a planned public dance. For this kind of information, it is a good idea to keep a "towns file" (see fig. 2).

The order of battle card example given in FM 30-5 is of little use in this kind of conflict, but that doesn't mean

TOWNS FILE

FRONT

Place Name:				
UTM Coordinates:		GEO Coordinates:		
Population: Men-	Women-	Children-	Seniors-	Total
primary organizations				
Churches:				
Schools:				
Other				
Key Personalities				
name		position		address and notations

REVERSE

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	
date	description
outline of popular attitudes toward the war	
Condition of Key public services:	

Note: It may be better to use 5"x8" cards or full file sheets. The entry blocks can also be numbered and a computer used to automatically cross reference and enter data.

Figure 2

it isn't a good idea to keep such a record.[2] Enemy units will have nicknames and code names, related political organizations, and a mix of weaponry which will help in tracking the unit. An order of battle card format can be designed to fit the situation (see fig. 3). Guerrilla unit organization is often described as being very complex; but, while there may ostensibly be an intricate relationship of cells and fire teams, it will likely become obvious that there is disorganization below the platoon level and often below company level. Above platoon level, the enemy organization may appear complicated by political and support units. However, if all the named organizations and key leaders are separated out, the formation of clean plumbing diagrams is possible.

A personality file is another useful record. Almost every enemy leader will have a pseudonym or nickname. He may also have a radio operator, and both of them will probably have girlfriends or boyfriends whom they visit when on leave. Even incomplete notes on lovers, relatives, habits of movement and physical description can lead to captures (see fig. 4).

Together, the grid coordinate register, the order of battle or unit file, the personalities file, and the population file will contain most of the information about the enemy and terrain needed to conduct operations. Some more detailed or more delicate information will be kept in separate counterintelligence or positive human intelligence files. Nevertheless, by cross-indexing the map through the coordinate register to the journal, all the information can be traced. Some other forms may be useful for presentations or may be requested from a higher echelon. The Salvadoran G2 distributed worksheets for certain statistics such as number of enemy deserters during the month or "urban buses burned." They didn't represent much work and could be prepared by extracting information from the four basic files. The method of posting the maps and the various file formats will be adjusted to the situation and to the convenience of the analysts. The methods offered above are only suggestions. However, because of the need to quickly invent or change details of the information processing system, a personal computer would be a very useful tool.

Intelligence Collection

The most important information for tactical and psychological operations planning usually came from interrogations. The problems experienced by the 4th Brigade may not be encountered by a U.S. unit or by another host country unit in a similar situation. However, in view of their possible future application, key difficulties in the area of intelligence interrogations are as follows:

• Prisoner handling was initially poor. Brutality was almost never the problem. The problem usually involved the inability to quickly transfer the prisoner to a point where a trained interrogator could begin to work. Several important prisoners waited days before being questioned prop-

erly. They gave information which led to searches of caches which had meanwhile been moved. The SOP for prisoner handling gave the brigade a fixed period of time to conduct an initial interrogation prior to evacuating a prisoner to the national level for a more thorough interrogation. However, after evacuating the prisoner, the brigade was unlikely to receive timely results of the more complete interrogation. Furthermore, since the shortage of trained interrogators generally caused the brigade to request interrogator support from the national level anyway, it seemed logical to conduct the most thorough interrogations possible at brigade level.

• The questioning of noncombatant

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD

FRONT

REVERSE

Figure 3

civilians also suffered from the lack of trained interrogators. Many civilians visited the brigade *cuartel* to volunteer information. These walk-ins were generally handled by the S2 himself during whatever time he had available. For the volume of work which the 4th Brigade faced, about six fully capable interrogators could have been employed. Most days there were no prisoners. However, they could have received walk-ins, manned pedestrian checkpoints at towns where there had been recent incidents, taken census data, or collected other psychological operations intelligence. The S2 was considering the purchase of a telephone answering machine so he could promote a hotline. The interrogation team could also be used to manage the hotline. Many of the soldiers have parents or other relatives living in contested territory. They visit home during leave and often pick up valuable information. The interrogation team could be tasked to better tap this source of information. Finally, they could be used to train the battalions in prisoner handling.

• Prisoner confinement capacity had been very limited. There were no adequate cells, so a small facility was being built. The situation required space for keeping about four to six key prisoners for periods of two or three weeks, space to keep up to 20 prisoners for two to four days, and a suitable area for maintaining larger groups of detainees for brief periods.

• The interrogators had to be fully briefed on the enemy situation. Some problems in questioning by less experienced interrogators came from their lack of awareness about the current tactical situation. There was also a strong tendency to follow an interrogation checklist and fail to ask imaginative questions which might lead to an operation or have some psychological value. Some of the more interesting and successful questions were: "When one of the women is pregnant, where does she have her child?" "Is the mail carried in anything special?" and "Where does the commander sleep?"

The promise of a low-level informant net in low intensity conflicts is obvious; and, if the tactical war becomes reduced by government success, a more sophisticated and more precisely targeted intelligence effort will be needed in order to pursue the smaller, terror-oriented enemy which will remain. As with interrogators, it is an advantage to organize nets from the brigade level so that the net organizers may be continually briefed on the current tactical situation.

Technical Collection

While human intelligence is very rich in detail, it is also confusing and dubious. Sources not only didn't remember well, forgot, and disagreed, they also just flat-out lied. Usually the lie had nothing to do with political intent or even that the source didn't want to cooperate. But whatever the reason, human intelligence in this kind of situation needs to be backed up by a body of more dependable data. However, it would be overreaching to say that human intelligence will be "confirmed" by other data. More often, the information from human sources will only be made more plausible. Aerial photo reconnaissance can be one of the anchors of brigade operational intelligence. While aerial reconnaissance often doesn't tell as much as is asked of it, it is a start for pinpointing enemy camps and determining which are active and inactive. For best results, in terms of acceptance and use of the intelligence, photos should be given to the user with overlays highlighting evidence used to support whatever analysis is proffered. Close liaison between the S2 and supporting photo reconnaissance is important for a timely, useful product.

Signals intelligence earned the most

PERSONALITIES CARD

FRONT

COMPLETE NAME:			
List of Pseudonyms/Nicknames:			
occasions mentioned			
date	mentioning reports	name used	locations and other notes
identifying characteristics			
height:	weight:	eyes:	skin:
hair:	other marks:		accent
habit of dress:			
other			

REVERSE

COMPLETE NAME:		
Duties or Position:		
close associations-include friends, relatives, lovers, etc.		
name	relationship	whereabouts
Habits of Travel or Movement:		
Known Weaknesses and Capture Possibilities:		

Figure 4

immediate positive reactions; and while complaints were aired about its being incomplete, it provided the only real-time intelligence witnessed. Ground sensors, such as the new REMBASS, have great potential for use in low intensity situations. In Chalatenango, there were only about five strategic targets which earned special allocation of government resources for their defense. The approaches to a few of these targets are well canalized, the soil is suitable for use of the seismic detectors, and there are good repeater locations to assure line-of-sight FM reception. Such factors suggest the potential use of the sensors in a defensive role. During the offense, friendly units would sweep an area hoping to surprise guerrillas in their hideouts, or at least oblige them to move without being able to carry everything with them. A set of sensors could be planted in the wake of an initial sweep, giving commanders of the follow-on sweeps some instant enemy movement information. Some active enemy camps were located in difficult terrain with a limited number of routes (20 to 30 in a 15km^2 area) in and out. By locating sensors along likely escape routes, the enemy could be chased without wasting as much manpower.

Collection Planning

It is unlikely that a collection plan based on the use of a worksheet could be put to efficient use in this kind of situation. For one thing, priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR) have to be handled somewhat differently for collection management in low intensity conflict. In the 4th Brigade, traditional PIR were habitually included in the intelligence annex to operations plans and subsequently ignored. "What is the location and strength of enemy units?" is too broad and obvious a question to be useful as a guide for the collection effort. One way to handle this problem is through the publication of a hierarchy of intelligence questions (see fig. 5). Split the hierarchy in two branches, one for tactical questions and one for psychological operations (PSYOP) questions. Split the tactical branch again under "How can we kill or capture the enemy?" and "Will the enemy attack?" Define the questions

further until all of the general but relevant questions are in the hierarchy. Provide the document to all officers as a guide to understanding the mission of the S2 shop. It may even be a good idea to have all the S2 personnel memorize the list. Questions that appear in operations orders or in requests for information to higher echelons should be specifications of questions that appear in the hierarchy. Requests for locations can be specified by time and area. The general questions may or may not appear on a request, but the requestor should be able to explain where each request fits into the order of questions. Figure 6 shows a collection planning aid which can be used by workers in the S2 shop to suggest detailed questions. Every other block is used by the shop worker, leaving a space beneath for the S2 or the S2 NCO to approve the question or reword it. When approved, the shop worker can send the request in a message, annotate the collection planning aid, and keep it as a suspense file for answers. This way the S2 can exercise the S2 shop workers' ability to ask pertinent and detailed questions on a regular basis without the continued presence of the S2. Taking advantage of finished intelligence products from outside agencies requires an understanding of the agencies' capabilities and requires more detailed requests. In the case of El Salvador, one of the outside agencies available to produce finished intelligence was the Central American Joint Intelligence Team. The products were excellent but, of course, needed to be reconciled with locally produced intelligence. In this regard, liaison by the outside agency to the brigade was especially helpful.

Security

Maintaining adequate operational security was a difficult challenge. The headquarters had been overrun a few months earlier and it was generally agreed that there had been collaboration from inside the camp. It also appeared that operations plans were being compromised. To increase operational security, fewer and fewer persons were included in planning until right before operations kicked off. This provided greater operations security but it also cost a great deal in coordination and preparation. Having an operations/message center

A. TACTICAL QUESTIONS

I. How can we kill or capture the enemy?

  A. Where will the enemy be when we are in position to destroy him?

    1. Where is the enemy?

    2. Where has the enemy been?

    3. What are the routes of enemy escape or reinforcement?

    4. How fast can the enemy move in each direction?

    5. What are the weather influences?

    6. What means of moving does the enemy possess?

  B. What advantages and capabilities does the enemy have which might help him avoid his destruction? (What is the strength of the enemy?)

    1. How many enemy are there?

    2. What descriptions are available?

    3. What materiel does he have?

    4. What is the condition of his morale?

  C. What is the enemy doing?

    1. What is the enemy planning?

    2. What is the enemy practicing?

    3. What type of defensive preparations is he making?

    4. What is the nature of his patrolling?

    5. What are his objectives?

  D. What has the enemy done?

    1. What are his movement habits? (By what routes has he moved?)

    2. What are his habits of organizing for the defense and for the offense?

Figure 5

HIERARCHY OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

II. Will the enemy attack? If so, when, where and in what strength will he attack?

  A. What are the terrain influences?

    1. Where is the enemy?

    2. Where has the enemy been?

    3. What are the most important targets from the enemy point of view?

    4. What are the routes toward these targets?

    5. How much time does the enemy need to reach each target?

  B. What is the strength of the enemy?

    1. How many enemy are there?

    2. What descriptions are available?

    3. What materiel does he have?

    4. What is the condition of his morale?

  C. What is the enemy doing?

    1. What is he planning?

    2. What is he practicing?

  D. What has the enemy done?

    1. What are his habits of movement?

    2. What are his habits of organization?

    3. What are his habits of communication?

    4. What are his habits of security/patrolling?

I. How can we change the resolve of the audience?

  A. What are the physical influences and restrictions?

    1. Where is the audience?

    2. With what means of communication can we reach the audience?

  B. What are the basic characteristics of the audience?

    1. How many persons form the audience?

    2. What are their descriptions?

    3. What things do they have and what do they need or claim/feel they need?

    4. Who are the leaders of the audience?

    5. What are the objects of their resolve?

    6. What is the level or condition of their resolve?

  C. What is the audience doing?

    1. What is the audience planning (including dances, games, etc.)?

    2. What type of education, indoctrination, propaganda does the audience receive?

  D. What has the audience done?

    1. What are the habits of movement?

    2. What are the habits of receiving information?

    3. What are the habits of communication?

II. How can we combat the influence of enemy propaganda?

  A. What are the targets of enemy propaganda?

  B. When is he going to attack with propaganda?

  C. With what kind of propaganda will he attack?

NOTE: Counter-propaganda methods include the following:

    1. Destroy the enemy propaganda source.

    2. Indoctrinate/educate the audience to resist enemy propaganda.

    3. Prevent reception by the audience of the enemy propaganda.

    4. Re-educate the audience or respond after reception of enemy propaganda.

As such, the detailed intelligence questions supporting counter-propaganda are the same as those written above for tactical operations.

Psychological questions consider four general audiences (the enemy, the civilian population, our own troops, and foreign audiences). The questions are directed toward determining the level and object of resolve of the individuals in each audience and how to reach the audiences with our messages in order to change resolve. The decision to attempt to change the resolve of a given audience follows an opinion regarding the probable future actions of that audience. Therefore, the psychological questions share with tactical questions the same premise regarding prediction. That premise is as follows:

To predict action the four areas of observable evidence are: 1. What are the past actions? 2. What are the current actions? 3. What are the physical capabilities? and 4. What is the influence of the environment?

with strictly controlled access and disciplined use of secure communications would obviously have helped. It was likely that operational information was being passed over non-secure telephone lines. Plans may have been leaked inadvertently by the same leaders who were trying to protect the information by denying it to their subordinates.

Polygraph testing is an effective way to increase confidence in the reliability of operations center personnel or in anyone having access to sensitive information. In a situation where it is difficult to do a thorough background investigation, polygraph exams are a way to probe reliability. They take time and require trained operators, but an examining program may well be worth whatever planning problems it involves. New voice-stress analyzers should be considered as they require little operator training and because examinations can be made surreptitiously and quickly. Use of either type of system may involve legal issues respecting individual privacy; these issues should be studied thoroughly prior to implementing an expensive program.

Perhaps the best way to avoid a compromise of friendly operations is to move and respond to information quickly. Obviously, if information from prisoners or informants is acted upon quickly, and operations have small target areas and modest objectives, the danger of an infiltrator within the unit is greatly neutralized as he or she will be unable to pass timely information.

Psychological Operations

While the collection planning worksheet may not be suitable, a worksheet, something like that found in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs*, may be very usable for PSYOP intelligence collection planning.[3] The "Remarks and Analysis" block could be enlarged. In fact, it could reasonably take up half the form. This modification allows the collection worksheets to also be used as an analysis workbook. Analysis of answers to PSYOP questions should be oriented toward asking more and better questions. Because of this, it is handy to make analytical notes on the collection requests plan.

The S2 will be extremely interested in all aspects of the psychological operations effort. The four general

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WORKSHEET		
Name of Preparer:	Date:	
Hierarchy of Questions (optional)		
Specific Question or Request	Agency	Date of Response

Figure 6

audiences will probably be: enemy troops, civilians, friendly troops, and international audiences. The enemy troops will be targeted with surrender campaigns (in El Salvador $250 was offered to any guerrilla who would turn himself or herself in with his or her weapon). While this was PSYOP, it was as much an intelligence operation since the reward was given really not for the weapon but for the interrogation that came with it. It was important that the individual enemy's morale be reduced by the PSYOP campaign not only at the point of surrender, but also to the point of possible collaboration. From there, the interrogator could take over and finish the job of PSYOP.

Propaganda directed at the civilian audience interests the S2 because, if the civilians wish to cooperate (as they did in El Salvador), the most obvious PSYOP goal will be to raise their resolve to such a level that they will risk giving information in the face of possible guerrilla retribution. In El Salvador the weapon turn-in program was flexible enough to include payment to civilians for useful information about the enemy.

Our own or friendly troops are reached in more traditional ways through command information programs and hopefully the continued interest of a responsible chain of command. Important to the S2 will be messages dealing with security awareness. Hopefully, morale will remain elevated to a level which en-

sures that few troops will fall vulnerable to an act of treason and will report suspected treasonous or careless acts. It is important that soldiers be well informed regarding the goals of the command and the reasons for fighting.

While propaganda considerations involving the international audience may have less direct interest to the S2 in terms of tactical intelligence collection, the S2 must at least be aware of the impact all of his intelligence activities have or might have on international opinion. The S2 may be directly or indirectly responsible for the control of information moving to ostensibly neutral organizations such as press services or the Red Cross. A balance must often be struck between the risk to operational security and the risk to favorable public opinion.

Population Resource Control

Permanent vehicle checkpoints were maintained at key points on the trunk highways, and temporary checkpoints were established in support of operations or other events. The brigade became better and better at conducting vehicle searches without abusing or offending the public. The brigade suffered several mobile ambushes along the north/south highway which splits the department. Usually someone riding in the back of a small car or truck would strafe a group of two or three soldiers as they patrolled along the road. As these ambushes occurred not far south of

the permanent checkpoint, improving vehicle searches at the checkpoint became a clear goal. Drivers and passengers recognized the threat posed by the vehicles to the soldiers and were patient with the inconveniences.

It is harder for the civilian to accept the inconvenience of a pedestrian checkpoint, since the walking civilian poses less threat to the soldiers than might a vehicle. An elderly person in a vehicle understands why the vehicle must be stopped, but has a harder time understanding why he or she must be stopped. Still, while the primary objective for stopping vehicles is to interdict the movements of supplies, weapons, and likely enemy, the primary objective of the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information. Therefore, correct soldier behavior is all the more important at the pedestrian checkpoint. Some tips for successful pedestrian checkpoints in similar situations are:

- Interview passers-by individually and in private.

- Give each person approximately the same amount of time whether or not he or she is providing any information.

- Have ready a reasonable way for the individual to contact the unit if he or she has more information to give than time allows.

- Offer each individual a comfort item such as coffee, cigarettes, or candy, as appropriate and available.

- Apologize for and explain the need for a brief search.

- Have someone politely organize those individuals waiting to be questioned, if there are any.

- Be unobtrusive with weaponry, but provide all-around security.

- Use a trained interrogator, if possible.

- Don't try to control too large an area—better to manage half the village completely than the whole town poorly.

- Don't act immediately on information given by a pedestrian if that would compromise the cooperation of the pedestrian.

- Offer women the opportunity to have another woman present if they wish, and try whenever possible to have a woman conduct female searches.

Many of these suggestions, which are based on the most common mistakes, are aimed at improving the confidence and security of the individual who wishes to speak.

For a period of time, the enemy had attempted to destroy the civilian personal identification system by burning local records and taking away everyone's identification papers. This was an understandable goal since the ability to check individual origins and bonafides is so important to successful counterinsurgency. When individuals are missing personal identification, some method of providing them with an ID (including a photograph) should be established.

Census data were lacking in the zone and efforts were being made to collect data beginning in the small towns nearest the garrison. Having village census data is extremely valuable for the conduct of pedestrian checkpoints. The census-taking process may identify the relatives of guerrillas or gain other information useful in building pinpoint PSYOP messages. Other basic PSYOP intelligence data can also be collected during the census. The idea of a census may seem overwhelming to us if we think in terms of the monumental task of counting 240 million Americans. However, the census of a village of 185 persons can be very helpful in keeping track of their comings and goings.

Conclusion

Listed below are some of the lessons learned from this operation and their application to U.S. tactical intelligence.

- CEWI units must prepare more cellular teams for attachment as needed to battalion and brigade S2 shops. Battalion and brigade S2 positions need to be filled with officers capable of leading human intelligence operations as well as technical intelligence collection in their tactical areas of responsibility. These officers need to be equally proficient in positive and counter-human intelligence since the practical difference between the two in this type of conflict may fade. It may also be worth the time it takes to more thoroughly train intelligence officers in interrogation techniques since they are likely to work with interrogation teams and because they may have to help train needed interrogators.

- In the 4th Brigade an S2 platoon of 35 appeared adequate; but, if a ground sensor system were introduced or a separate PSYOP intelligence section added, the usable size might increase by two or three members. The brigade had a separate S5 section in charge of civil action and PSYOP; and, due to the particular approach of the S5, the S2 shop had only indirect participation in PSYOP. Nevertheless, the S2 and S5 shops will have to work very closely in U.S. operations. Our intelligence officers can expect to receive more instructions on techniques of collection, processing, and using PSYOP intelligence. Thus, an increase in the number of PSYOP intelligence subjects presented to basic and advanced course students is warranted.

- The brigade S2 section included no women, but it was recognized as a weakness, so the S2 was working on adding female members. Women would have been very effective as interrogators since there were a number of female prisoners and many female informants. There will clearly be a need for female intelligence personnel. Rather than attempting to avoid using women in units which are likely to be deployed to a combat zone, MI units may be better off ensuring that they have sufficient female linguists for their contingency areas—otherwise units are sure to face a very limited ability to properly exploit many information opportunities.

- The situation of the 4th Salvadoran Brigade must be partially discounted as a model for the construction of an approach to tactical intelligence anywhere else. Even within El Salvador during the same period, other brigade areas faced different problems. Also, lessons must be applied differently to U.S. combat operations than to operations involving a "host country" with U.S. support. The latter will surely include a unique mix of problems of resources, training, social habits, enemy tactics, and population attitudes.

- The basics of tactical intelligence taught at Fort Huachuca proved very useful and correct, although most of the details, such as map overlays, order of battle cards, and interrogation

checklists, needed to be changed to fit the "low intensity" environment. The new emphasis being placed on incorporating low intensity conflict into MI doctrine and course materials is an important step in the effort to apply the basics of tactical intelligence to the low intensity environment.

• Considering the weight of human intelligence and what is arguably a need for brigade or battalion S2s to lead human intelligence operations, more training emphasis could be put on interrogation and prisoner management, positive human intelligence, and counter-human intelligence. At the same time, any current notion that there is overuse of hard technologies for intelligence collection should be dismissed. Signals intelligence, aerial photography, remotely piloted vehicles, ground sensors, polygraph machines, and computers all provide an important advantage. At the brigade level, S2s must understand all the possibilities, but obviously cannot manage all the technologies. They can and perhaps should lead human intelligence, so it seems reasonable that they have a more thorough education in human intelligence subjects. Also, it is obvious that the level and direction of resolve of the civilian population, enemy troops, and host country troops will have a direct impact on information flow.

• A greater dose of PSYOP course material can be expected as Fort Huachuca adjusts the training of intelligence management to put more emphasis on this kind of war. An introduction to population resource control, such as vehicle and pedestrian checkpoints, seemingly the educational property of the military police, may also need to appear in MI curricula.

• Fort Huachuca will continue to prepare MI lieutenants and captains to win the battle of the Fulda Gap, but it is evident that more MI lieutenants and captains will need to receive training to meet the low intensity challenge. Many MI officers will be right to feel a greater personal sense of urgency during classes which fall into the informal category of "El Paraiso" than under the category of "Fulda Gap." ★

Footnotes:

1. FM 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*, October 1973, p. 5-7.

2. Ibid, p. 7-11.

3. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, October 20, 1969, p. C-1.

Editor's note: While FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, has replaced most of the information in FM 30-5, chapters 5 and 7, which deal with processing and order of battle, and appendix T, which deals with indicators, are still in force until FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, is published and disseminated.

Capt. Geoffrey B. Demarest is the commander of HHS, 519th MI Battalion, 525th MI Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C. He holds a B.A. in Economics from the University of Colorado, an M.A. from the Graduate School of International Studies, Denver University, and a J.D. from the Denver University School of Law. He is a 1975 graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course and Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer Course. Demarest has also graduated from the MI Officer Advanced Course, the Psychological Operations Officers' Course, the Foreign Area Officers' Course, and the Defense Language Institute. Assignments have included S2, 2d Battalion, 5th U.S. Cavalry; Intelligence Officer, 24th PSYOP Company; instructor, School of International Studies, U.S. Army J. F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center; and S3 Plans Officer, 525th MI Brigade.

Putting PSYOP in its Place

by Capt. Michael T. McEwen

Recent Army reorganization efforts resulting from a range of studies and analyses have established psychological operations (PSYOP) as a subspecialty of Special Operations Forces. The numerically dominant element of Special Operations Forces is Special Forces; next in number are the Rangers, followed by PSYOP and Civil Affairs. (These are active force numbers. When Reserve forces are included, PSYOP and Civil Affairs move ahead of Rangers.)

Some within the PSYOP community question whether this reorganization is the most appropriate means to provide a PSYOP capability which can support the overall requirements of our national defense policy. In order to explore this issue further, the support requirements for three distinct areas must be considered: the unified commands, conventional ground forces, and other U.S. government agencies. In the first and last of these, PSYOP may work well under the special operations aegis. The 1st Special Operations Command is specifically designed to meet these requirements, and there is no doubt that PSYOP plays an important role in these arenas. However, the major requirement for PSYOP, in terms of the number of missions and the orientation of current units, is still centered around the support of conventional ground forces.

Pigeonholing PSYOP in special operations has tended to cause conventional commanders to overlook its significance. Although doctrine specifies that the G3 has overall responsibility for PSYOP, recent history has shown this to be a less than effective arrangement because operations staffs frequently do not have PSYOP expertise and do not know how to use this asset. In essence, PSYOP usually does not have a strong advocate in the operations and plans arena and typically does not receive adequate recognition.

> " . . . PSYOP . . . full and proper employment goes far beyond the G5's sphere of operations."

Some commands have not yet implemented the newest organizational doctrine and continue to place PSYOP under the G5, which, in fact, was its "home" under the old doctrine. Although PSYOP clearly plays a vital role in civil-military operations, its full and proper employment goes far beyond the G5's sphere of operations.

A Home for PSYOP

Looking at the current tactical doctrine and the functions of the staff sections, it makes most sense to put PSYOP under the G2. PSYOP not only is intelligence intensive in its operations, but it is also a major producer of intelligence. The concept of Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) is extremely compatible with PSYOP. In fact, it would be exceptionally easy to augment CEWI groups with a PSYOP battalion, and CEWI battalions with a PSYOP company. PSYOP assets and expertise would enhance current CEWI capabilities in the vital area of deception operations, and having electronic warfare assets in close proximity to PSYOP would be particularly beneficial when conducting deception operations. In addition, the analytical capability of PSYOP units would provide an important additional resource to the CEWI organization.

Putting PSYOP in the CEWI organizational structure would give it a solid home within an accepted corps and division element. As part of the intelligence assets, PSYOP would gain an advocate on the principal staff and would begin to receive the regular and routine use that it deserves. Perhaps most important, PSYOP would become more visible to senior Army commanders who must be made to realize that the failure to plan and use PSYOP is as grave an error as is the failure to use intelligence, artillery, or

engineer support.

A commander who does not use PSYOP at every opportunity forces his soldiers to fight a stronger enemy. Although it is difficult to quantify in every case, it is pretty widely accepted that well-executed PSYOP will reduce an enemy's ability to fight. He may not always surrender, but he can often be persuaded to adopt a less aggressive posture.

Even more malleable are civilian tional area. (These functional areas are roughly akin to the old "secondary" specialty.) The functional area for PSYOP officers is designated as 18—Special Operations. Formerly, PSYOP was a subspecialty of 48—Foreign Area Officer (FAO). However, by making PSYOP an 18 functional area, under the limits applied to the officer's functional area, the foreign area officer skills that are so critical in PSYOP cannot easily be acquired.

> "A commander who does not use PSYOP at every opportunity forces his soldiers to fight a stronger enemy."

populations, which can pose real problems in combat. Every commander can see the wisdom of having the local populace on his side and having hostile, or at least nonsupportive civilians, in the enemy's rear. PSYOP is probably the best tool for gaining the support of civilians on both sides of the forward line of own troops.

Having a PSYOP capability in the G2/CEWI sphere would assure a commander that these assets were being routinely considered in the staff section that is closest to PSYOP in nature and function.

PSYOP and the Military Intelligence Career Field

Currently, the enlisted career management field for PSYOP is 96F. This is a relatively recent change which was implemented for several reasons: the most important were compatibility of skills and opportunity for career progression.

As a 96F, an enlisted PSYOP soldier is trained to function as a PSYOP specialist **and** as a 96B intelligence specialist. When not assigned to a PSYOP unit, the 96F can take advantage of numerous opportunities for career development in Military Intelligence units.

The same logic that brought about the 96F specialty in the enlisted ranks is probably even more powerful when applied to the officer ranks. The new officer professional development program allows an officer one basic branch and not more than one func-

If PSYOP were to become a Military Intelligence specialty (in the 35 series), it would be relatively easy for the PSYOP officer to take 48 (FAO) as his or her functional area; this would complement the officer's background in PSYOP as it does in other intelligence fields. PSYOP would then become a "module" which could be added to the basic or advanced courses or taken en route to an assignment. This would accommodate the current training strategy very well and permit greater flexibility for the individual officer.

Since PSYOP officers are qualified to serve in general intelligence positions as well as PSYOP, their career advancement tracks are numerous. Under the new officer career development program, adding PSYOP as a Military Intelligence specialty provides many more advantages and far fewer penalties than the current proposal which would make PSYOP a Special Operations specialty. In addition, as a Military Intelligence specialty, PSYOP would be given the broad exposure it needs by placing it in an established, accepted branch with a solid infrastructure. This is more preferable than trying to force it into the new and unproven special operations field which, of necessity, must focus its energy on trying to provide adequate support for its more numerous Special Forces personnel. Another obvious reason for placing PSYOP in the Military Intelligence Branch is that the enlisted soldiers are already there, so it makes sense to manage the officers in the same system.

A Final Note

Of course, it remains for the Military Intelligence Branch to examine this proposal to determine its desirability and feasibility. Perhaps there are difficulties that are not obvious in this brief overview. However, it appears that PSYOP is much more compatible with Military Intelligence than with Special Forces. Of course, PSYOP support for Special Forces is vital, just as PSYOP support is needed for all types of operations. However, since the major requirements for PSYOP support fall in the domain of conventional forces, it seems to make good sense to place PSYOP in a framework where it can best serve the full variety of Army operations. It should also be possible to meet unified command and interagency support requirements by creating an organic PSYOP capability in the current 1st Special Operations Command. Since the Special Operations Command already has organic intelligence assets, it would be no problem to expand them to include the necessary PSYOP capability. This would allow "special operations PSYOP" to support that unique requirement, while the majority of PSYOP assets would be located within the conventional forces which they are currently tasked to support.

The Military Intelligence option appears to offer many advantages over the current proposal with few, if any, readily apparent problems. ★

Capt. Michael T. McEwen is assigned as a PSYOP officer at Headquarters, 5th PSYOP Group, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the PSYOP Officer Course. He holds a master's degree in Political Science from the University of Oklahoma, where he specialized in International Terrorism Studies. McEwen was previously assigned as the chief of the Terrorism in Low Intensity Conflict Branch, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. McEwen has had numerous articles published in other military, academic, and professional journals.

By Lt. Col. Ronald Cosklo

On October 6, 1973, the Israeli nation was surprised by an Arab attack which the Israeli government, and especially the intelligence service, should have expected. As Israeli General Avraham (Bren) Adan points out, the intelligence establishment ignored all the indicators until the undeniable reality of the impending attack finally crushed all the previous misconceptions: "When, following receipt of a reliable report, the director of military intelligence at last reached the conclusion that war was about to break out and passed that information to the chief of staff, the time was 0400 on October 6—10 hours before hostilities began."[1] The issues and events which might help explain why Israel was caught off guard concern national-level policy; however, the lessons learned are so basic and so valuable that they can be applied by decisionmakers all the way down to battalion level.

A blue ribbon panel, headed by Dr. S. Agranat, president of the Israeli Supreme Court, was commissioned to examine the events which preceded October 6, 1973.[2] The results are alarming because they identify as the weak link the psychological dimension of intelligence analysis—an area in which preconceived beliefs can

"the conception."[4] The conception became solidly entrenched in Israeli intelligence services and was supported by the director of military intelligence who guaranteed that his department would provide sufficient advance warning to permit an orderly call-up of the reserves. This promise became the foundation for the Israeli Defense Force's defense plans and also planted the seeds for the greatest intelligence failure in Israeli history.

Maintenance of the Conception

The Israelis had mobilized three times since 1971, always in anticipation of an Arab attack which failed to materialize. These mobilizations had occurred because the Arabs were adept at creating noise and signal deception.[5] The deception was further reinforced by the Israeli disposition at that time to hear only certain signals—those which were in agreement with established doctrine.

The degree to which the conception was being accepted as fact became apparent with the suppression of a startling document entitled, "Movement of the Egyptian Army."[6] This document, written by Israeli Lieutenant Benjamin Siman-Tov, summarized facts which supported the theory that the Arabs were preparing for an all-out war.

The buildup across the Suez Canal provided the cornerstone for this document. The facts presented contradicted the opinion held by all senior government officials.[7] But because "the conception" was so deeply rooted, senior officials chose to ignore the facts and accepted instead the premise that the Egyptians were simply moving forces in concert with normal training exercises. Moreover, the refusal to even entertain the possibility of an Arab attack demonstrated

that the psychological forces surrounding the conception were strong enough to cripple the entire decision-making process, a result which nearly proved fatal.

Wishful Thinking/Group Dynamics

Senior government officials suppressed, perhaps unconsciously, uncomfortable evidence which failed to support their views. Such thinking prevailed over the two years preceding the war, despite erratic and suspicious behavior on the part of Israel's adversaries. For some time, "the conception" represented a valid assessment; however, the failure or breakdown of intelligence occurred because the conception was not changed as conditions changed. The Israelis should have recognized that an attack was possible even when hostile action could not be supported by good military judgment.[8]

Another reason for the failure of the Israeli elite intelligence apparatus might be found in the institutional changes taking place at that time. During that critical period, the Israeli intelligence services were reduced from four to one. This action made the development of competing viewpoints even more remote; conclusions drawn from several sources could have provided other alternatives to the decisionmakers.

After its investigation, the Agranat Commission came up with some new intelligence ground rules which emphasized the need to be open-minded and to subject all theories, assumptions, and principles which guide national policy to close and continuous scrutiny.

There is strong evidence to suggest that any group tends to stress the particular consensus it reaches. Obviously, this predisposes members to a singular focus, and they tend to conform to an established (safe) view. In order "to play the game," people quickly learn that it is expedient to function within the secure framework of accepted norms and assumptions (conceptions).[9] Evidence also supports the notion that the group force becomes intolerant of maverick thinkers and, thus, subtly eliminates opposing views. In the case of the events leading up to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, a strong group force may

Yom Kippur War: A matter of perception

prevail even in the face of opposing facts.

The Conception

Previous Israeli victories had helped create and sustain a consensus regarding Arab intentions which dominated both the national power structure and the intelligence service.[3] This consensus rested on two assumptions: first, Egypt would not attack without air (interdiction) superiority; and second, Syria would not attack alone. This consensus was known as

Soviet Organization for Theater War

by Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr.

Soviet military doctrine and strategy reflect many of the traditional elements of classic strategy. That is to say, it is not enough for a state to be able to defend itself; it must also have the ability to attack, and prevail, should war occur. Thus, the creation of a military establishment able to win a war, even a nuclear one, is seen as the only sensible recourse in a world fraught with dangers. The Soviet Union, then, appears to exemplify the old adage, *si vi pacem parabellum*—if you want peace, prepare for war—in the most literal sense of that term.

The impressive array of military hardware with which the Soviet Union has armed itself is only the most visible aspect of a military institution in a state of flux. In addition, significant doctrinal and organizational changes, representing a mature level of military thought, have also occurred in the last ten years. In order to be effective on the battlefield, there must be a balance between equipment, doctrine, and organization. A great deal has

been written about the first two areas, somewhat less on the third. The focus of this article, therefore, will be on the most salient elements of the command structure which have been altered since the mid-1970s. When seen in an historical perspective, it becomes apparent that today's Soviet military planners have drawn on the school of the "Great Patriotic War" for answers to contemporary organizational problems.

The development of Soviet military policy since 1945 has not always been as forward looking as it appears to be today.[1] During the first postwar period, from 1945 to 1953, Soviet military thought ossified as the result of Joseph Stalin's influence over the military establishment. Debate over the content of doctrine and the application of military art was officially forbidden. This prompted one expert on early Soviet military affairs to observe: "Thought was reduced to silence, and genius reduced to Stalin."[2] This rigidity gave way to

what might be called the "nuclear phase" of Soviet military thought. The mid-1950s to the early sixties witnessed the incorporation of nuclear weapons into Soviet doctrine, the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959, and a corresponding decline in the influence of the traditional armed services. This emphasis on fighting a nuclear rocket war began to wane even before its chief proponent, Nikita Kruschev, was ousted from office. Indeed, Kruschev's fall from grace had little to do with a clash between himself and the military services, since the revision of Soviet doctrine began a full three years before his departure.[3]

By the early 1960s, the "revolution in military affairs," a euphemism for developing postwar technology, was underway. Nuclear weapons were downplayed as the most important solution to national security dilemmas in favor of a more traditional combined arms approach. This view resulted from a Soviet rethinking of

its strategic position, and the movement by Western nations toward a doctrine of "flexible response." Flexible response posited a controlled escalation from theater/conventional to strategic/nuclear warfare. With the inevitability of all-out nuclear war now in doubt, the Soviet military establishment recognized the need to develop armed forces capable of fighting across a broad spectrum of combat environments. The achievement of strategic parity with the United States in the 1969-1971 time period helped reinforce the notion that the initial period of a war might not see the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, conventional forces would operate on the battlefield in a nuclear-threatened posture. As one writer explained in an article from the Soviet journal *Military Thought*: "This will force the opponents to organize and carry out their combat operations with conventional means of destruction in such a way as to be in the most favorable position in relation to each other in case of the use of nuclear weapons, to acquire an advantage in nuclear means, to be ready for a rapid offensive immediately after nuclear strikes, and to have the necessary dispersal of troops for the purpose of protection from means of mass destruction."[4]

The superiority of NATO's tactical and theater nuclear arsenal provided further impetus for the Soviets to prepare for operations which might begin on the conventional level and escalate to nuclear warfare. Fear of global nuclear exchange, which would do tremendous damage to the two main antagonists, focused Soviet efforts on defeating the Western Alliance at the lowest (conventional) level of violence.[5]

The emphasis on conventional war-fighting capabilities has received a great deal of attention in the most recent period of postwar Soviet military policy. Since 1973, the pace of change within the Soviet armed forces has intensified to create a military establishment able to fight across a broad spectrum of combat. These developments proceeded from the assumption that a prolonged period of non-nuclear conflict may precede, or even preclude, escalation to nuclear war. Recent arms programs and structural changes can also be seen as the fruition of the "revolution in military affairs"—in outward appearances, anyway. The increase in power projection capabilities in the navy and airborne forces, for example, reflect the Soviet Union's desire to fight its battles as far from Soviet soil as possible. Although serious questions about the effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces remain, it is important to understand the last decade's investments in its military establishment.[6]

How best to employ the qualitatively improved weapons entering the inventory in the mid-1970s became the central question facing Soviet military planners. Technical advances in military hardware necessitated the

creation of more versatile organizational structures to achieve strategic objectives across large geographic areas. Combined arms operations, in the Soviet sense of the term (operations conducted by branches of the armed services), remained the cornerstone of the Soviet conceptual framework for war. However, the greater speed, range, and lethality of modern weapons and the demands of Soviet military doctrine created problems for the organization—the front— normally responsible for conducting a combined arms offensive. As a result of the "revolution in military affairs," combat operations had outgrown the front. A new organizational structure was needed to effectively employ the latest weapon systems while retaining the initiative in a combined arms offensive. The solution to this dilemma was to be found by looking back to the Second World War (known to Soviets as the Great Patriotic War), specifically, to the command structure of the armed forces in the Far East.

During the Second World War, Soviet front commanders answered directly to the general staff, which acted as the operations center for the *Stavka* of the Supreme High Command. In order to facilitate coordina-

tion of effort between several fronts in a large operation, a representative of the *Stavka* was sent to the field. Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU), filled this important role on numerous occasions. Although an informal arrangement, the *Stavka* representative provided an intermediate link in the normal chain of command from front to the *Stavka*. Whenever more than one air army became involved in an operation or extra naval forces were needed to support the ground forces, air and naval representatives were also sent to the field.[7]

This arrangement proved satisfactory when dealing with the Germans. However, a different approach was required for the Far East because of its great distance from Moscow. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Japanese occupied Manchuria in August 1945, a "high command for Soviet troops in the Far East" was established as an intermediary between the fronts and the *Stavka*. Marshal A. M. Vasilevskiy, himself a member of the Supreme High Command, became the commander of this Far East Theater of Operations.[8] The successful campaign waged against the Japanese forces in Manchuria was due in no small measure to the existence of a

high command capable of orchestrating the combined efforts of the armed forces within the theater. The Soviets hail the Manchurian campaign as a prime example of their armed forces at their zenith. As such, this campaign has become a paradigm for a successful offensive operation.[9]

The need to control wide-ranging combined arms operations over a large area has been satisfied by the creation of two strategic-level organizations, both of which are based on the example of the World War II high command in the Far East. The theater of military operations—*teatr voyennykh deystviy* or TVD—is just such a high-level command, charged with conducting military operations within a given geographic area. TVDs have been established for both ground and naval forces. The mix of ground, air, and naval forces within a TVD is based on several variables such as the geography of the area, enemy forces, and the political, military, and economic importance of the objectives.[10]

The theater of war—*teatr voyny* or TV—is the highest Soviet strategic command outside of the wartime *Stavka*. The TV is made up of two or more TVDs and encompasses land, air, and sea areas of an entire conti-

Figure 1

nent. While the TVD's main concern is for the orchestration of combined arms operations, the TV is designed to coordinate the overall war effort against a single enemy or a coalition of enemy forces.[11]

The TVD structure, which disappeared after the Manchurian campaign, reappears now as an attempt to satisfy the command and control requirements for large-scale military operations. The increased scope and pace of military operations caused by the technical advances of the past 25 years resulted in a corresponding decrease in the time available to make decisions. Thus, a direct link between front and the *Stavka* becomes anachronistic due to the need to act and react in the face of rapidly changing situations.[12]

The TVD also satisfies the need to integrate the various branches of the armed forces for a combined arms offensive. TVD commands permit a far greater degree of flexibility by tailoring a force that would be needed to achieve Soviet objectives in a specific theater of war. This "force packaging" approach suggests a rather sophisticated attempt at solving the problem of combining arms for a strategic mission.[13]

According to the most recent edition of **Soviet Military Power**, the Soviets have established three theaters of war: the Western, opposite NATO; the Southern, covering Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East; and the Far Eastern, facing China (see fig. 1). However, the Southern TV may not be a theater command at all; it may, in fact, be a separate TVD answering directly to Moscow. This conclusion could be drawn when one considers the Soviet definition of a theater of war—the air, sea, and ground space of a *continent*. Alternatively, Soviet forces in the south could actually be a TVD subordinate to the Far Eastern Theater.

Although the Far Eastern Theater may have been the first TV established in the postwar era, the Western, with three subordinate TVDs (Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern) is by far the largest in terms of available troops and equipment. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations and the bulk of Soviet military might are deployed in the Western TV. In time of war, the commander of the Western TV would be responsible for conducting military operations against NATO.[14]

Additional changes made in the structure of the Soviet armed services facilitate the integration of the several branches into an all-arms force within the TVD.

Prominent Soviet writers on military affairs, from 1981 to 1983, hinted at the existence of a single organization for controlling the Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry. Statements by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the general staff, referred to the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) as a triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. This new organization would incorporate the assets of the strategic rocket forces (SRF), submarine-based nuclear missile forces, and long-range aviation under a single command. Only the first of these, the SRF, is considered a separate branch of service; the other two belong to the navy and the air force, respectively.[15]

The establishment of an organization bearing the title, Strategic Nuclear Forces, has not been formally announced by the Soviets. However, the SNF would enhance the flexibility of Soviet TV and TVD commanders in a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons on either the theater or intercontinental/strategic levels. Coordination of efforts between the services would be greatly eased by creating a mix of strategic nuclear weapon systems, under one command, tailored to meet the demands of specific TVDs.

The application of this concept to the Western TV is more or less obvious, given the need to control escalation in a theater war with NATO. Less certain is the matter of operational command and control of the SNF in an exchange with the United States. The Soviet **Dictionary of Basic Military Terms** defines theaters of operations (TVDs) as: "A particular territory, together with the associated air space and sea areas . . . within whose limits a known part of the armed forces of the country (or coalition) operates in wartime . . . . A theater of operations may be ground, maritime, or intercontinental."[16] Since a number of ground and naval TVDs have been identified over the last few years, it is quite possible that the Soviets may also have designated an intercontinental TVD (or TV) which could be used to conduct strategic operations against the United States (or North American continent). This would seem to be in accord with the recent practice of forming wartime high commands in theaters of operations during peacetime.

Recent changes in the air force and the air defense forces also contribute to the Soviet search for battlefield effectiveness within the context of the TVD structure. By resubordinating the aircraft of the former tactical air armies and national air defense forces (*PVO strany*), Soviet air assets are now designed to conduct combat missions according to aircraft type. Tactical ground support and interdiction functions will be carried out by army aviation (helicopters) and frontal aviation (fixed-wing aircraft). The rotary-wing assets of army aviation are allocated to divisions and armies to support immediate tactical operations. Frontal aviation can provide aircraft for close air support or deeper strikes in the enemy's rear. Aviation armies of the Soviet Union, which replace long-range aviation, consist of some fighter bombers (such as the SU-24) and all of the medium and long-range (including intercontinental) aircraft. While frontal aviation and army aviation provide immediate tactical and operational level support to fronts and TVDs, aviation armies of the Soviet Union act as a strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command. They can be used to supplement the air assets of the TVDs, based on the Supreme High Command's assessment of relative need, or be held in reserve as a strategic asset for either theater or intercontinental missions.[17]

The air defense forces of the Soviet Union, prior to the early 1980s, fell into two categories: national air defense forces (known by their Soviet acronym *PVO strany*) and the tactical air defense troops of the ground forces. These two organizations have since merged to form a single branch dubbed the troops of air defense (*Voiska PVO*), which includes national-level interceptor aircraft and all surface-to-air missile units. This consolidation of assets reduces the difficulty of coordinating tactical and strategic-level air defense, formerly the responsibility of two entirely separate branches. A single com-

mander for *Voiska PVO* now answers to the combined arms commander at all levels, further streamlining the command structure from army to TVD level. Not surprisingly, the reorganization of the air defense units into a single branch with both tactical and strategic missions is reminiscent of the air defense structure which evolved toward the end of World War II.[18]

All these changes have been implemented to support Soviet offensive operations within a theater of war. The rationale for a high-speed, fast-paced combined arms offensive that strikes deep into enemy territory is the Soviet desire to fight at the lowest level of conflict. As authors Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines put it: "Movement toward a strategy that would prevent NATO nuclear use and ensure Soviet success with conventional weapons required Soviet military planners to change the way they thought about theater operations and to rethink the types, mix, and quantity of weapon systems required."[19]

A quick defeat of NATO on the conventional level, with emphasis on destroying the Alliance's theater nuclear systems, would ensure Soviet dominance of the escalation process toward first nuclear use. Thus, the pressures of technological advancements in weaponry and the need to defeat a nuclear armed opponent before escalation occurs resulted in the creation of both theaters of war and theaters of military operations.

There is little need to delve into the details of the "new" Soviet theater strategy since this has already been done by military analysts in other forums.[20] However, two points need to be made concerning Soviet theater strategy—one organizational, the other philosophical.

Soviet efforts to create flexible forces for an offensive within a TVD range from the strategic (TV, TVD) to tactical (division, regiment) levels. The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) is a vital part of the frontal offensive. The OMG's mission would be to drive through gaps in enemy defenses and attack the opponent's nuclear weapon systems, command centers, and logistic infrastructure. The OMG is designed to be a raiding force, not to be confused with the second echelon which would exploit the successes of the attack echelon. The OMG mission

has previously been associated with existing formations. One or more divisions (preferably tank, but possibly motorized rifle) would be selected as the operational raiding force.[21]

In what is quite probably another example of the Soviets reaching into the past for solutions to military problems, the 1985 edition of *Soviet Military Power* reveals the existence of two corps-sized units associated with the OMG mission. These units are described as being nearly twice as large as a tank division, consisting of over 450 tanks, 600 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and armored personnel carriers (APC), and 300 pieces of artillery/multiple rocket launchers (MRL). The authors note that these "corps-like" units are well suited to the operational-level raid and exploitation mission. In addition, more "units of this type are expected to be formed once testing and evaluation are completed."[22]

While *Soviet Military Power* does not go into detail on the organization of these new corps, the quantity of combat equipment and past Soviet experience suggest a structure similar to the tank and mechanized corps of World War II. During the Great Patriotic War, tank or mechanized corps were assigned to army level as mobile groups, forerunners of today's OMGs. Tank armies became the OMGs for fronts in the latter stages of the war.

With nearly a three-to-two ratio of IFVs/APCs to tanks in the new corps, the subunits are most likely combined arms (motorized rifle heavy). Based on the tank and mechanized corps structure of the Great Patriotic War, it is likely that four or more maneuver brigades would be subordinate to a corps headquarters. Separate organizations for artillery, air defense, and rear services would make up the balance of corps assets.[23]

Although the creation of new corps appears to have answered the need for a specialized front-level OMG, it also raises several important questions. The commitment of a corps-sized unit in an offensive against NATO would be an important part of the Soviet commander's battle plan. It would also be a prime indicator of Soviet intentions prior to or during an offensive. Unless these new corps are stationed well forward in peacetime, which they well may be since *Soviet*

Military Power does not say where they are located, their movement into East Germany or Czechoslovakia would become an important indicator in the European indications and warning arena. Unless and until these units are deployed forward, the front-level OMG mission will most likely be conducted by tank or motorized rifle divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany and the Central Group of Forces.

Once into the depth of the enemy's defenses, the two greatest weaknesses for any force acting as an OMG are air defense and logistic support. The OMG's role as a raiding force requires that it operate at a considerable distance from the main body. This leaves it open to attack by NATO air forces and mobile ground reserves. To counter the air threat, the Soviets may well have provided the new corps a healthy amount of air defense assets capable of keeping up with the advancing tank and motorized rifle elements. Coordination with frontal aviation and the fighters of *Voiska PVO* will also be necessary to ensure local air superiority which could increase the OMG's survivability.[24]

Providing logistic support to OMGs would prove extremely difficult in wartime. The experience of supplying Mobile Groups during the Second World War illuminated the problem, but provided no easy solutions. In the vast expanse of the Russian steppes and the plains of Eastern Europe, Soviet Mobile Groups advanced until they ran out of fuel or were finally brought to a standstill by the Germans. While the distances involved in a modern West European context would be much less, the high rate of fuel consumption and, possibly, ammunition expenditure, would be a major weakness of the OMG.[25]

The one philosophical point which needs to be made about today's Soviet strategy is its adherence to the basic assumption that nuclear weapons might still be used at some point in an offensive. Analysts Hines and Petersen stressed this fact in their articles on the Soviet conventional offensive. While the Soviets might wish to keep a conflict against NATO a conventional one, they must keep in mind the ever-present threat of nuclear use by the Western Alliance. Other writers on Soviet military affairs

have not adequately addressed this subject. Recent Soviet efforts to create a conventional warfighting capability have been portrayed as a desire to fight a wholly conventional war.[26]

It would be a mistake to believe that the Soviet military has "gone conventional" in its war planning; although on the surface, there has been a great deal of emphasis on combat with conventional means. Since the 1960s, the Soviets have recognized the need to develop combined arms forces capable of fighting against what Professor John Erickson terms a "nuclear backdrop." He points out that the Western notion of nuclear versus conventional warfare is not accepted by the Soviets because: "When Soviet military specialists discuss the battlefield in terms of 'nuclear' and 'conventional' weaponry, this is not an 'either/or' proposition but essentially 'both/and.'"[27] The problem of making the transition from conventional to theater-nuclear warfare is eased if the nuclear weapons-use assumption is made from the start. It is also made that much easier with the organiza-

tional structure of TVs and TVDs now in place.

During the 1960s, it was necessary for the Soviet military to determine how nuclear weapons would fit into the combined arms framework.[28] This occurred after Krushchev's "one-weapon" solution to fighting a modern war of the late 1950s, a phase which made it seem as though the Soviet Union had indeed "gone nuclear" in its strategy and had adopted a "massive retaliation" policy of sorts. This notion was discredited even before Comrade Kruschev's fall from power, but the legacy of the nuclear doctrine lingered for many years in the West. Soviet rethinking of theater war began with the development and fielding of improved weapons in the 1970s and the determination by Soviet strategists that NATO must, and could, be defeated at the conventional level in order to protect the homeland from nuclear strikes. Thus, the reorganization and restructuring of the late 1970s and early 1980s represent not a break with past doctrine, but a fulfillment of

the "revolution in military affairs." If the 1960s saw the "fitting" of nuclear weapons into the combined arms framework, the 1970s witnessed a "refitting" of conventional weaponry in the context of operations conducted against a "nuclear backdrop."[29]

Fielding massive quantities of weapons and creating an organizational structure for their use constitute but one part of Soviet defense efforts. The troops that comprise these forces must be well trained and well led. This remains the responsibility of the senior Soviet military leadership, which not only implemented the doctrinal and organizational initiatives of the last ten years, but has had to adapt itself to the new forms and principles of modern warfare. A brief examination of recent promotions and changes in the upper echelons of the Soviet officer corps demonstrates a determination to get the right people into the right positions to execute the theater offensive in time of war.

All of the top five posts in the Kollegia of the USSR Ministry of Defense have changed hands since the fall of 1984 (see Table 1). Marshal Sergei Sokolov replaced Dimitri Ustinov as defense minister upon the latter's death. Marshal S. F. Akhromeev is now chief of the general staff, taking the place of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. With the recent departure of Marshal Victor G. Kulikov from the post of commander, Warsaw Pact, it is now widely believed that Marshal Ogarkov has been named as his successor. If true, Ogarkov would have regained his status as a first deputy minister of defense.[30] The new first deputy minister of defense for general affairs and local wars is Marshal V. I. Petrov, whose background is probably the most appropriate for the position he now holds. Having served as a commander of the Far Eastern TVD, Petrov was instrumental in implementing new small-unit tactics throughout his command. He also has a lot of experience with airborne/airmobile operations and is considered an excellent organizer. In short, Petrov possesses all the qualities needed to oversee the training of units for operations in underdeveloped countries or lightly defended rear areas.[31] Finally, it has also been reported that Marshal Aleksei A. Yepishev has been replaced as head of the Main Political Administration by General Aleksei D.

Kollegia of the USSR Ministry of Defense[1]

*Defense Minister	MSU Sergei Sokolov
#*First Deputy Minister of Defense/ Chief of the General Staff	MSU S.F. Akhromeev
*First Deputy Minister of Defense/ Commander-in-Chief, Warsaw Pact	MSU Nikolai V. Ogarkov
#*First Deputy Minister of Defense/ General Affairs	MSU V.I. Petrov
*Chief of the Main Political Administration	Army Gen. Aleksei D. Lizichev
Deputy Ministers of Defense:	
*Ground Forces	Army Gen. Y.F. Ivanovskiy
*Strategic Rocket Forces	Army Gen. Yuri Maximov
*Air Defense Forces	Marshal of Aviation A.I. Koldunov
Air Forces	Chief Marshal of Aviation S.P. Kutakov
Navy	Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov
#Rear Services	MSU S.K. Kurkotkin

*-Recent appointee, since beginning 1984.

#-Recent promotion, since March 1983.

[1]The information in this chart is derived from *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, Vol. 8, p. 19, and "Personnel Movement in Soviet High Command", *Jane's Defence Weekly* (April 13, 1985): p. 263.

(Table 1)

Lizichev, who most recently held the position of political commissar of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.[32]

Among the deputy ministers of defense, Army General Y. F. Ivanovskiy of the ground forces is one of two new appointees. He will probably be promoted to the rank of marshal, so that he will be on equal footing with the other deputy ministers and chiefs of services, all of whom normally are marshals. Ivanovskiy seems a logical choice for commander of the ground forces, given the current emphasis on the theater offensive. His previous command in the Belorussian Military District gave him considerable insight into the use of large units in the deep offensive. It is significant to note that Ivanovskiy commanded the winning TVD in the landmark ZAPAD-81 field exercise, the same exercise which brought the OMG to the attention of Western military analysts.

While General Ivanovskiy's career seems to be on the rise, so too is that of the chief of rear services, Marshal S. K. Kurkotkin, who was promoted to his present rank in 1984. The Soviets may be signaling their recognition of the importance of logistics to the strategic offensive with the promotion of Kurkotkin to marshal.[33] Army General Yuri Maximov, who replaced Marshal V. F. Tolubko as head of the Strategic

Rocket Forces, is the other new appointee among the deputy ministers of defense.[34]

Yet another appointment within the ground forces appears to support the contention that qualified senior officers are being placed in key positions for the execution of the new strategy. Army General A. M. Maiorov, formerly a senior commander in Afghanistan, complements his superior as the new deputy commander of the ground forces. Maiorov has considerable experience in the use of helicopters in combined arms formations. He is also familiar with the use of under-strength units in combat, something which would surely characterize the use of OMGs in enemy rear areas.[35]

Two changes have taken place among the TVD commands. In a very significant move, Army General M. M. Zaitsev, commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, and, as such, commander of the Western TVD, has been replaced by Army General Pyotr G. Lushev.[36] (See Table 2.)

Soviet TV and TVD commands have been the subject of extensive speculation in the West. Ever since Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was relieved as the chief of the general staff, rumors have suggested that he would be appointed to a field command, the Western Theater of War (TV). The most author-

itative statement, made by Politburo member Grigory Romanov, explained that, "Marshal Ogarkov commands the Soviet Union's largest Western force."[37] This has been interpreted as either the Western TVD, opposite NATO's Central Region, or a Western TV, the existence of which remains unconfirmed.

Given the important role played by Ogarkov from 1977 to 1984, a role which cannot be understated, it would seem unlikely that the Soviets would waste the talents of the chief architect of the revitalized defense structure.[38] If Ogarkov has indeed been named commander of the Warsaw Pact, by virtue of this position, he might very well function as overall commander of the Western Theater of War, if such a TV actually exists.

This spate of changes at the highest levels of the military suggests that Soviet leader Gorbachev is bent on replacing aging or inefficient military leaders with younger, more dynamic men.[39] Such changes further support the overall attempt by the Soviets to restructure and revitalize their military organization.

Conclusions

The Soviets have made tremendous strides over the past decade in their search for military security. Qualitative improvements in equipment will enable Soviet forces to operate in combat environments along a continuum of violence from low-intensity guerrilla war to strategic nuclear war. The increased quantity of this equipment, the most visible manifestation of Soviet military might, has increased the overall firepower of combat units several fold.[40] The increased density of weapon systems, especially artillery, improves the strategic offensive's chances for success. It also helps ensure that the offensive will stay conventional.

The creation of several theaters of war and theaters of military operations provides the framework within which the military systems, both individual and collective, will operate in wartime. That all of these concepts have their roots in the past is not surprising given the Soviet's predilection for scientific and historic research. There may have been a revolution in military thinking since the end of World War II but, for the Soviet Union, the continuity with the past is evident

---

Soviet TV/TVD Commands

CINC, Western Theater of War (TV)	MSU Nikolai Ogarkov
Cmdr., Northern TVD	Unknown
Cmdr., Western TVD (also CINC, GSFG)	General of the Army Pyotr G. Lushev
Cmdr., South-Western TVD (also Cmdr., Kiev MD)	General of the Army I.A. Gerasimov
CINC, Southern Theater of War (TV) (or TVD?) (also Cmdr., Turkestan MD)	General of the Army Unknown
CINC, Far Eastern Theater of War (TV)	General of the Army V.L. Govorov
Cmdr., Far Eastern TVD (also Cmdr., Far East MD)	General of the Army I.M. Tret'yak

(Table 2)

even today.

In spite of their recent military advances, doubts about the effectiveness of the Soviet defense establishment persist. The continued emphasis on centralized control of combat formations contradicts the demands for decentralized decision-making on a modern battlefield at the tactical level. Current efforts to "fine-tune" the present structure are focused on improving command and control through the use of automated decisionmaking systems. However, this solution may not prove as viable as the Soviets would like to believe. As John Hemsley notes in his book **Soviet Troop Control**: "As the senior commander's authority becomes more totalitarian, so the room for junior leaders to express their initiative becomes less, and their inclination to do so declines."[41] Assuming that initiative and flexibility are desirable virtues for junior combat leaders, and Soviet writings give every indication that this is the case, then the next few years of military policy will likely see more emphasis on developing these positive qualities.[42]

Today's Soviet leadership is totally preoccupied with the notion of military security, which occasionally is ensured at the expense of its neighbors. As authors Petersen and Hines observed, "The Soviets are continuously investing tremendous amounts of time and resources in preparation for a war they do not want to fight."[43] Thus far the return on their investments has produced a military force organized and equipped to fight a modern war. The efforts of the last 10 years have focused on the "hardware" of the military system in terms of equipment and the creation of an organizational framework for the execution of the theater offensive. The next decade will likely see more attention paid to the software in terms of educating officers at all levels to run the revitalized Soviet military machine. ★

Footnotes

1. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, **The Armed Forces of the USSR** (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 37-68.
2. Raymond L. Garthoff, **Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age** (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 62.
3. Scott and Scott, p. 49.

4. Col. B. Samurukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," *Voyennaya Mysl* (Military Thought), No. 8, FPD 0125/68, August 26, 1968, in **Selected Readings From Soviet Military Thought**, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 174.
5. Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," *Orbis*, Fall 1983, p. 695.
6. John Erickson, "Toward 1984: Four Decades of Soviet Military Policy," *Air University Review*, No. 35, January/February 1984, pp. 30-34.
7. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, **The Soviet Control Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival** (New York: Crane Russak & Company, Inc., 1983), p. 51.
8. S. A. Tyushkevich, **The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of their Organizational Development**, Trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), p. 348.
9. *See* Capt. Eugene D. Betit, "The Soviet Manchurian Campaign: Prototype for the Soviet Offensive," *Military Review*, May 1976, pp. 65-73; and Peter H. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly, "The Manchurian Campaign and Its Relevance to Modern Strategy, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1980, pp. 159-178.
10. **Dictionary of Basic Military Terms**, Trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO), p. 220.
11. Ibid.
12. A Soviet military author, M.P. Skirdo, wrote: " . . . the spatial scope of combat operations had increased incomparably, whereas the time available for collecting and processing information and making a decision has diminished markedly." Quoted in John Hemsley, **Soviet Troop Control** (Oxford, U.K.: Brassey's Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 153.
13. John Erickson, et. al., **Organizing for War: The Soviet Military Establishment Viewed through the Prism of the Military District**, The College Station Papers, No. 2 (College Station, Tx.: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1983), pp. 1-9.
14. *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1985), p. 14. A brief discussion of the Far Eastern Theater's existence can be found in R. A. Woff, "The Ground Forces," in David Jones, ed., **Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual**, Vol. 4 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980), pp. 79-82.
15. Michael J. Deane, Ilana Kass, and Andrew G. Porth, "The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1984, pp. 63-67.

16. **Dictionary of Basic Military Terms**, p. 220.
17. Alfred L. Monks, "Air Forces (VVS)," in David Jones, ed., **Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual**, Vol. 8 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1985), pp. 145-146. Additional information on the roles of army aviation and the reserve air forces of the Supreme High Command can be found in John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe," *Military Review*, April 1984, pp. 19-21. Soviet divisions and armies have dedicated helicopter support assets in the form of a squadron (18 aircraft) and regiment (40 aircraft) respectively. See FM 100-2-3, *The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment*, July 16, 1984, pp. 4-93 and 4-114.
18. Russell G. Breighner, "Air Defense Forces," in David Jones, ed., **Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual**, Vol. 7 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1984), pp. 158-176. The author concludes his discussion of the reorganized *Voiska PVO* by noting some of the Soviet assumptions about defending their airspace at the Military District or TVD level: "The implications of this discussion for today's reorganized air defenses are that the greatest mobility and flexibility are required; that centralized, preplanned operations will be implemented to react to the probable threat actions; that the ground forces' air defenses should be adequate to the point of not drawing upon strategic defenses; and that, as in World War II, there may not be sufficient forces available in any case" (p. 168). The recent reorganization may have solved many of the problems which existed under the old system, but it is hardly a panacea in solving all of the Soviets' air defense difficulties.
19. Petersen and Hines, *Orbis*, p. 705.
20. The best work published so far on Soviet doctrinal and organizational developments in the early 1980s have been the two articles by Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines (*See* footnotes 5 and 17). Other articles of note on the changing Soviet strategy include two pieces by Christopher Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group—A New Challenge for NATO," *International Defense Review*, September 1982, pp. 1177-1186; and, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1980s," in Robert R. Bowie, ed., **Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 105-136. An article by C. J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups: A Closer Look," in *International Defense Review*, June 1983,

pp. 769-776, discusses the OMG's application in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG). For a West German view on the subject of OMGs, see Michael Ruehle, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: Is the Threat Lost in a Terminological Quarrel?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1984, pp. 53-60.

21. Petersen and Hines, pp. 717-721.

22. *Soviet Military Power*, p. 63.

23. By 1944, a Soviet tank corps consisted of three tank brigades and one motorized brigade. An artillery group with one towed artillery battalion, one self-propelled artillery battalion, and an air defense battalion supported this organization. *See* Albert Z. Conner and Robert G. Poirer, "Soviet Wartime Tank Formations," *Armor*, May-June 1983, p. 23.

24. Col. V. Kuznetsov and Col. B. Andreyev, "Coordination Between Aviation and Tanks," *Voyennaya Mysl* (Military Thought), No. 8, FPD 0761/67, August 7, 1967, in **Selected Readings From Soviet Military Thought**, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), pp. 124-132.

25. That the Soviets failed to solve the problem of supplying Mobile Groups during the Great Patriotic War is evident in Colonel V. Odintsov and Colonel V. Ovsyannikov, "Rear Support for Mobile Groups," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Military History Journal), No. 3, March 1983, Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), pp. 28-34.

26. *See* Peter H. Vigor, **Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 8-9.

27. John Erickson, "Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice," in John Erickson and Lynn M. Hansen, **Soviet Combined Arms: Past and Present**, The College Station Papers, No. 1 (College Station, Texas.: The Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1981), p. 28.

28. Ibid.

29. The continuity of contemporary Soviet doctrine with the past is stressed in William F. Scott, "The Themes of Soviet Strategy," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1984, pp. 68-73. The close relationship between conventional and nuclear operations is also noted by Ilana Kass and Michael J. Deane, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern Theater Battlefield: The Current Soviet View," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1983, pp. 193-213. This article is especially noteworthy not only for citing some of the misinterpretations of recent Soviet doctrinal changes by some Western analysts, but also the important role nuclear weapons continue to play in the

theater offensive. The authors conclude that " . . . the Soviets now perceive a totally integrated nuclear/conventional operation, within the framework of which nuclear *and* conventional weapons supplement and reinforce each other, creating the synergistic effect deemed necessary for the attainment of victory . . . ," p. 212.

30. Dusko Doder, "Soviets Restore Ogarkov to Military Leadership," *Washington Post*, July 18, 1985, p. 1.

31. R. A. Woff, "The Ground Forces," in **Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual**, Vol. 4, ed. David Jones (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980), pp. 79-80. *See also* "Personnel Movement in Soviet High Command," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 13, 1985, p. 623.

32. Hederick Smith, "Shuffle in Soviet Military Under Way," *New York Times*, July 19, 1985, p. 3.

33. "Personnel Movement in Soviet High Command," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 13, 1985, p. 623.

34. "New Soviet C-in-C Announced," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, August 10, 1985, p. 251.

35. "Personnel Movement in Soviet High Command," *Jane's*, p. 623.

36. *See* Hederick Smith, p. 3 for replacement of Zaitsev.

37. Yossef Bodansky, "Ogarkov Confirmed as Western Theater C-in-C," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, October 27, 1984, p. 716.

38. David Jones, editor of **Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual**, is worth quoting at length on Ogarkov's contributions to the Soviet defense establishment: "While the preliminary stages of this process [the reorganization] may date from the early 1970s, it has been Ogarkov who both led the staff during the actual reorganization . . . and who personally articulated the rationale behind the creation of the new theaters of military operations (TVDs), the reorganized air services, the use of operational maneuver groups (OMGs), the restructured military district, possible creation of a strategic triad (of missiles, bombers, and submarines), and so on. This in itself made him one of the most important servants of the Soviet state and, in turn, it makes the world view of his General Staff—the 'brain of the Army'—a matter of more than academic concern." (David Jones, "The Soviet Military Year in Review: 1983-1984," in David Jones, ed., **Soviet Armed Review Annual**, Vol. 8, p. 12.)

39. William J. Eaton, "Rocket Commander Replaced, Kremlin Says," *Los Angeles Times*, July 26, 1985.

40. Compare, for example, the Tables of

Organization and Equipment for a Soviet motorized rifle division as found in FM 30-40, *Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces*, June 30, 1975, pp. A-2, A-3, to the TO&E for the same organization in FM 100-2-3, *The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment*, July 16, 1985, pp. 4-33 to 4-40. In the categories of medium tanks, IFV/APC, and tubed artillery, the increase in weapon systems has been 32 tanks (+17%), approximately 150 IFV/APC (+50%), and 48 tubed artillery (+50%).

41. John Hemsley, **Soviet Troop Control** (Oxford, U.K.: Brassey's Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 159.

42. An example of some of the positive qualities to be inculcated in the Soviet officer can be found in an article by the commander, GSFG, Army General M. Zaitsev, "Tested Principles of Troop Training," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Communist of the Armed Forces), January 2, 1984, Trans. FBIS, pp. 10-18. " . . . commander's foresight, initiative, courage, audacity, and the ability independently to solve difficult tasks are today doubly and triply necessary for an officer. Possessing these qualities, many of our commanders are achieving victories in training battles . . . ," p. 14.

43. Petersen and Hines, p. 732.

Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr. is assigned to the 174th MI Company of the 513th MI Group, Ft. Monmouth, N.J. He received a bachelor's degree in History and English from Norwich University and a master of arts in History from Kansas State University. Kells recently graduated from the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Strategic Intelligence Analyst Course, which is conducted by the Defense Intelligence College. His last assignment was with the 522d MI Battalion at Ft. Hood, Texas, where he served as a platoon leader, BMO, and as chief of the all-source production section. Kells has been previously published in **Journal of the West, Military Intelligence**, *and* **Military Review**.

Terrorism Is Here to Stay:
an interview with Robert H. Kupperman

The following is based on a recent interview with Robert H. Kupperman conducted by the editor.

Robert Kupperman reclined in a comfortable chair, somewhat pensive, yet relaxed, staring about his uncluttered but functional office on the 4th floor of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). As a veteran of over 400 radio and television appearances, another interview was probably the least of Kupperman's worries on another gray and rainy fall day in the nation's capital.

Kupperman is a senior advisor and Director for Science and Technology at the CSIS, a think tank which has enjoyed a great deal of influence in the Reagan White House, especially in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Apart from his academic affiliation, Kupperman consults on national security and counterterrorism issues. Clients have included the Army War College, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Navy, TRADOC, and the U.S. Senate, to name a few.

Though a mathematician by training, Kupperman is no stranger to the national security field. He has served in a number of government posts, including assistant director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the White House and chief scientist at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). While at ACDA, Kupperman chaired government-wide studies on U.S. counterterrorism policies and objectives. He has since become involved with numerous committees and study groups on terrorism.

According to Kupperman, "Terrorism is going to be with us for a long time, and the Western world has to wake up to the thought that there will at least be sporadic and episodic violence. Whether we call it terroristic for political or ideological reasons or for more sociopathic reasons; nevertheless, there will be such violence.

And governments will be extorted, and television will be there showing you the carnage."

On the other hand, Kupperman notes that governments are learning to cope better with terrorism, especially in the police and intelligence arenas. But when speaking of international cooperation, he cautions against becoming too caught up in formal agreements: "Now that [cooperation] doesn't mean that there are all sorts of formal agreements and treaties. In my own view, that would destroy the cooperation. There is, gender arguments notwithstanding, an old boys' net that has been around for a long time. And the less we tamper with this by formalizing it, the more likely it is to operate successfully."

In the intelligence arena, Kupperman believes we are doing better than we have ever done. "Cooperation is outstanding. Not perfect. There is a willingness of people to pass information on very quickly. There is a common concern about some groups. It's all very good. But some groups have not even been well penetrated yet, particularly some of the Shiite groups. And that's just going to take time." While never perfect, Kupperman is quick to note that when intelligence is working well, the public never learns of its successes. "There is a lot that has been prevented," he notes, "and a lot of good things that have happened, a lot of plots that were about to happen that were thwarted both domestically and abroad."

In Kupperman's view, this atmosphere of increased cooperation has emerged because few if any countries are immune to terrorism. Even the Soviets were recently victims of a terrorist act in Beirut; nevertheless, Kupperman makes no bones about Soviet involvement in international terrorism, "They are certainly occasional victims. On the other hand, they have done a lot more victimizing than playing the role of victim."

Various commentators have ob-

served that democracies find it reprehensible that innocent civilians may be killed during counterterrorist actions even when the greatest care is taken to avoid it. In discussing the legal and moral constraints which come into play when infiltrating terrorist groups or combating terrorists, Kupperman provides a certain insight into the American approach: "Well, I think we are going to have to find that we can't afford to be lily white and understand that our predisposition to use rockets, launch shells from battleships, and napalm from aircraft, is not always an adequate proxy or substitute for somebody with a .38."

Kupperman noted that we as Americans are often unwilling to exercise extreme sanctions on a selective basis when innocent human life may be lost, yet we seem more than willing to disregard this principle when technology allows us to ignore the result of our actions. For instance, notes Kupperman, "When you use a shell from the 16-inch guns of the New Jersey and you wipe out a Druze village, you are disregarding human life."

It is a difficult question. And there is no clear-cut answer, " . . . I feel for all human beings," says Kupperman almost apologetically, "but people make decisions in war, and this is a form of warfare. This is not primarily a juridical problem."

On the question of retaliation, Kupperman believes that there is also no textbook solution. "Well, to deal with the issue of retaliation, let me start off by simply saying something absolutely heretical: that we ought not have a policy about terrorism. The problem with having a policy about terrorism is that we may have to do something which may require us to automatically retaliate when there is no good reason to do so, or when we can't really find fairly precise targets. That is the first reason. Secondly, we are a large enough and resilient enough nation that we do not always have to go on a tit for tat basis

U.S. Air Base Bombed Again — 3 Civilians Wounded

Hijackers Killed — 2 Hostages Wounded as Police Storm Airplane

Car Bomb Kills 5: Destroys Block

Terrorism and the Mass Media

By Dr. Rudolf Levy

In a democratic society, free and unencumbered media are indispensable communication links between the government and those it governs. This is one of the basic rights in a democracy and is guaranteed by the United States Constitution. As such, the media serve the economic and sociopolitical interests of society by collecting, recording, and disseminating information.

Because of rapid advancements in electronic communications, information can be collected at the site of an incident and transmitted worldwide directly into viewers homes. This increased access to and reliance upon the media make their psychological impact dramatic and persuasive.

Unfortunately, this same technology provides terrorist groups one critical asset—immediate access to millions of people through the mass media, which willingly or unwillingly serve their propaganda and psychological warfare needs. Terrorism is propaganda by deed—armed propaganda. Terrorism feeds on publicity; only in this way can terrorists advertise their ideologies, causes, and deeds to the world. In many ways, the modern terrorist is the creation of the media. Espousing various ideologies and claiming some sort of liberation of the masses, terrorists have become increasingly adept at using the media in an effort to influence people and governments.

Media Functions

Although it appears that only terrorists can take advantage of the media, in a democratic society each individual and, indeed, the government have equal access. There are five basic functions of the media in a free society:

- **Informational**: to maintain the flow of news and current events.

- **Judgmental**: to provide a basis for judgment and interpretation.

- **Educational**: to transmit knowledge and to define and clarify.

- **Interactional**: to provide an open forum for the free exchange of ideas and opinions.

- **Recreational**: to provide amusement and learning situations and to send out social messages.

Terrorist Media Strategy

It is evident that terrorists have expended considerable effort to manipulate the media in all five of its basic functions. Carlos Marighella, Brazilian philosopher, author, and leader of a terrorist organization until his death in 1969, described media manipulation strategy as an aggressive psychological warfare technique which attempts to place the government in the position of always having to defend itself. According to Marighella's **Manual of the Urban Guerrilla,** terrorist media manipulation strategy is divided into three phases:

- **Phase I, primary**: tactical objectives include attacks against suitable targets on a small scale which bring the name of the group and its causes before the public.

- **Phase II, secondary**: the strategic objective is to have the media advertise the organization's ideological claims in an appeal for broad support.

- **Phase III, final**: a call for complete public support while actually fighting the government in an attempt to

Military Intelligence

Order Form Mail To:

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Enclosed is $ _____ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. _____

MasterCard and VISA accepted.

MasterCard   VISA°

Credit Card Orders Only
Total charges $_____
Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Customer's Telephone No.'s

Area Code	Home	Area Code	Office

Charge orders may be telephoned to the GPO order desk at (202)783-3238 from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. eastern time, Monday-Friday (except holidays).

Please enter my subscription to MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
[MILIN] for one year at $14.00 Domestic; $17.50 Foreign.

Company or Personal Name

Additional address/attention line

Street address

City   State   ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

For Office Use Only

Quantity		Charges
_____	Publications	_____
_____	Subscriptions	_____
Special Shipping Charges		_____
International Handling		_____
Special Charges		_____
OPNR		_____
_____	UPNS	
_____	Balance Due	
_____	Discount	
_____	Refund	982

Book Review Policy

Book reviews are considered to be an integral part of the presentation of information of professional interest to the MI community. The normal policy of *Military Intelligence* is to publish reviews of books which have appeared in print over the previous year. Book reviews which are more than one year old are only published in cases where useful subject matter might not otherwise have been brought to the attention of our readers. Such reviews are considered on a case-by-case basis. Reviews of current books are more likely to be published. A limited number of books are received directly from publishers and are available for review. If you are interested in reviewing one of these books, please contact the editorial staff. Unsolicited reviews are also welcome and encouraged.

"Feedback" is the readers' column, *your* column. Letters printed in "Feedback" can be on any subject that relates to intelligence, electronic warfare, doctrine, tactics, innovations from the field, suggestions, criticism, even praise, or anything else the readers of *Military Intelligence* may find of interest. Letters *do not* have to refer to a previously printed article or letter from the magazine to be used in **FEEDBACK.**

Letter Policy: All letters to the editor must be signed. Names may be withheld if requested. Letters should be type-written and double spaced. The editor reserves the right to shorten letters. Letters are normally edited for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation. Please include a phone number (Autovon preferred) and a complete return address on the letter itself (envelopes tend to get separated from the letters).

Military Intelligence Writer's Guide

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE is oriented toward active Army, reserve and civilian intelligence personnel throughout the Army and Defense Intelligence communities. When writing an article, consider the readers. They range from privates to general officers to civilians, and they all have one thing in common: they work in, or have interest in, military intelligence.

SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence; tactical and strategic intelligence; organization; weapons and equipment; foreign forces; electronic warfare; and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, ect.). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: Military Intelligence prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the readers' attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the readers' time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

ACCEPTANCE: We make no prior commitments on acceptance until we have thoroughly studied each manuscript. All manuscripts must be original, previously unpublished works. Authors submitting articles are responsible for informing the staff of **Military Intelligence** of simultaneous submission and/or acceptance by other publications.

FORMAT: We prefer articles from 1,000 to 2,500 words in length. We will publish shorter or longer articles depending on quality. Develop your ideas and stop. Send clean, doublespaced manuscripts typed on one side of the sheet. Your name, length of manuscript, address, and phone number (Autovon preferred) should be typed on the first page. We prefer one original and one copy. Cite your references and enclose all quoted material in quotation marks. If possible, credit should be given within the article as footnotes are burdensome and use valuable space.

GRAPHICS: Artwork in the form of black and white glossy photographs, maps, sketches or line drawings can enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of your article. If you have an idea for artwork or know where we can get it, let us know.

CLEARANCE: All service members and Department of Defense civilians must clear articles through their local security office prior to submission. A signed statement of clearance must accompany the article. Certain categories of articles, as outlined in AR 360-5, must be cleared through the Office, Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army. Your local information officer can assist with this.

BIOGRAPHY: Enclose a brief biographical sketch, including important positions and assignments, experience or education which establishes your knowledge of the subject, and your current position and title. Photos of authors are no longer used in **Military Intelligence.**

COPYRIGHT: Military Intelligence is not copyrighted. Acceptance by **Military Intelligence** conveys the right for subsequent reproduction and use of published material for training purposes.

If you are interested in a subject, chances are that others will be too. Pick a subject, thoroughly research it, and think all your ideas through. Write with enthusiasm, but be natural. Don't adopt a different style.

For more information, contact the editor by writing to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000; or call Autovon 879-2676/3266, or commercial (602) 538-2676/3266.

Book Review Policy

Book reviews are considered to be an integral part of the presentation of information of professional interest to the MI community. The normal policy of *Military Intelligence* is to publish reviews of books which have appeared in print over the previous year. Book reviews which are more than one year old are only published in cases where useful subject matter might not otherwise have been brought to the attention of our readers. Such reviews are considered on a case-by-case basis. Reviews of current books are more likely to be published. A limited number of books are received directly from publishers and are available for review. If you are interested in reviewing one of these books, please contact the editorial staff. Unsolicited reviews are also welcome and encouraged.

"Feedback" is the readers' column, *your* column. Letters printed in "Feedback" can be on any subject that relates to intelligence, electronic warfare, doctrine, tactics, innovations from the field, suggestions, criticism, even praise, or anything else the readers of *Military Intelligence* may find of interest. Letters *do not* have to refer to a previously printed article or letter from the magazine to be used in **FEEDBACK.**

Letter Policy: All letters to the editor must be signed. Names may be withheld if requested. Letters should be type-written and double spaced. The editor reserves the right to shorten letters. Letters are normally edited for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation. Please include a phone number (Autovon preferred) and a complete return address on the letter itself (envelopes tend to get separated from the letters).

Military Intelligence Writer's Guide

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE is oriented toward active Army, reserve and civilian intelligence personnel throughout the Army and Defense intelligence communities. When writing an article, consider the readers. They range from privates to general officers to civilians, and they all have one thing in common: they work in, or have interest in, military intelligence.

SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence; tactical and strategic intelligence; organization; weapons and equipment; foreign forces; electronic warfare; and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, ect.). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: Military Intelligence prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the readers' attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the readers' time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

ACCEPTANCE: We make no prior commitments on acceptance until we have thoroughly studied each manuscript. All manuscripts must be original, previously unpublished works. Authors submitting articles are responsible for informing the staff of Military Intelligence of simultaneous submission and/or acceptance by other publications.

FORMAT: We prefer articles from 1,000 to 2,500 words in length. We will publish shorter or longer articles depending on quality. Develop your ideas and stop. Send clean, doublespaced manuscripts typed on one side of the sheet. Your name, length of manuscript, address, and phone number (Autovon preferred) should be typed on the first page. We prefer one original and one copy. Cite your references and enclose all quoted material in quotation marks. If possible, credit should be given within the article as footnotes are burdensome and use valuable space.

GRAPHICS: Artwork in the form of black and white glossy photographs, maps, sketches or line drawings can enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of your article. If you have an idea for artwork or know where we can get it, let us know.

CLEARANCE: All service members and Department of Defense civilians must clear articles through their local security office prior to submission. A signed statement of clearance must accompany the article. Certain categories of articles, as outlined in AR 360-5, must be cleared through the Office, Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army. Your local information officer can assist with this.

BIOGRAPHY: Enclose a brief biographical sketch, including important positions and assignments, experience or education which establishes your knowledge of the subject, and your current position and title. Photos of authors are no longer used in Military Intelligence.

COPYRIGHT: Military Intelligence is not copyrighted. Acceptance by Military Intelligence conveys the right for subsequent reproduction and use of published material for training purposes.

If you are interested in a subject, chances are that others will be too. Pick a subject, thoroughly research it, and think all your ideas through. Write with enthusiasm, but be natural. Don't adopt a different style.

For more information, contact the editor by writing to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000; or call Autovon 879-2676/3266, or commercial (602) 538-2676/3266.

Military Intelligence

Order Form   Mail To:

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Enclosed is $ _____ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No._____

**MasterCard and
VISA accepted.**

MasterCard   VISA°

Credit Card Orders Only
Total charges $_____
Fill in the boxes below.

Credit
Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date ☐☐☐☐
Month/Year

Customer's Telephone No.'s

| Area Code | Home | Area Code | Office |

Charge orders may be telephoned to the GPO order
desk at (202)783-3238 from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
eastern time, Monday-Friday (except holidays).

Please enter my subscription to MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
[MILIN] for one year at $14.00 Domestic; $17.50 Foreign.

Company or Personal Name

Additional address/attention line

Street address

City   State   ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

For Office Use Only

Quantity	Charges
_____ Publications	_____
_____ Subscriptions	_____
Special Shipping Charges ·	_____
International Handling	_____
Special Charges	_____
OPNR	_____
_____ UPNS	
_____ Balance Due	
_____ Discount	
_____ Refund	982

---

achieve final objectives.

Contagion Hypothesis

The three main criticisms of the media in its treatment of terrorists and terrorism are its emphasis on terrorist incidents, the fictionalization of terrorism, and the glamorization of terrorist personalities. Experts believe that this type of coverage often has adverse effects, such as:

• Encouraging the formation of new groups. Tactical successes and successful exploitation of the media lead to terrorists taking advantage of the momentum of previous actions and, thus, to an increase in terrorist acts.

• Keeping the terrorist organization's name before the public and the "masses" on whose behalf the terrorists supposedly act.

• Leading other less successful groups or individuals to commit more daring acts of terrorist violence.

• Tempting terrorists, who have received favorable media coverage in the past, to attempt to seize control of the media.

Media-Enhanced Impact of Terrorism

Terrorist violence becomes the theater of the obscene, a drama amplified by mass media and relentlessly projected onto the world's consciousness. In fact, a circus atmosphere is often created as reporters scramble to be on the scene and to witness every gruesome detail of the violence as it unfolds. The coverage of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by a militant Shiite group in June is one recent example.

As with all crimes, excessive publicity creates copycat situations where individuals imitate the criminal acts they see reported on television. This was evident during the Cyanide Tylenol case in Chicago. Within a few weeks there was a flood of complaints about poison food and candy or contaminated eye drops and other products throughout the United States. Excessive or slanted reporting of terrorist incidents, especially where the terrorists are portrayed as being strong and the authorities weak, can create hysteria and a climate of intimidation. In fear of their lives, people may act on their own, outside of the law, or they may demand that drastic measures be taken by the government. Usually, such action is counterproductive and, in fact, plays right into the hands of the terrorists. Whenever terrorism counteraction measures are taken, some freedoms must be suspended. A classic example of media-created mass hysteria and panic is the 1938 Orson Welles' radio broadcast, "War of the Worlds." The mere fact that the so-called invasion was presented on nationwide radio gave it a certain credibility. In addition, people were already in a state of anxiety because of the trouble brewing in Europe. Taking these two circumstances into account, it is easy to see how the "invasion" was accepted as fact.

Also, as television dwells on the sensational, retelling and portraying all the bloody details over and over again, people become immunized against the reality of the suffering; such reporting dulls their sense of propriety and morality. Societies that are exposed to large doses of terror and killing become desensitized to it and come to regard acts of terrorism, including killing, as normal, everyday occurrences.

On-the-spot coverage of hostage situations can actually endanger the lives of hostages and law enforcement personnel, as well as interfere with hostage recovery operations. On the other hand, the media can sometimes assist in the hostage negotiation process. Hostage takers usually trust the media and, sometimes, will settle for the publicity rather than actually commit the violence that always earns it.

The media is able to confer status on people merely by mentioning their names; consequently, folk heroes and legends have been created. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, "Carlos" Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, Fusako Shigenobu, Dr. George Habash, and others were portrayed as selfless fighters for human rights and liberators of the masses, or as modern "Robin Hoods," while, often, they were instruments of subversive powers, and nothing less than cold-blooded murderers.

By using techniques such as repeated reporting, making assumptions, and fictionalizing about the terrorists, the media can literally create something that did not initially exist. The media become an unwilling partner of the terrorists as their broadcasts and press coverage create fear and panic in people—since this is precisely what the terrorists seek. However, looking at the other side of the coin, the media could be used to expose terrorists for what they really are and, thereby, calm the population.

Again, modern technology aids the

terrorists, who carry transistor radios and portable television sets, then listen to and view law enforcement activities in process. Examples abound of terrorist exploitation of media broadcasts and communications which caused loss of lives. In Vietnam, unscrupulous reporters "uncovered" continuing or planned operations and reported our troop movements to their headquarters via telephone or single-sideband radios which were easily intercepted by the enemy.

The Khaalis Hanafi Muslim Group takeover of several buildings in Washington, D.C., in 1977 almost ended in tragedy when local TV reporters filmed the lifting of a basket of food to an upper floor of a building where 11 people were hiding from the terrorists. Although initially unaware of their presence, terrorists were promptly informed by sympathizers who saw the news report on local television. Fortunately, police rescued the people before the Hanafi terrorists had a chance to act.

The presence of media cameras, lights, and sound equipment draws crowds—some of whom may be on the side of the perpetrators, others against them. Situations such as this could lead to serious disturbances, riots, and street fighting and can interfere with law enforcement operations. Also, placing law enforcement personnel on the spot by hounding them for interviews further interferes with operations and distracts, intimidates, and impedes the decisionmaking process.

The media have created spectacles out of small incidents that might have been resolved much faster. Terrorists want to prolong siege/hostage situations, because as long as the media cooperates, they are receiving publicity and are accomplishing at least part of their mission. The 1977 siege of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, Columbia, lasted more than 60 days, but could have been resolved much sooner.

Perhaps the best illustration of saturation media coverage that aided the terrorists is the Iranian hostage situation which lasted from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981, a total of 444 days. It was a crisis that shook the diplomatic and political world. Daily, television viewers worldwide saw that terrorists had power over the most powerful and democratic nation in the world. Counting down the days, TV announcers would narrate the embassy takeover and show pictures of one of the hostages with his head bandaged being pushed around by a mob and a U.S. flag burning while being stomped on the ground. Probably the best example of terrorist control over media programming is the Iranian student-filmed interview with Cpl. Gallegos, one of the U.S. hostages. The unedited interview aired for 30 minutes on one of our major networks. Speaking under a portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, Gallegos affirmed the humane treatment the hostages were receiving and the absence of abuse. However, prior to the interview, one of his captors, Mary, delivered a lengthy unedited anti-American tirade. Here, the terrorists were given a worldwide hearing of their poisonous propaganda, designed to cause controversy and dissension among U.S. citizens and members of the government. And they succeeded to a certain extent.

However, not all media coverage during the Iranian hostage situation was negative. Following the seizure of our embassy and the subsequent expulsion of U.S. citizens from Iran, the media were the only effective intelligence and communications links to that country. And after the expulsion of the U.S. media from Iran in January 1980, the British Broadcasting Corporation and German wire services served as our only link there.

Terrorist Use of Media Information

Information gleaned from television or newspapers can be very useful to terrorist operations. Profiles of hostages, their families, and friends are excellent tools and can be used to pressure hostages and increase terrorist blackmail capabilities. Such was the case when Brig. Gen. James Dozier was kidnapped in Italy. The Red Brigades were provided Dozier's biographical data as well as information on his family and friends by the press, radio, and television. This was the most valuable intelligence the terrorists were to secure. Since reporters have little or no access to the terrorists, they must concentrate on the law enforcement side; consequently, decisions, tactics, and movements are "given" to the terrorists by the media.

As stated previously, media coverage can endanger the lives of hostages. The 1977 terrorist hijacking of German Lufthansa Flight 181 is one

of many examples of terrorist use of media reports. First, a foreign radio station reporter overheard a radio transmission of a German Boeing 727 carrying a GSG-9 rescue team to Crete, and promptly announced it on the news. The Germans quickly explained that the aircraft was carrying the requested terrorist captives to them. Second, reporters probably contributed to the death of the German airline captain when one of them announced that the captain was passing information about the terrorists to the authorities. Upon hearing this, the terrorist leader, Zuhair Akache, a.k.a. Captain Mahmoud, murdered the German pilot in front of the passengers.

The presence of media in siege/hostage situations can also cause problems. During negotiations, journalists may be saying one thing while the negotiator is saying something else, thus destroying the negotiator's credibility. Milking the media for what it is worth also delays resolution of these incidents.

The situation is further complicated when, exposed to world scrutiny provided by the media, the terrorists, anxious not to lose face, may initiate even more drastic actions or kill hostages or innocent bystanders. The presence of an audience may also goad terrorists into doing what they think is "expected" of them. Reporters who deal directly with the terrorists or insert themselves between law enforcement personnel and the terrorists isolate the negotiators and law enforcement personnel. This occurred in 1971 during the Attica Correctional Facility riots and, in fact, contributed to the siege/hostage situation.

Media presence can also alter the psychological environment in which the terrorists operate either by giving them a feeling of security, by upsetting them with inflammatory statements, or by divulging names and activities the terrorists wish to keep secret. Direct communication between reporters and the terrorists can further endanger lives. During the Hanafi incident, mentioned earlier, a local TV reporter had a telephone interview with Khaalis, the terrorist leader, pressing him for a deadline. However, during negotiations, the **absence** of a deadline is more advantageous to negotiators. In another instance, a thoughtless and ignorant reporter linked Khaalis to another organization which he hated; this created a vicious outburst and one of the hostages was threatened with death. The 1977 Hanafi situation turned out to be a dangerous media circus that could have cost many lives.

Constant media scrutiny of law enforcement, intelligence, and other counterterrorism personnel interferes with their operations since, for obvious reasons, they need to keep their identities secret. This type of interference also delays important decisions. The presence of media on the scene gives away an important bargaining tool in hostage situations and sieges.

Terrorist Exploitation of the Media

One of the most exploitable aspects of the media is the competitiveness of reporters. There is almost a rabid quest to be the first to bring the terrorist theater drama to the people. As a result, the situation is not examined carefully enough, so subsequent coverage may only succeed in glorifying the terrorists. Their actions are portrayed as being just and the government's actions as unjust or repressive, and the message that comes across is that the terrorist's only immediate solution is violence.

With the media's help, terrorists have an easy time presenting the government as weak and ineffective. At this point, the terrorists hold all the cards; to them, the end justifies the means. They are willing to risk lives, even their own, to achieve their objectives. Law enforcement people, on the other hand, operate under a practical handicap of minimizing the harm to persons and property.

Manipulation of the media, by having them repeat broadcasts each time the terrorists do something, makes it appear that the media are working for the terrorists. Media events, such as the Iranian hostage situation, the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Afghanistan in 1979, and the bombings of U.S. embassies and the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, have had a psychological impact on the U.S. population and have resulted in the radicalization of some elements and the polarization and division of other elements within the U.S. government. Cries for "liberation of the downtrodden" or "help the underdog" appeal to certain segments of American society and cause some people to excuse the violence or killing of innocent people, because the terror-

ist's cause sounds "just."

Mass Media Benefits

The media's role in terrorist incidents can be just as beneficial as it can be detrimental. It is the job of the media to inform the population about terrorist activities and to alert people to emergencies. Law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community benefit from the extensive data base and up-to-date information generated by the media. In the past, the media have actually provided alternatives to terrorist acts. The media have also been able to expose foreign influence or support of terrorist activities and have been instrumental in the apprehension of terrorists and foreign agents. Knowing that the media may expose them does provide some curbs on terrorist activities. Files, tapes, films, photographs, and articles about terrorists and their activities constitute an excellent data base. In short, the media **can do** for the authorities what they **do** for the terrorists.

Role of Media in Terrorism Counteraction

The media are in a position to help as well as hurt terrorism counteraction operations. To accomplish the positive result, it is necessary for the authorities to develop rapport with reporters and other members of the media. They must be kept informed of the real situation in regular or impromptu briefings. The briefings should be conducted by professionals from public affairs offices (PAO) or by intelligence personnel. All PAO personnel should be familiar with ter-

rorism and terrorism counteraction. Media representatives should be briefed, if they are not familiar with the terrorist threat.

A media center, provided with communications, radio, and television, should be set up away from the incident scene to protect members of the media. This press center should be operated by a PAO team and should include a legal officer, a chaplain, and, wherever possible, intelligence personnel, especially in cases where hostages are held. Media representatives should be escorted by PAO or law enforcement personnel when they leave the press center. An access and pass list for reporters should be established in a prolonged situation. A separate area should also be established for families of hostages and other victims of the terrorist strike. Generally, families of hostages should be kept away from the media. Special requests by the media for interviews with these people should be considered carefully, and interviews should not be allowed to interfere with counterterrorist operations, to endanger the lives of hostages, or to jeopardize negotiations. A public affairs annex should be included in every counterterrorist/hostage recovery plan.

The majority of media representatives are responsible professionals who take their jobs seriously and are willing to do the right thing. To prevent them from reporting or to deny them information would constitute a violation of First Amendment rights. A thorough explanation of the case, an appeal for cooperation, and courteous treatment of media representatives would benefit our intelligence

operations, public relations, and the overall terrorism counteraction effort. ★

Rudolf Levy, a native of Czechoslovakia, was a member of anti-Nazi underground organizations during World War II and later was a member of an anti-Communist organization. He was arrested by the Czechoslovak Secret Police and later escaped to West Germany after serving six months of a 15-year sentence. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1951 and was commissioned in 1961 with dual branch status in Infantry and Military Intelligence. While in the Army, Levy served in Europe, Japan, Alaska, Korea, Vietnam, and in various assignments in the continental United States. Levy is a professional linguist in Slavic languages and has conducted research and studies on international terrorism and political violence and Communist tactics and strategy for the past 30 years. He also teaches at colleges and universities and departments of public safety. Levy was educated at the Technological Institute in Prague, Heidelburg University, Geneva International University, University of Texas, and American Western University, studying Political Science, International Relations, and Political Violence. Levy was formerly employed as a researcher, course developer, and instructor on international terrorism and counterterrorism operations with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. He also serves as guest lecturer at other military schools and installations.

☭SOVIET AWARENESS

ACROSS

3   Russian ruling house 1613-1917
5   Committee for State Security (abbr.)
8   Landlocked sea entirely within USSR
10   Don R. empties into it
12   Country in which GSFG located (abbr.)
13   Major river of West Siberian Plain
14   Only ice-free port in E. USSR with direct access to open sea.
17   WW II leaders met here in 1945
18   Official USSR press agency
20   River flows through Leningrad
22   Gurevich helped design aircraft with this prefix
24   Where B-52's would be in Soviet AF
25   Initials for secret police prior to NKVD
26   Country with northernmost land border with USSR
27   Bloody _____ (abbr) shooting, 1905
28   Largest All-Union Republic (abbr)
32   Yerevan is the capital
34   Russian term for country house
37   "Krasnaya" in English
38   Russian for "self-published"
41   Resort on E coast of Black Sea
42   World's largest inland body of water
43   Administrative city on Irtysh R.
46   Original E terminus of Trans-Siberian RR
49   Shot from this ship signaled start of Oct. Revolution
51   Military Airlift Command for Soviet Air Force
52   Abbr designates dates according to pre-1918 calendar
53   Major product of region around Baku
54   Crew of this ship mutinied in 1905

DOWN

1   _____-10 is a new defensive missile
2   Highest mountain in Europe
3   Siberian holy man, influenced last Tsar's wife
4   Prefix for standard Soviet assault rifle
6   Code name for Nazi invasion, 1941
7   National Air Defense Forces (abbr)
9   Caviar is this part of Sturgeon
11   Austrian Lemberg, then Polish city, now in the Ukraine
14   Name of WW I capital
15   Second largest city in USSR
16   WW II name for Tsaritsyn
19   Way no good Russian drinks Vodka
21   Major RR construction, hero project (abbr)
23   Sea NE of Kola Peninsula
29   Kutuzov met Napoleon here
30   Border clashes with China along this river
31   Large dam on Angara R.
33   Galosh is NATO name for
35   USSR national airlines
36   Design bureau for Condor (abbr)
39   National symbol for Armenia located in Turkey
40   Still an active seminary nr. Moscow
44   Born Iuli Tsederbaum, Lenin's political rival
45   _____-Litovsk Treaty ended WW I
47   Design bureau for C-141 look alike (abbr)
48   _____-17,18,19 are Third Generation
50   " _____ Days That Shook the World"

THE Creative LEADER

by Lt. Cmdr. Anthony Kendall

To be prepared professionally and intellectually is one of the greatest challenges facing the military officer. However, there is a tendency to ignore or mitigate this challenge and to develop only to that level which meets today's minimum requirements. Although this generalization may be unfair to some, there is no question that a number of officers have learned to anticipate only routine demands and have been conditioned to *react*, not to act. The purpose of the armed forces is not to perform routine tasks but to promptly and adequately respond to crises with maximal efficiency.

The emphasis of this article is on the nature of creativity: how to recognize it, its purpose and relationship to the officer corps, and the need for it. By recognizing and encouraging creative talent, the military can increase its efficiency, which ultimately contributes to the country's welfare. Nuclear, conventional, and unconventional warfare will indeed be challenging, but the flexible and *thinking* officer can meet this challenge by using creative leadership.

Successful leaders must possess two types of creativity in order to lead and to make sound judgments. The first is *intuitive creativity*—short-term, tactical creativity. This type of creativity may be a key element in combat leadership. The second type is *reflective creativity*—long-term, strategic creativity. Without reflective creativity, an officer will lack insight and will probably be unable to perceive the future. This article will explore both types of creativity and what happens when either is lacking in the officer corps.

Time and time again, the officer corps of all services has been stunned when wars or major crises have broken out. In a crisis, the demand curve shifts and marginal performers become a liability, especially if they hold responsible positions. An Army general fell victim to the "routine" at the Battle of St. Vith when his command was decimated by a fierce German counter attack.

"A middle-aged man, he had spent his whole life—a quarter of a century of it—preparing for war. Year in, year out, when the Army had been thought of as a refuge for fools or work-shys, he had plodded through morning parades in the harsh sun of Texas, hiked through the dusk of midwestern maneuvers, faced the sullen resentful eyes of the two generations of young soldiers whom he had gigged for cursing-out a sergeant or failing to salute, listened to the same old chatter a hundred times at officer clubs—to find out in one short week that he was a failure."[1]

After Pearl Harbor, as with many other wars and crises, there was a great exodus of officers who had spent their lives in the military, but retired when they were needed the most; the war found them unprepared intellectually to cope with the realities of the unexpected. It can be said that the onslaught of war is like the first snowstorm of a bitter winter—the weakest branches fall from the tree, but the strong ones survive. An example of a strong officer who adapted, survived, and showed reflective creativity is Lieutenant F. H. Michaelis (a future admiral). After the unexpected attack on Pearl Harbor, Michaelis reevaluated his career and goals and

overcame his fixation for battleship warfare. He became a naval aviator and was quite successful in his new role.[2] However, the fast-paced nature of nuclear warfare and terrorism may not be so "forgiving," as to allow unprepared officers who cannot perceive the future accurately the time that Michaelis had to change and adapt.

The problem facing junior and senior officers alike is not nuclear warfare or the emergence of terrorism, but being able to deal with the unexpected—the element of "surprise." Over a hundred years ago, Carl Von Clausewitz identified surprise as one of the key elements of warfare, and yet we still fall prey to it as we did at Pearl Harbor and in Beirut with the bombing of our Marine barracks. Obviously, the principles of Clausewitz are well known to the Soviets and their terrorist surrogates.

Terrorism, almost by definition, involves an unexpected act. Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, Chief of Naval Personnel, stated that one of the challenges facing the Navy is learning how to deal with international terrorism.[3] But, too often, the answer is a one-week course with a practical exercise at the end. Promulgating SOPs and instructions and erecting barricades at military facilities throughout the world are only superficial, somewhat hysterical solutions to the real problem. Nor are more modified rules of engagement or computer programs, which are only automated man-made algorithms designed to think for the officer, part of the solution. No amount of training or reprimands, or the "slaying of scapegoats," will teach officers to deal with

the unexpected.

What then is the solution? Over 40 years ago, Admiral Ernest Joseph King provided a clue in his well-known order prior to World War II: "There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates . . . if they are reluctant to act because they are accustomed to detailed orders and instruction—if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide, and to act for themselves in their several echelons of command—we shall be in a sorry case when the time of 'active operations' arrives."[4]

There are many characteristics which separate a successful leader from an unsuccessful one, such as moral outlook, intelligence, and determination. However, the distinction is actually related to one's level of creativity. General George Brinton McClellan, for example, was very intelligent and highly respected by his men; on the other hand, General Robert E. Lee was creative. Lee realized that 19th century technology had changed some aspects of warfare, whereas McClellan failed to take full advantage of technology, such as the use of railroads for increased mobility of forces.

Creative leaders take what less creative men call "threats" and use them as opportunities and challenges. Creativeness will not assure success in adapting to new or modified "rules of warfare," but a noncreative, inflexible officer will almost certainly be doomed to failure. Creativity, then, is not limited to the author or artist, nor is it limited to the theoretical, though that is its origin.

What is Creativity?

In order to discuss creativity and how its encouragement can be a pragmatic approach to improving the quality of the officer corps, it must first be defined. Psychologists have described creativity in many different ways, but they basically agree that it is *any process by which something new is produced—an idea or an object, including a new form or arrangement of old elements. And the new creation must contribute to the solution of the problem.*[5]

The process itself is classically divided into four basic stages: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.

Preparation is perhaps the most important stage in the creative process. Without it, the other stages would not be possible. It is a period when raw data is gathered on a particular subject. The process is also referred to as immersion; the thinker is literally immersed in a flood of data.[6] The noncreative person may experience the same phenomenon, but the creative person has the ability to separate the significant from the insignificant. Albert Einstein was purported to have said that it took him a year after graduation before he could be creative because he had to sort out the real facts from the great quantity of useless information and untruths that he had received in college.[7] General Douglas MacArthur spent his earlier years in the Philippines and the Far East gaining experience that served him well during the "crisis years." For the young officer today, the academies, OCS, or ROTC provide the foundation for data gathering. Applying this to the Navy, a young officer's experiences during midshipman cruises should serve him well in the 21st century if he is able to discern the useful from the worthless.[8]

Incubation is the least understood and most controversial stage of creativity. Literally, incubation means to hatch, to develop, or to take form. The meaning suggests a time of unconscious work or a period away from the problem. (This facilitates the shedding of preconceptions or fixations concerning the method of solution.)[9]

Intuitively, incubation does seem to be present, although there is no solid evidence to support this claim. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to prove the existence of incubation. One study tested for the existence of several possible factors related to incubation.[10] These included *free incubation*, pausing from trying to solve the problem; *demanding cognitive work*, shifting a person's direction to other concerns; *active review*, a belief that incubation occurs because absence from a problem forces a thinker to remember forgotten but important ideas; *set breaking*, breaking an unproductive set or overcoming fixation; *stress reduction*, failing to solve a problem because of too much pressure or motivation; and *visual analogies*, a claim that incubation occurs because an event is analogous to the solution of the prob-

lem. (Example: Seeing a cat trying to get a bird out of a cage gave Eli Whitney the idea for the cotton gin.) Therefore, the quiet officer may not be unproductive after all; he may be developing principles that will someday contribute to the well-being of the country and the armed services.

Illumination is a sudden insight into the problem. Elements that precipitate insight include intense but unsuccessful work on the problem, a time interval between working on the problem and final illumination, and finally, a chance moment of reflection which brings the person back to the previous problem. This hiatus can sometimes bring startlingly dramatic results. People have responded to illumination with exclamations such as "Aha!" "Eureka!" and "Of course!" James Watt worked unsuccessfully for two years on the development of a condenser for the Newcomen steam engine. Then one day, while taking a Sunday walk, Watt came up with the solution in a matter of minutes.[11] Before the Battle of Midway, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort Jr., of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, came up with the idea of sending a clear-text bogus message which would be intercepted by the Japanese saying that Midway's freshwater machinery had broken down. From intercepted and decoded messages, it was discovered that the Japanese were planning an attack on the nebulous "AF." The Navy confirmed "AF" meant Midway when a subsequent Japanese message, in reaction to the fake message, reported that "AF" was low on fresh water.[12] This small creative act contributed to the final victory at Midway.

Verification is essential because it brings an idea from the theory of the mind to the rigors of reality. Verification tests the value of the solution. Unfortunately, verification may come too late. December 7, 1941, verified in a tragic manner what some officers had been saying for years—that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to an air attack.

Nurturing Creativity

Behaviorists believe the best way to increase creativity is by constructing an environment that nurtures and encourages it. Creativity can be fostered by "reinforcement of selected behaviors and shaping them to progressively higher levels."[13] Superiors

can provide leadership not only by example but also by being teachers. Some officers confuse enigmatism with leadership. But, when the situation permits, a true leader should foster creative behavior by explaining his own decisionmaking processes. He should aggressively seek and critique subordinates' creative processes and, in turn, encourage them to develop the same in their subordinates. SOPs, instructions, and regulations are not providing junior officers the needed "reinforcement of selected behaviors." "Teachers," not cult leaders, are needed to prepare today's junior officers to be tomorrow's leaders.

A major hindrance to creativity is conformity. Conformity is defined as *the loss of self-reliance and the undermining of creative powers by emphasizing the outer environment over the individual's own thought process and imagination*. A commanding officer warns that we must not have a corps of officers who " . . . know how to conform but not create, interpret but not innovate."[14]

Conformity could be one reason why officers generally score low in creativity tests. Research tends to substantiate this hypothesis. Officers are usually high in conformity and low in creative ability.[15] Officers also scored low in resistance or independence (approximation of nonconformity).[16]

Officers who are nonconformists often do not advance in their careers because nonconformity in an officer is often confused with counterconformity. Nonconformists are not rebels. Creative, nonconformist officers do not strive for the superficial goal of change for its own sake or for notoriety. Generally, they are not martyrs, but are pragmatists who seek change to improve the organization.[17] Researchers report that creative people tend to have a high tolerance for ambiguity, unusual problem-solving skills, and nonconformist approaches to problem solving.[18]

Organizational structure can be a negative environmental influence and can "institutionalize" conformity. Creativity is impeded when too much emphasis is placed on the following elements:

- **Specialization:** In striving for efficiency and stability, the military tends to go to the extreme and isolates officers from the "big picture."

- **Departmentalization:** This is good to a certain extent; however, it can also limit channels of information. An empirical study concluded that departmental organizations create many managers who can detect and solve problems relating only to their specific jobs.[19]

- **Structuralization:** A military structure is needed, but it can exert great pressure on individuals to perform, thus reducing creativity.[20]

Even if the environment is not truly conformist, it can still be detrimental if the officer feels that the surroundings warrant conformance. Thus, the officer spends a lot of time trying to conform. Conformity can alienate the creative individual from the group and, in so doing, limit information channels.[21]

Is Creativity Needed in the Military?

Is creative talent really needed in the military, and is it easily recognized? Historically, people have failed to recognize creative individuals. Research found that a group of future teachers generally rejected a list of certain traits when presented to them. They believed them to be undesirable, and yet, the list was developed by using examples from people identified as being very creative.[22]

Military leaders are teachers, but they can also fail to recognize or appreciate creative potential. A former superintendent of a military academy, responsible for the creative development of future leaders, states: "Success or failure in battle with the fleet is in no way dependent upon a knowledge of biology, geology, ethics, social science, the literature of foreign languages, or the fine arts."[23] Years ago, a superior officer of Admiral Alfred Mahan stated in reference to Mahan, "It is not the business of a Naval officer to write books."[24] If Mahan had been encouraged more by his superiors, how many more young junior officers might he have inspired to greatness?

When creativity is either scorned or not recognized, the results can be disastrous:

- **Alfred Mahan: Ignored by many (excluding Theodore Roosevelt), but not the Japanese, who used many of** his principles to America's grief. His writings also influenced Kaiser Wilhelm II's decision to build a powerful German navy.

- **Robert Goddard: Ridiculed as a "moon man" in this country, Goddard's early plans aided the Germans in the development of the V2 rocket.**

- **Charles DeGaulle: French military leaders didn't bother to read his book, The Army of the Future, in which he outlines the theory of mechanized warfare. Needless to say, the Germans read and used it.**

Recommendations

It is recognized that there are many talented officers and that all services have made efforts to encourage creative production. The following is a list of policies which the Navy should continue to support, as well as additional recommendations which could nurture and increase creative output in all services:

Sponsor creativity. Creative people often fail to communicate their results because they are not necessarily skillful in verbal communication. A superior officer can use his power as a sponsor and advocate. He can also act aggressively and decisively as a "teacher" to help develop a junior officer's communications skills.

Halt or slow down the increasing specialization in war colleges and graduate schools. Creativity flourishes in a theoretical environment; emphasis should be placed on the idea behind the "hardware," not the hardware itself. Much of the needed specialized training should be taught in specialized courses *before* the officer enters war college or graduate school.

Constantly re-evaluate the organizational structure in terms of the promotion of creativity. Without violating the chain of command, encourage informal communication between the departments at the squadron or ship level. Frequently, a junior officer may only have one or two jobs in his first tour; however, a good skipper will ensure that the junior officer learns about the tasks and responsibilities of other departments. The commanding officer should avoid "rewarding" the outstanding junior officer by keeping him in one billet during his entire tour.

Study the effects of officer training (academy, OCS, ROTC) on creativity. Identify when conformity is essential and eliminate it when it is not. Also, determine at what point "standardization" is being carried too far.

Invest in creative production by allowing for short periods of time for special projects. Idle time is an essential element in creativity. If all an officer's time is devoted to working on the mundane and the routine, the mundane and the routine will probably be all he produces. A commanding officer should encourage creative production by assigning a promising junior officer two weeks to do anything that the junior officer believes will aid squadron or ship operations. This unstructured task will challenge the junior officer to think. Perhaps the ship's operations could be improved by the infusion of new ideas. The commanding officer or the executive officer could also develop nonroutine scenarios that require command decisions to challenge junior officers to come up with solutions. This will encourage them to solve problems and make critical judgments. The commanding officer could also learn from the exercise.

Prevent information channels from being restricted. Re-evaluate the "need to know" principle. Be less concerned with money when scheduling officers to attend important conferences; send junior officers to important meetings—if only to listen and learn. Also develop and distribute more biographical data, both *intra*community and *inter*community. The Navy should continue to sponsor and to encourage the use of tactical journals among the warfare communities.

Recognize creative officers. The United States must never lose one of its major military advantages over the Soviets—the fact that American officers are more imaginative and creative than their often inflexible Soviet counterparts.

Ultimately, the government approves defense policy, but it is extremely dependent upon wise counsel from the services. Unfortunately, conformity and the lack of insight resulted in military leadership failing to provide the government with an accurate picture of the situation during the Vietnam war, the Iranian hostage situation, and the Beirut bomb-

ing. Conformists work nicely in the military system, but they fall apart in a crisis. A crisis is usually unexpected, a surprise that causes an upheaval in the very system they depend upon for guidance. An officer, no matter what his rank, who has a myopic view of the world is neither an asset nor a leader. The United States officer corps must not fail in an ever-changing world because, if it fails, the leadership will fail, for leadership and officership are synonymous. ★

Footnotes:

1. C. Whiting, **Decision at St. Vith** (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973).

2. F. H. Michaelis, Retired Admiral, USN, "Naval Lessons Yesterday and Tomorrow," **Vital Speeches**, January 15, 1976, p. 213.

3. W. P. Lawrence, Vice Admiral, USN, **OP-01 Meeting**, January 13, 1984.

4. M. Janowitz, **Sociology and the Military Establishment** (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974).

5. L. R. Harmon, "Social and Technological Determiners of Creativity," in C. Taylor, ed., **The 1955 University of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Creative Scientific Talent** (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1956), p. 42.

6. M. Henle, "The Birth and Death of Ideas," in H. E. Gruber, ed., **Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking** (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 31-62.

7. E. K. Von Fange, **Professional Creativity** (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959).

8. H. Poincare, **Science and Method** (New York: Dover Publications, 1952).

9. Henle, pp. 31-62.

10. R. M. Olton and D. M. Johnson, "Mechanisms of Incubation in Creative Problem Solving," **American Journal of Psychology**, Vol. 89, 1976 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 617-630.

11. Von Fange.

12. E. B. Potter, "The Crypt of the Cryptanalyst," **Proceedings**, Vol. 109, August 1983, pp. 52-56.

13. L. Krasner and L. P. Ullman, **Research in Behavior Modification: New Developments and Implications** (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965).

14. R. E. Mumford, "Get Off My Back, Sir!" **Proceedings**, Vol. 103, August 1977, pp. 18-23.

15. R. S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Creative Thinking," in H. E. Gruber, ed., **Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking** (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 120-140.

16. F. Barron, **Creative Person and Creative Process** (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969).

17. Crutchfield.

18. J. A. Glover and A. L. Gary, **Behavior Modification and Other Good Behavior** (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Boxwood Press, 1975).

19. D. C. Dearborn and H. A. Simon, "Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identifications of Executives," **Sociometry**, Vol. 21, 1958, pp. 140-144.

20. Von Fange.

21. Crutchfield.

22. R. B. Ammons and C. H. Ammons, "How to Foster Genius: McCurdy Revisited," **Proceedings of the Montana Academy of Sciences**, Vol. 21, 1962, pp. 138-144.

23. J. W. Masland and L. I. Radway, **Soldiers and Scholars**, (Princeton: University Press, 1957).

24. S. P. Huntington, **The Soldier and the State** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

Lt. Cmdr. Anthony Kendall is currently assigned to the Naval Communications Area Master Station, Mediterranean, Naples, Italy. He has served previous tours in the United States and overseas as a naval flight officer and airborne communications officer. Kendall's warfare specialty is C³ and his subspecialty is C²I. He holds a master's degree in Manpower Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and is completing the Naval War College off-campus program. Kendall was the winner of the 1984 U.S. Naval Institute Leadership Essay Contest.

Intelligence Support to Airmobile Operations

by Maj. Danny S. Grisham

As early morning fog rose from the hills surrounding the rural village of Marxheim in southern Germany, UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, masked by dense forests, swept swiftly into the scattered clearings. Within minutes these workhorse aircraft of the 11th Combat Aviation Group (CAG), VII Corps, discharged elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment's 2d Battalion, then quickly escaped across the treetops along prearranged routes to assembly areas over 70 kilometers away.

The 11th CAG had successfully completed its mission: to cross the forward line of own troops (FLOT); to evade enemy air defenses and troop concentrations; to insert an assault force into multiple, unoccupied landing zones; and then to recover to initial assembly areas along alternate egress routes. Success lay both in the skill of the crews and thorough planning on the part of the staff. However, a major factor which contributed to the success of the mission was the timely intelligence provided to both planners and executors before, during, and after the actual insertion.

Successful cross-FLOT operations were accomplished on four separate occasions during the 1984 VII Corps Reforger exercise Certain Fury. This article discusses the intelligence sup-port for these operations, describes the planning that must occur, and identifies artificial exercise conditions that would be altered during an actual mid-intensity conflict.

Intelligence support for cross-FLOT operations during exercise Certain Fury was conducted in three phases: preparation, insertion, and extraction. During Phase I, Preparation, priority intelligence requirements were determined, and appropriate collection assets were tasked to satisfy those requirements. Additionally, up-to-date intelligence summaries and special products, such as air defense artillery threat profiles, were provided to operational planners for initial concept development. Phase II, Insertion, involved the periodic updating of intelligence prior to launch, and the continuous preparation of inflight reports during the penetration and the return of insertion aircraft. Inflight reporting of near real-time intelligence required an innovative communication scheme which is discussed below. During Phase III, Extraction, intelligence support was provided to flight crews performing extraction operations. This support was similiar to that provided to inserting aircraft. During this phase, the collection effort focused on determining the presence and reaction of hostile forces in the vicinity of pickup zones. Using its own organic communications, the VII Corps all source production section (ASPS) was able to transmit intelligence updates and target information directly to the inserted rangers.

Phase I. Preparation

Upon initial receipt of the mission, the corps ASPS immediately provided all available, pertinent intelligence to the 11th CAG S2. Meanwhile, a small planning cell, comprised of representatives from the 11th CAG, VII Corps ASPS, and the 207th MI Group Operations Center, determined priority intelligence requirements, developed a concept of intelligence support, and conducted detailed planning. Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), Quicklook II, and Guardrail V assets from the 207th MI Group's 2d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) provided dedicated support during Phase II and Phase III, as well as collected much of the intelligence during the preparatory phase. These flexible and responsive airborne platforms immediately became available to corps and are fully capable of collecting the required information. As the first priority, ASPS planners identified a critical soft target such as a major command post, supply point, or support facility. Also of immediate concern was the identification of adequate landing areas which would be far enough from rear area security

forces, air defense systems, and troop concentrations, yet near enough to enable a dismounted force the opportunity to reach its objective. The third priority was to identify multiple ingress and egress routes to and from the landing zones across the FLOT.

The VII Corps ASPS expeditiously collated and analyzed this intelligence and quickly transmitted it to the 11th CAG headquarters in the form of intelligence reports, briefings, liaison, and staff visits. As the intelligence picture developed, operational planners continuously refined and altered flight routes and selected landing zones to avoid threat forces and to maximize the effects of terrain masking against threat radars. The corps fire support element and the G3 electronic warfare officer planned suppression of enemy air defense by incorporating the use of conventional artillery and electronic warfare assets available to the corps into the time-phased insertion plan.

Phase II. Insertion

Here, the primary task was to provide the commander of the penetrating flight near real-time intelligence during both his flight from the marshalling area to the landing zones (located approximately 70 kilometers beyond the FLOT) and his return. Priority intelligence requirements during this phase were geared toward detecting the activation of air defense artillery radars along the planned ingress and egress routes and monitoring any enemy reaction to the insertions, with emphasis on movement toward designated landing zones.

Several steps were taken to provide the necessary timely intelligence. First, intelligence analysts developed and tasked their specific intelligence requirements and concisely defined the geographic areas of interest. All supporting personnel, including flight crews, systems operators, analysts, and communicators, were fully briefed on the operational concept as well as their specific role in the mission. Aviation planners in the group operations center scheduled SLAR, Quicklook II, and Guardrail V sorties to provide the necessary coverage. Perhaps most importantly, a small responsive analytic cell was formed at the ASPS to provide dedicated support.

Located at a SLAR ground sensor terminal (GST) within the ASPS, operation coordinators from the 2d Aerial Exploitation Battalion and 11th CAG quickly collated, interpreted, and analyzed down-linked intelligence data in relation to the planned flight path and landing zones. This intelligence was then transmitted, using the FM communications in the GST van, to an orbiting OV-1D which then relayed it to the flight commander of the assaulting aircraft. Supplied with this information, flight commanders were able to avoid activating air defense radars along their planned routes and were able to select alternate landing zones. In addition to threat emitters, the movement of reaction forces (detected primarily by SLAR) toward preplanned landing zones was of critical importance. When the insertion was completed, egressing aircraft returning via different routes continued to be supplied the intelligence necessary to successfully evade high threat areas.

Phase III. Extraction

Intelligence support to a second cross-FLOT flight to extract the rangers previously inserted was almost identical to that discussed above. This phase, however, emphasized the need to identify safe landing zones to which the flight commanders could be directed.

Conclusion

Intelligence support to special operations is feasible today on the modern battlefield. Our automated systems and responsive communications provide the means for imaginative planners to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. What is needed now is the refinement of these procedures, along with a recognition of the associated costs and limitations.

Many artificial conditions existed during exercise Certain Fury. First, because the Blue Forces enjoyed air superiority, special electronic mission aircraft were not threatened by Orange Air Forces. Second, because of the reduced airspace imposed by European air traffic control requirements, supporting aircraft were not required to fly outside threat air defense artillery coverage, thereby enabling them to operate from near optimal flight tracks. Third, the paucity of enemy forces, particularly air defense systems, did not accurately represent the magnitude of forces NATO would encounter in western Europe. Although not an artificiality, support to these special operations required extensive, dedicated SLAR, Quicklook II, and Guardrail system assets. Similarly, support within the ASPS consumed considerable time for many key players from the ASPS, MI Group, and CAG. Commanders must weigh the benefits this heavy commitment of scarce intelligence resources provides against the competing needs for collection assets that almost always exceed availability.

Despite the many artificialities and limitations mentioned above, the experiences gained and discussed here have general application to similar intelligence operations. During an actual major exercise, a corps demonstrated an organic capability to provide continuous near real-time intelligence to support major airmobile operations. This support displayed a capability to rapidly collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence collected from multiple sources using intelligence and communication systems that are currently available within a corps. Because of this capability, flight commanders were able to either successfully avoid high threat areas, or to decisively attack enemy forces at critical times using suppression of enemy air defense tactics. While the procedures outlined here are by no means comprehensive, they did prove successful during exercise Certain Fury and could be applied in support of future airmobile operations. ★

Major Danny S. Grisham was commissioned in 1969 from Henderson State College, Arkadelphia, Ark. As a company grade officer, he served in command and staff positions with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division (Vietnam); the 650th MI Group, 3d Infantry Division; and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. As a field grade officer Grisham served in staff positions with Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command. He holds a master's degree in International Relations from Boston University and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Since 1983, Grisham has been the S3 of the 207th MI Group, VII Corps.

Lightning Eagle 1:
A Division - Level Intelligence CPX.

by Capt. Tom Adams

There is agreement within the United States Army that military intelligence (MI) is the key to fighting and winning future wars. However, without commanders and staffs who fully realize the potential of intelligence as a combat multiplier, U.S. forces will fight at an enormous, and possibly fatal, disadvantage.

In order to prepare its battalions and brigades to better perform their roles in the intelligence cycle, and to take advantage of the intelligence which is produced, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has begun a ground-breaking series of intelligence-oriented command post exercises (CPX) designed to acquaint these units with the nature, function, and use of the division's intelligence assets.

These Lightning Eagle exercises challenge the brigades of the division and their constituent battalions to operate as part of a brigade task force in a high threat environment. In order to survive and win, the units must make maximal use of all intelligence collection systems: human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. By using the division's organic resources and correctly tasking higher echelon collection systems, they must be able to find, track, and target high-speed enemy forces advancing on multiple routes.

While these tasks are critical for all Army maneuver units, they are especially important for the air assault division because of its wide area of responsibility. To take advantage of the air assault division's ability to move rapidly and to quickly mass airborne firepower, the commander must be able to see the battlefield completely, correctly, and in near real time. This, then, places a heavy burden on the intelligence elements of the division.

To ensure that these elements of the 101st meet the challenge, the division commander directed his G2 to prepare a series of exercises unique in the Army. These were to be division-directed, brigade-level CPXs devised, directed, and run by the G2 to emphasize intelligence training of maneuver unit staffs and commanders. Lightning Eagle I was developed by the G2 and his staff, in coordination with the commander of the 311th MI Battalion (CEWI).

It was decided that a combat simulation designed at Fort Leavenworth, known as First Battle, would be the system within which the CPX would operate. The focus of the exercise would be on the infantry battalions of the division and the intelligence support provided by brigade and division to these battalions. Eventually, a four-phased approach to the problem was developed:

Phase I. Intelligence system orientation for brigade and battalion officers and NCOs.

- Brief on division intelligence capabilities.

- Brief on mission and operation of G2, 311th MI Battalion, and 2-17th Cavalry.

- Perform the following hands-on equipment demonstrations: TRQ-32(V), PPS-5/15, TPQ-36, PRD-11, RJS-3100, and HEXJAM.

- Brief on employment of HUMINT/counterintelligence assets.

- Give overview of First Battle rules.

- Give overview of intelligence rules and modifications.

Phase II. Exercise preparation.

- Publish/brief division operation order (OPORD).

- Publish/brief brigade OPORD.

- Set up First Battle boards.

- Conduct First Battle rules training.

- Publish/brief battalion OPORD.

- Brief battalion OPORD to the brigade commander.

- Prepare First Battle counters and worksheets.

- Conduct practice game turns.

Phase III. Conduct Lightning Eagle CPX (two days).

- Brigade-level CPX: half of first day (eight hours).

- Battalion CPXs: half day each for one and one-half days; one-hour game turns, five turns each for battalion and brigade.

Phase IV. After-action reviews.

- Hotwash to brigade commander and G2 after each half day.

- Hotwash for all commanders and staffs at ENDEX.

- Written after-action comments.

In order to improve the value of the exercise, each battalion was given control of the entire brigade's intelligence assets during that battalion's exercise turn. This, of course, is far more support than a deployed battalion would expect to receive. However, it allowed the task force commanders and staffs to plan for, use, and control a greater than normal variety of intelligence assets. It proved to be an effective learning device. By imposing a heavy short-term planning load, it underscored both the type and quantity of input available and, just as importantly, drove home the coordination and support requirements of these systems.

One major point of the exercise was to highlight the elements of a task force that can be used to gather intelligence. This includes not only the dedicated collection systems of the CEWI battalion, but also the normal operations of listening posts, observation posts, and patrols. Also important were the elements whose routine activities produce valuable incidental intelligence: attack and transport helicopter overflights, engineer operations, fire support teams, and artillery and air defense radars.

The most important task for exercise planners was to provide a "field"—an array of indicators which could be

discovered and reported using the full range of collection assets. This, in turn, requires that the exercise Threat Forces operate under very strict control in order to be certain that the preloaded indicators reflect logical and realistic operations under OPFOR doctrine. In order to control message input, planners devised a time/event matrix showing the times for various significant activities to take place and which of the available collection systems would be capable of reporting them. This was simply a butcher-paper chart with ruled columns. Each vertical column reflected a particular system while each horizontal row showed what indicators were available for collection at any given time.

This proved to be a crucial element, since almost all enemy activity is the product of a series of discrete events leading to a particular type of operation. It is the task, then, of the intelligence team to analyze these events in terms of indicators so that enemy capabilities and limitations can be determined. For example, the marshalling of transport aircraft from dispersal locations is an obvious indicator of an impending airborne operation; however, any conclusion must be validated by other indicators such as troop movements, the absence of airborne troops from barracks, etc. The exercise planners needed to portray these events in a logical sequence in order to provide realistic indicators. This was the purpose of the time/event matrix. In an exercise as short as this, it was impossible to provide realistic time lines since most preoperational buildup had to take place "off-stage" prior to STARTEX. The exercise itself was not long enough to allow full-scale pre-operational activity on the part of the OPFOR. In order to overcome this, much of the enemy pre-STARTEX activity was reflected in a series of intelligence summaries and a situation summary provided to the players before the exercise.

In order to focus the exercise on a single, attainable, friendly objective, the U.S. Task Force was given a straightforward mission and was required to develop intelligence requirements to support it. Within the operations format of an existing, real-world plan, the battalions were given the mission to determine which of the two routes of advance would be used by the first echelon regiments of an approaching enemy force and then to conduct an air assault delay along that route. This is a realistic mission for a battalion task force, and one which requires considerable emphasis on intelligence, not only for early warning, but also to track the progress of the enemy force.

Two separate administrative cells were organized to support the CPX: a controllers' cell with six persons and an evaluation cell with nine persons. The control cell consisted of one senior controller/senior umpire (captain or major), one umpire (sergeant first class or master sergeant), and four battle board controllers. The evaluation cell consisted of representatives, all either captains or majors, from the following elements: one from G2, one from G3, one from artillery, two from signals intelligence/electronic warfare, two from HUMINT/counterintelligence, one from cavalry, and one from signal.

The evaluation personnel not only provide primary input to the after-action report, but also act as on-board experts in their fields. That is, not only do they evaluate the conduct of the operation, but also assist the players by quickly resolving conflicts arising from questions of doctrine or technical capability.

The participating battalions and brigades were encouraged to organize for the exercise using their normal operational SOPs. Properly utilized, Lightning Eagle can serve as a valuable "no loss, no foul" opportunity to evaluate unit SOPs.

Personnel and logistics are not played as part of this exercise, and these staff sections are not represented either as players or controllers. However, units were expected to provide their normal headquarters element, less a G1 and a G4.

From the organizers' point of view, it was of special importance to provide an adequate supporting command structure. Since much of the intelligence input to a deployed task force originates at division and corps, it was necessary to represent these elements with response cells. For the G2, minimum manning for the corps response cell was determined to be one person in each of the following positions: operations officer (captain or major), operations NCO (staff sergeant or sergeant first class), all source production section (ASPS) officer (captain or major), and journal clerk (private first class or specialist four). For the G3, it was also determined that at least one person in each of the following positions would be required: operations officer (captain or major), operations NCO (staff sergeant or sergeant first class), electronic warfare officer (captain or major), air liaison officer (captain or major), and journal clerk (private first class or specialist four).

It is very important that corps players have a thorough knowledge of corps and echelons above corps/national systems, and that a firm determination be made as to which systems will be played during the exercise. If the scenario chosen is based on an actual operations plan (OPLAN), it should reflect the assets available under the OPLAN rather than what "ought to be" available. Corps players must understand the capabilities of these systems, their response times, and their degree of availability. If at all possible, these players should be drawn from corps intelligence personnel.

A division response cell for the G2 would require, at a minimum, one person in each of the following positions: operations officer (captain or major), operations NCO (staff sergeant or sergeant first class), ASPS officer (warrant officer two or three), ASPS analyst (sergeant or staff sergeant), collection management and dissemination (CM&D) officer (first lieutenant or captain), CM&D NCO (sergeant or staff sergeant), and clerk (private first class or specialist four).

For the G3, the minimum requirement would also be one person in each of these positions: operations officer (captain or major), operations NCO (staff sergeant or sergeant first class), fire support element officer (first lieutenant or captain), electronic warfare officer (first lieutenant or captain), aviation officer (first lieutenant or captain), air liaison officer (first lieutenant or captain), signal officer (first lieutenant or captain), and journal clerk (private first class or specialist four).

Like their counterparts at corps, these individuals must be thoroughly familiar with division intelligence systems and capabilities. In the 101st, an "Intelligence Capabilities Handbook," compiled by the G2 staff, was issued.

This served both as an educational device and as the final authority on questions concerning intelligence systems capabilities.

Because intelligence operations are highly dependent on communications links, the signal evaluator is an especially important member of the team. He or she should be selected with particular care.

Two of the most valuable tools used in the exercise were the task force battalion OPORD briefing to the brigade commander and the "hotwash." Before beginning his portion of the CPX, each battalion commander, along with his staff, was required to brief the OPORD to the brigade commander. This assured, first of all, that the brigade commander's intent was fully understood and implemented and that all assets were fully integrated in support of that intent.

Immediately following its CPX, each battalion participated in an after-action review or "hotwash" while the events were still fresh in the partic-ipants' minds. This review was an informal procedure in which all participants, including controllers and evaluators, reviewed the operation for lessons learned. During this session, it is extremely important that positive comments be surfaced and recognized. The battalion players should receive immediate feedback for the things they did right, keeping the process on a positive note. None of the participants should be made to regard this as a "bet your bars" exercise.

Conclusion

The Lightning Eagle Intelligence CPX is not a test to be passed or failed. It is first and foremost a learning experience. It should be a risk-free environment for commanders, staffs, junior leaders, and technicians to improve their understanding of military intelligence in modern combat. It can also be a diagnostic tool for units to use in evaluating their combat intelligence needs and how they can be met with existing systems. For intelligence professionals, it is an opportunity to examine shortfalls in equipment, doctrine, and procedures, and to test methods for overcoming them.

For all the participants, regardless of their role, it is an opportunity to enhance their understanding of military intelligence operations. The exercise also stresses the importance of intelligence as a combat multiplier and as an essential part of the combined arms team. ★

Capt. Tom Adams is presently assigned as Assistant G2 (Plans), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky. He previously served as the S3 of the 3/327th Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division. Adams holds a bachelor of arts degree from Empire State College and a master of arts degree from Syracuse University. His military schooling includes the MI Officer Advanced Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and Ranger, Special Forces, and Airborne courses.

---

forces. During the early phases of LIC, the decision support template must be accompanied by insurgent order of battle charts when briefing the commander, since "doctrinal/ situational" templates will not yet be developed.

The decision support template, the final product of the IPB process, is essentially the intelligence estimate in graphic form. The decision support template provides the commander with viable, time-phased options so that he can concentrate critical assets at the right place at the right time.

IPB concentrates on building data bases supported by graphics before hostilities begin and outlines its applicability in support of tactical operations. IPB is the basis for collection, coordination, situation development, electronic warfare, and LIC operations. Constantly changing and being updated, IPB supports the commander and staff in making decisions by using the four templates and various overlays. Through systematic and continuous IPB, uncertainties are reduced and the commander can then influence the battle—not just react!

Postscript

Since its inception in the mid-1970s, IPB has proven to be a dynamic tool. It has evolved considerably to meet the rigors of intelligence doctrine. This article represents an attempt to illustrate the progress which has been made. However, this is not the final word on this subject. More work needs to be done. For example, the offensive orientation of current doctrine demands IPB be applied beyond the FLOT. Secondly, there is a misconception that IPB is simply terrain analysis. While terrain analysis is extremely important, the key here is threat integration, where all battlefield elements are combined. Perhaps the solution to this problem lies in education; all intelligence personnel must understand the IPB process in its entirety. Anything less is a disservice to the commander. ★

1st Lt. Joshua J. Novak is assigned to the Computer Based Education Center of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Currently, he is developing a computer-based

interactive videodisc training package on the IPB process. A 1984 graduate of the Tactical All-Source Intelligence Officers Course, Novak holds a bachelor's degree in History from Pennsylvania State University.

CW2(P) John W. Stanley Jr. is currently an instructor/author in the tactical intelligence task group, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. His previous assignments include tours with the 102d MI Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, Korea; the 525th MI Group, the JFK Center for Military Assistance, and the General Intelligence Production Division, all at Fort Bragg, N.C.; Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Ga.; and MACV Team 21, Vietnam. Stanley has attended the Warrant Officer Senior Course, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, the MI Officer Basic Course, and the Advanced Airborne Course.

American Intervention in Russia

1918-1920
by Capt. Richard Groller
Part 1

Out of the turmoil of World War I, a power struggle between the forces of capitalism and communism arose. At its inception, the Soviet Union faced nearly insurmountable odds both from within and without. This article will discuss one factor in that struggle for survival: U.S. military intervention.

Wilson: Yes or No?

One of the great dilemmas plaguing the Wilson administration during World War I was the Soviet question. As a defender of liberal-capitalist democracy, Wilson found it hard to justify American alignment with Czarist Russia against German imperialism. However, with the abdication by Czar Nicholas II and the replacement of that regime with the Kerensky Provisional Government, the picture changed drastically. The United States, then, became the first nation to recognize the Russian Provisional Government, which adhered to the principles of democracy and freedom and was also in favor of continuing the war against Germany.

The October Revolution, however, created new difficulties for Washington. No one was certain of Lenin's position and the Allies found themselves in a waiting game, wondering which way Russia would turn. Daily, *New York Times* headlines proclaimed the defeat of one side or the other: *Revolutionists Seize Petrograd, Kerensky Flees; Kerensky Gaining Support; Russian Revolutionaries Plan Three Month Armistice, Now Hold Moscow, Move to Confiscate Land;* and *Kerensky with Army from the Front Routs Rebels, Loyalists Defeat Reds in Moscow, Cossacks Join Conservatives against Bolsheviki.*

The waiting went on for months, while the war continued. On January 8, 1918, Woodrow Wilson proposed his Fourteen Points to Congress. The sixth point concerned the evacuation of German troops from Russian territory, with the provision that the Russian people be allowed to decide their own future.[1] In the aftermath of the Fourteen Points Address, U.S. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker issued a memorandum arguing that any overt American support for anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia would aid Germany. Baker hoped that through the impact of German imperialism and Wilsonian ideology, Russian radicalism would assume a more democratic, pro-Allied position: "Our only chance in Russia is to re-establish, as quickly as possible, confidence in our absolute honesty and disinterestedness, in the hope that we may thereby help the Russians to establish a government in sympathy with democratic ideals, and in the further hope that the sincerity of the Germans may become patent, thus forcing Russia to the conclusion that, after all, her true interests must lie in a vigorous continuation of war.[2]

Secretary of State Robert Lansing, however, was quite articulate in his anti-Bolshevism and opposed the policies of Baker and of President Wilson's most trusted advisor, Colonel Edward Mandel House. By February 1918, Wilson, too, had begun to distrust the Bolsheviks, "under the impact both of Lansing's articulate anti-Bolshevism and growing evidence that Lenin fully repudiated the values and institutions of liberalism."[3]

In the meantime, Lenin had begun negotiations with the Germans which culminated in the March 3, 1918, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—a treaty which effectively took Russia out of the war. This development, along with persistent rumors that Lenin was in reality a German agent, intensified Allied reaction. Wilson was incensed because Lenin's position made some aspects of his Fourteen Points un-

attainable. Lenin's position was, in fact, diametrically opposed to Wilson's principles and to the American system of government. Moreover, the U.S. policy of equal commercial opportunity for all in the Far East was being threatened. German territorial gains within Russia and the loss of a major fighting force brought the Allies another problem: What to do about Russia? The Allied response was military intervention.

As the Germans extended control over greater expanses of Russia and established bases from which to attack the Allies, Americans called for U.S. action to save Russia from the Teutonic menace. Sirene C. West, a prominent Methodist and a leader of the YMCA, wrote in the **New York Times** on July 1, 1918: "I have reached the conclusion that there is no force in Russia today strong enough to overthrow the German hold upon the people of that country; the force should come from the outside and that outside force should be America . . . the Stars and Stripes are the salvation of the Russian People . . . ."

North Russia

By July 1918, U.S. policymakers believed American intervention was necessary to defend Allied interests in Russia. On July 2, Russian anti-Bolshevik forces proclaimed a state of war in Archangel, threatening the arctic port of Kola with German reprisals. Anticipating trouble, Allied naval forces guarded the port. By July 4, Germany launched a major offensive against north Russia, and on July 8 an independent, anti-Bolshevik Murmansk joined the Allies. Thus the stage was set for American intervention on July 15. The following day, an article in the **New York Times** stated: "After capturing Kem, a railroad station on the White Sea coast, the American and British forces advanced toward Toreki, the Russian Bolshevist authorities having withdrawn to Nirok. The commanders of the Entente Allied forces have issued an appeal to the population on the Murman coast requesting their help against Germany and Finland. It is declared that the Murman coast is Russian territory under the protection of the Entente powers . . . . Meanwhile the Germans are making a desperate attempt to secure the control of the Murman

coast. They need the harbors for submarine bases now that Zeebrugge has been closed and Ostend rendered of little value, while British minefields make it ever more difficult for their submarines to reach the Atlantic. The total Teuton force in Russia is 32 German and 15 Austrian divisions . . . spread over a vast area from the vicinity of Petrograd to the Black Sea. In Finland, threatening the Murman railway, the Germans have rather more than a division, the bulk of this body is in the south . . . ."[4]

As the defense of the Murman railroad and coast became increasingly difficult, additional troops were needed. On August 6, a **New York Times** headline read, "American Troops Landed in Archangel," while the article further stated: "American troops participated in the landing of the Allied forces at Archangel last week . . . (and have) been greeted enthusiastically by northern Russia. The people consider that the United States is absolutely without selfish interests as regards Russia, and look upon the Americans as a guarantee of the friendliness of the Allies toward the country. The population of Archangel received the troops with cheering. The men debarked and advanced toward Archangel, where already the anti-Bolshevik revolution had taken place. The leaders of the movement invited the protection of the Allied troops. The final defeat of the Bolsheviki occurred Saturday at the station of Yaakagorka on the left bank of the Dvina."

The original American forces that landed in Murmansk were composed of blue jackets and marines;[5] later on they were beefed up by the 339th Infantry Battalion. With Allied forces, they drove back the German onslaught but were met by the Bolsheviks. By September 30, American, British, French, and (White) Russian troops occupied "villages on both sides of the Dvina River to a point 125 miles north of Kotlas in . . . Vologda . . . They are now 375 miles east of Archangel."[6] American troops made unobstructed progress along the Volga River and occupied Shenkursk. The Bolsheviks had apparently disappeared. Then, on October 2, three Americans were killed in the first U.S. encounter with the Bolsheviks in the town of Obozerskaya. On November 11, the Armistice ending World War I

was signed even as the fighting between Allied forces and Bolsheviks continued. By late November, heavy snows compelled the American forces to bivouac in the central northern front, in the region of Kadish. Americans there endured more hardships than U.S. forces elsewhere in Russia, especially because the terrain between Dvina and Vologda was primarily swamps and forests. American troops were also operating on the Mehrenga River, 50 miles south of Seletskoe. On December 2, American and Russian troops moved up the Pinega River and captured Karpagaraskol, a town 120 miles from Pinega. Eventually, the Americans began fighting the Bolsheviks "Indian style," by tracking them through the snow.

For the next three months, severe weather conditions limited the action to minor skirmishes. However, by April, fighting became more intense, and on April 1, Brigadier General W. P. Richardson was named Commander of the American Forces in north Russia. Low morale among the troops was increasing, and at least 43 American soldiers were missing (believed to have deserted) on the Bolshoia Ozera front. And still the fighting continued.

On April 11, a company of the 339th Infantry Battalion refused to go to the front, threatening general mutiny unless withdrawn as soon as weather conditions permitted. The 310th Engineer Battalion landed at Murmansk on April 12 to help relieve the already strained and agitated troops. By mid-April the ice began breaking up in the rivers, making it easier for American troops to locate Bolshevik patrols. The total number of Americans missing had reached 556; however, relief was in sight. Army Chief of Staff General Peyton Conway March announced that all U.S. forces would be out of Russia by July. This boosted morale enough to hold the troops together until they were able to leave. Meanwhile though, they continued to fight, taking Mesalskaya on May 8 and clearing and repairing sections of the Murmansk railroad of enemy forces and damage.

The U.S. cruiser Des Moines finally arrived and the first American forces were withdrawn by way of Archangel. By June 10, the entire 339th Infantry Battalion was withdrawn from Russia. After the last of the 310th engi-

neers left Archangel, only Brigadier General Richardson and a small detachment remained to take care of final details before leaving Russia on June 29. While these American forces had fought a strictly anti-Bolshevik war after the Armistice, other American forces fighting simultaneously in Siberia had quite a different set of problems. ★

Next Issue: The Siberian Intervention

Footnotes

1. Douglas W. Downey, ed., **New Standard Encyclopedia**, Fourteen Points (Chicago: Standard Education Corporation, 1983), p. F290.
2. N. Gordon Levin Jr., **Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution** (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 63.
3. Ibid., p. 62.
4. **New York Times**, July 16, 1918.
5. **New York Times**, August 8, 1918.
6. **New York Times**, September 30, 1918.

Capt. Richard Groller is a Military Intelligence officer currently assigned as the signals intelligence requirements officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. He is a recent graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Advanced Imagery Interpretation Orientation Course. Groller has a master's degree in Electronic Warfare Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as a master's degree in Business Administration from Western New England College. His previous assignments include the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., where he was chief, Advanced Electronic Maintenance Division; and the 7th Infantry Division.

┌─**Crossword Puzzle Solution**─┐

SOVIET AWARENESS

Yom Kippur War

(Continued from page 23)

have eliminated Israel's maverick thinkers.

Since assumptions, theories, hunches, and hypotheses are an analyst's basic tools, no estimate could ever be produced without such a framework. However, within this framework intelligence experts must guard against "wishful thinkers" who are tempted to explain away problems when the going gets tough.

The problems encountered in this scenario are not new or unique. In fact, safeguards have been developed to reduce or eliminate them. The first safeguard is to constantly update and revise established assumptions. The intelligence community must be aware of personal perceptions which seem to prevail over long periods of time and which are supported by *all* new information. Established truths must be constantly tested by fire—the fire of severe criticism and diverse opinion. This must be a continuing exercise and must be supported by the gathering of accurate and timely information which is evaluated from both sides. This is the only way to even hope to avoid surprise.

Another safeguard is provided by using several diverse sources of intelligence, including outside input. This will have the greatest effect on the decisionmaker and promote a broader understanding of the situation. Had the Israelis seriously taken into account intelligence provided by the United States, their own conclusions would have then come into question.

A third safeguard is invaluable but not always pleasant. It requires that dissent and criticism, especially from below, be institutionalized by creating a structure which demands it. Players will then be required to attempt to disprove their own beliefs by seeking out information that is contrary to those beliefs.

Conclusion

It is universally accepted that the Israeli military establishment is a superb one. And, certainly one of its greatest strengths lies in its ability to conduct searching and critical examinations of itself and then thrive on the results. The U.S. military should heed the lessons of the Agranat Commission so that it does not fall prey to a fate similar to that experienced by the Israelis during the days leading up to the outbreak of a war they tried to wish away. ★

Footnotes

1. Avraham (Bren) Adan, **On the Banks of the Suez** (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1980), p. 79.
2. The interim report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, Jerisalem, Iril, 1974. Two subsequent reports have been published but have not been made public.
3. Avi Shlaim, **Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War** (Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 352.
4. Ibid.
5. Note: Signals are evidence of intent. Noise is an indication of irrelevant signals.
6. A report by Lieutenant Benjamin Siman-Tov who was the Order of Battle Officer in the Israeli Southern Command Intelligence, dated October 30, 1973.
7. Note: Golda's Kitchen Cabinet was composed of the Prime Minister and selected ministers who made all of the important decisions on national security.
8. Suggested reading: Benno Wasserman, "The Failure of Intelligence Prediction," **Political Studies**, VIII, June 1962, pp. 166-167.
9. Uri Ra'Anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, **Intelligence Policy and National Security** (Handen, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1981).

USAR Lt. Col. Ronald J. Cosklo is currently assigned to the Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Va., with liaison duty to the 95th USAR Division (Training). He has served as a G2 and a flight instructor (Master Army Aviator Designation) and held various division and brigade staff assignments and aviation command assignments. Cosklo is a graduate of the Naval War College.

The first prong of our two-pronged attack (battlefield intelligence) is not a requirement in peacetime.

The second prong of our military intelligence system (civil intelligence) is indispensable if we are to avoid and/or prevent terrorist acts. The more we know of the culture, language, problems, sociology, and basic needs of individual countries/nations, the more it increases our awareness of potential problem areas which might escalate into international crises. It is here that information supplied by the military intelligence system can give us an opportunity to stay one step ahead and to possibly prevent a major worldwide crisis. Once a problem or difficulty is surfaced and addressed, the necessity for terrorism is diminished or dispelled. Other ways may be used to analyze and solve the problem at hand. Many times, acknowledgement that a situation exists can preclude radical behavior.

The cost of fielding well-trained intelligence experts is a small price to pay considering the emotional and physical damages caused by terrorism. The ability to cope with and/or combat heretofore unidentified problem areas throughout the world would have both tangible and intangible benefits of inestimable value. The military intelligence system does not have to be limited to assistance in the battlefield arena. The political climate of a country and/or nation, the needs of its people, and the vital issues within the geographical area (politically and militarily) are of intense international concern. In the age of instant communication and rapid transportation, events which take place in one continent can affect conditions in another, distant continent almost momentarily.

In summary, the military intelligence system's two-pronged attack gives us the opportunity to utilize well-trained personnel constantly: during wartime, on the battlefield, and during peacetime, submerged in the international communities throughout the world. Now is the time to make full use of one of the military's most versatile and important assets . . . its military intelligence system.

Janet W. Pruet
Fort Gordon, Ga.

Editor:

In each conflict in which the United States has had to commit troops there have been numerous examples of failure. These failures can be classified as initial failures and subsequent failures. They cover the entire spectrum of warfare.

Pearl Harbor is the classic case of an initial intelligence failure and the Battle of the Bulge is an example of a subsequent failure. In each case some aspect of the intelligence cycle was at fault. In Pearl Harbor, the dissemination of intelligence was the problem; at the Bulge, the failure was in the analysis. With faulty analysis, dissemination only serves to compound the problem.

During the Vietnam War, in the initial stages, the collection effort was at fault. And then, when a wealth of information became available, the original faulty analysis permeated future analysis. Political pressures also did not help the analysis.

On the ground level, combat troops were very poorly trained in recognizing enemy equipment, shell fragments, and, in many cases, their own equipment which "came back to them." The classic example was the confusion caused by reports of an AK-50 in use by the enemy. Intelligence analysts were uncertain if it was "a K-50" submachine gun or a new Soviet assault rifle. Other examples included the "range extender" for the RPG-7 which turned out to be the propelling charge, seen for the first time by someone who had never seen the weapon before. In early 1969, Gen. Westmoreland, then Chief of Staff, directed that foreign weapons training be incorporated in basic training, but CONUS installations had no foreign weapons. A few years later, plastic replicas were created but by then the troops who received the training did not go to Vietnam.

Today, our collection effort in support of the strategic intelligence effort is adequate. However, the analysis as done by DIA, CIA, FSTC, and INSCOM is slow to reach the field. A few unclassified studies and guides simply do not suffice. For example, the T-72 tank, first displayed in 1977, did not show up in literature for the troops until 1978, and plastic or sponge rubber models did not enter the system until 1984, by which time the T-80 was being fielded. Seven years, even in peacetime, is unacceptable. In these seven years, a lot of people could have been killed in action. Granted, things move a lot faster in combat, but the delay factor is still there.

In training exercises for ground units, there is very little intelligence training for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the lack of intelligence support. During an ARTEP, a ground unit is usually tasked to handle a PW, a captured document, and secure its position. If this is done once, it is assumed that the S2 has done his job. For intelligence analysts, preparing one or two reports and an overlay of the enemy situation from the previous week does not constitute useful training. In this case, the S2 is little more than an office clerk and has very little opportunity to report anything. Spread this across an entire division or corps slice and you have very little ground level information coming in at corps or higher. Therefore any attempt at analysis will be inaccurate and the dissemination will only compound the problem.

The Military Intelligence Branch has come a long way since its inception in 1962 and has highly qualified people and organizations, but it has been reluctant to get involved in the combat intelligence system, either as members or as training support personnel. This must change unless we are to repeat the mistakes of the past. Within the Reserve and National Guard structure, the problem becomes more acute because of time and manpower constraints.

The problem is well defined; the solution is, or should be, obvious but the implementation is up to the intelligence community.

Lt. Col. William L. Howard
USAR, Armor

Thinking About Writing

by Capt. Ralph Peters

Once upon a time, before mankind grew modern and wise, European civilization relaxed into the Dark Ages. Patiently awaiting electric lights, with the skies presumably cloudy all day, men wrapped their lives in simple faith and labor. For the better part of a millenium, my own Teutonic ancestors remained so technologically illiterate that they could not even manage routine wars of mass destruction without external inspiration. Centuries drowsed by between really good slaughters, and it took adamant troublemakers such as the Albigensians, Hussites, or Moors to arouse the vested interests of the day. Brutality remained largely a local affair, and disease was more to be feared than the conspiracies of men. Best of all, life made sense. Science had not yet taught us our thorough insignificance. Nor were we anxious to learn how far away the heavens truly were. When stray Arabs, drooling astronomy and math, came pawing at Europe's innocent skirts, we urgently chopped them into little pieces. Few realized that life was broken, thus blessedly few sought to fix it. The intellectual elite focused their puttering on the quest for the "lost" formula that would turn lesser elements into gold . . .

Today's military leaders often resemble those alchemists. The finest search earnestly for the hidden cause of our organizational inabilities. Maneuvering factions of military sorcerers battle over which compound from the doctrinal lab will finally turn soldierly lead into war-winning gold. One party insists that technology is the ultimate answer. Another, more sensitive to fashion, prescribes a massive dose of leadership, then goes about administering it with charts, graphs, and tables that would frighten an astrologer. The doctrinal pendulum swings from resolute defense to relentless attack, with little center of gravity. Only the notion that there might not be a single, easy answer, that balance, quality, and purpose remain fundamental, appears too drab and dull-witted to contemplate.

One current concern is that officers do not write well. Certainly, this provides cause for alarm, for the inability to write clearly promises slovenly staff work, doctrine as lengthy as it is inapplicable, and orders that confuse the force unto its own destruction. But the proposed and attempted solutions are seriously flawed. Our initial attack on the problem involved a few hasty classes, annoying in their self-righteousness, stressing iron grammar, inflexible punctuation, and the indiscriminate use of the active voice. Further, the program chose a "double-negative" rather than a positive approach to teaching. Instead of providing students with examples of good writing, helping them discern why it is good, then encouraging them to emulate good style, we provide examples of bad writing and tell students, "Don't do that." In any case, our effort has been superficial. In the face of the genuinely awful prose composed on a daily basis by the United States Army, it is akin to attempting to cure leprosy with first-aid cream.

Our hasty attack failed. Now we will renew the battle in greater strength. Entire departments are to be hurled out of reserve, smothering recalcitrant officers with such a weight of instruction that their stubborn backwardness will be crushed out of them. We will take these dull grapes and make wine, no matter the cost.

Now, in all seriousness, too many officers cannot write effectively. The problem is genuine. But the currently-proposed solutions are unlikely to have the necessary effect, simply because they neither recognize nor address the underlying problem.

Clear writing is easy. It is clear thinking that is hard. The man who can think clearly will write clearly, even if he commits the heresy of substituting commas for semi-colons (which we Americans neither like nor understand, anyway). On the other hand, the officer who cannot think in an orderly and critical manner will inevitably fail to accurately communicate his intent, no matter how perfect the mechanics of his grammar, since he just does not know exactly what he really wants to say. It is the genius of good writing to make that which is complex accessible to a wide audience. Good writing "makes it all sound so simple." The officer who has not learned to think analytically, to impress order onto the chaos of his thoughts, will invariably write badly, making complex matters seem even more difficult than they actually are. Again: clear writing is a function of clear thinking. It is not a motor skill.

Many an officer will tell you that he or she hates writing. What that individual usually means is that he or she dreads the *thinking* that coils around the pen and lurks behind the typewriter. This does not indicate sloth, for we have the hardest working officer corps that history has to offer. But it is typical to encounter someone who will gladly type or re-type for you—often on a home computer—but who wants nothing to do with an original effort.

In a direct sense, thinking is similar to exercise. It is most painful for those who have made the least effort in the past. The unaccustomed are not even sure where to begin. The novice must sustain his effort through a period of initial misery. And, like exercise, starting gets tougher as you grow older.

Most discouraging of all for those sincere leaders who recognize our deficiencies in communicative skills, there is no easy way to teach grown men and women to think. There is no philosopher's stone. You have to sweat for years at the mental gym. Quick fixes and shortcuts offer about as much promise as

---

The MI Magazine staff would like to encourage authors to submit essays so that they can be incorporated as a regular feature of our branch journal.

those advertisements that guarantee to make you and me look like Hercules in two weeks, for only $19.95.

The situation is not hopeless. But we do need to make a more penetrating effort. Throwing all the staff in the world at symptoms offers little hope of a pervasive cure.

Look beyond the poor writing we encounter on a daily basis. Consider a few of the broader indicators of our reluctance to think hard and our inability to think clearly. For instance, our doctrine is out of control. We publish far, far too much doctrine; and, while the most current pays at least lip service to the goal of achieving AirLand Battle capability, it really shares no binding vision of what an army is, does, or should be. We are producing "near-term" doctrine that betrays our lack of analytic foresight. Despite the seductiveness of many aspects of AirLand Battle, it remains no more than a single warfighting technique. Its greatest virtue is its dynamism; but, even so, it fails to embody a fundamental, enduring view of warfare. The more we restrict ourselves to the givens of AirLand Battle Doctrine, the more our Army threatens to become a one-trick pony. And we are so unaccustomed to thinking in fundamentals that our doctrine is becoming daily more prescriptive, even as we sing our routine hymn to initiative. Well, prescriptive doctrine has long been recognized as a symptom of a military establishment's internal decay. Within the U.S. Army, we possess an incredible amount of inherent freedom to create transcendent doctrine. Yet we are so uncomfortable with the freedom that we insist on putting ourselves behind confining doctrinal bars. We are becoming our own jailers.

We fail to say what we mean because we do not really know what we mean. We substitute complex formulae for substantial capabilities. Our doctrine expands wildly in volume because we are searching blindly for its meaning, publishing en route. If we really knew what we wanted to say, we would say it far more cogently. We need to recognize that complexity does not necessarily equal intelligence, sophistication, or even cleverness. Further, if our doctrine were the product of more rigorously imaginative thought, it would surely be more readable. And, were it more readable, it would more often be read. And the Army might learn its own doctrine at last.

Another critical indicator of our reluctance to think hard is the manner of instruction and testing for officers at our schools. Rather than seeking out experts who can teach, we select from the most readily available personnel and attempt to make them expert by virtue of duty position. As a result, many instructors, despite hard work and good intentions, become little more than parrots who cannot respond thoughtfully to serious questions (not only because they have thought insufficiently about their subject, but often because they never realized that questions beyond doctrine might exist). In a parody of our conception of the Soviet army, students are expected to keep their mouths shut and just pass the tests. Hard questions are "sharpshooting." Little thought is

required, or expected. We seek to improve the writing (thinking) skills of our officers, but we do not ask them to write much on tests because that makes the tests more difficult to grade. And the students complain. The military pilgrim's progress is reduced to a matter of choosing *a, b, c, or d*. My brothers, we are building Potemkin villages.

In addition to our inability to properly measure progress in the *thinking* skills, we face an even more fundamental dilemma: we, as officers, do not communicate vertically. We are expected to associate and communicate horizontally, with our peers. Fear, or, as a minimum, acute discomfort, bothers every other arrangement. Exceptions smack of fraternization and muddle the chain of command—or so we believe. Except for the strictest contact on duty, or at gruesome "social" functions, different ranks tend to exist in their own intellectual vacuums. We praise the concept of the mentor. And we do not even talk.

Finally, our research and development efforts seem to suffer more deeply from a lack of incisive and unified conceptual thought than do other fields. Muddled thinking in this area is not only financially costly, it is mortally dangerous. We have long bulled our way through with outdated or incoherent doctrine, but too many wrong decisions about the equipping of our Army may prove fatal despite genius and heroics on the field of battle.

So. We want to help our officers write clearly. We peek around the corner, sizing up the bigger problem behind the immediate one, and decide that it might be a general help if officers could think analytically and creatively. Now where do we begin to solve a problem that size?

The approach must be comprehensive, but it need not be terribly expensive. Fundamental to the solution is a change in attitude (and please do not staff it to death). At each level and at every opportunity, we must encourage *thinking*. Here, the immediate goal of turning officers into more capable writers actually helps. For the act of writing, over a sufficient period and given mature supervision, actually helps the individual learn to think in a militarily practical manner. As an example, sitting down to write about a subject in order to learn about it (or to discover what you *really* think about it) is an excellent technique for deepening knowledge. But the exercise is painful, especially at the beginning. You will not teach officers, or anybody else, to write well, much less to think clearly, in ten hours or ten weeks of instruction. Analytical *attitudes*, along with so much writing that even the talented student makes progress, must be incorporated into the system of officer education at all levels—including the precommissioning phase. Get rid of the multiple-choice tests. An officer who knows how to think can look up factual data. A more valid test is to investigate the student's *conceptual* understanding by making him explain on the cold white page. It may be harder to grade, but, fundamentally, it is not the grade that really matters, but the exercise itself. Encourage officers to think, force them to write, and, in time, you will have a higher proportion of thinking officers who can express

themselves efficiently. But do not expect results overnight. And be prepared for a substantial number of failures.

While grammar and punctuation are important, they are not the goal of good writing. They are merely tools to make the job of writing clearly easier. Do not become obsessed by them. There have been many, many dreadfully poor writers who punctuated scrupulously, while some of our most brilliant literary figures never quite got the hang of it. Do not mistake the tools for the job itself.

One example, mentioned briefly above, of how *not* to teach anyone to write is the specification snarling its way across the military landscape that all writing should be in the active voice. The English language—especially American English—is glorious in its flexibility and its dynamic range of expression. It is a language so highly evolved that it lets the speaker or writer approach precision in his expression. Simply put, in English you really can say what you mean much of the time. Now this is not true of most languages. When you seek to limit the way in which we are to use this tremendous, multipurpose tool by creating unprecedented doctrinal strictures, you drastically limit its effectiveness. *The real point is that the writer needs to understand when it is best to use the active voice.* Again, we seem intent on carrying everything to destructive extremes. Insisting on absolute primacy for the active voice is equivalent to limiting the employment of artillery to a direct fire role.

Next comes the importance of good reading habits to good writing. While most officers read enthusiastically, few read selectively. Often, they do not know *how* to read selectively. The sheer availability of reading material since the paperback revolution is partly responsible. Unless you have already made a critical start, it is difficult to know what book or books will have the most value in the study of a given subject. It is true that we publish a fair number of reading lists, usually sponsored by some military school. The embarrassing part is that most of the lists suffer from inadequate standards. Usually, they just seem to be a listing of books somebody liked; and, while there are often fine works on the list, they are usually surrounded with self-important trash and fad books. Officers need to acquire good reading habits early in their formative periods. Luckily, this further supports the effort to teach officers to think on a more sophisticated level. Thinking, reading, and writing are mutually supporting. Along with experience, they form a sort of mental combined arms team.

And still there is great danger. Clear writing is important. Clear thinking is critical. Sound reading broadens, while experience informs all else. Yet none of this is worth very much if the officer is not a man or woman who is capable of action. In our susceptibility to extremes, we must not let the pendulum swing so far that we become, literally, an Army of paper tigers.

I suggest that, over the entrance of each new department of communicative arts or communication skills, we carve a quotation from Leonard Wood to help us keep our perspective: **The purpose of an army is to fight.**

In closing, allow me to violate one of the cardinal rules of effective military writing by junior officers—avoid the first person (for all rules are made to be selectively broken).

In my early twenties, I made a third, and ultimately successful, attempt to join the Army. Once, I had given in to the pleas, howls, and warning of my family, while on the second occasion, with the country confused by a war that would not end, a shaggy recruiter told me to go home and be glad I hadn't been drafted.

On this last occasion, I was determined. Fortunately, the new recruiter, a Field Artillery sergeant, was more encouraging than his predecessor had been. And I considered it a pretty good deal that I could go right in as a private first class as a consequence of having stumbled through several years of college. At least I wouldn't have to start out at the bottom.

The recruiter had not been completely positive about my prospects, however.

"What did you study in college?" he asked.

I considered several possible answers, each more or less true, before settling on the bluntest.

"English," I said, feeling that somehow that single word diminished my physical prowess in his eyes by at least fifty percent.

The recruiter, splendid in his ribbons and stripes, nodded slowly. I had caused him immediate pain. Then he brightened, generous and forgiving.

"Well," he said, "don't worry. The Army'll teach you how to do something useful."

He was right, and wrong, too.

Capt. Ralph Peters is the author of numerous published articles on military subjects, as well as one novel which received favorable national reviews. He entered the Army as a private in 1976, was commissioned through OCS in 1980, and has served extended tours with both the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division in USAREUR. Peters is a tactical intelligence officer and a native-rated German linguist. He is currently attending the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, after which he will join the staff of III Corps (Mobile Armored).

USAICS Notes

Promotion Ceremony

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Intelligence Center and School Commander, and Mrs. Gail Pfister pin brigadier general stars on then Col. Cloyd H. Pfister during a ceremony at the Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Az. Pfister was promoted on Oct. 18. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Tracy E. Eilers)

Brig. Gen. Cloyd H. Pfister, deputy commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, received his first star on Oct. 18 in a ceremony at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr., Intelligence Center and School commander, and Mrs. Gail Pfister pinned the stars on the new general.

Brig. Gen. Pfister, assigned to the Intelligence Center and School since 1984, has served as chief of staff and deputy commander. He began his military career by enlisting in the Army Security Agency in June of 1957. In 1958, he earned the Maxwell Taylor Award as the Distinguished Graduate in Russian Language studies at Monterey, Calif., and then received his commission in April of 1959 from the Infantry Officer Candidate School.

Brig. Gen. Pfister has held alternating assignments in politico-military and intelligence positions. His more recent assignments include a tour with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, on Middle East matters, commander of Field Station Berlin, Berlin, Germany, and chief of staff, Intelligence Center and School.

Brig. Gen. Pfister was born in State College, Pa. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy from Oberlin College, Ohio, and a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from American University, Washington, D.C. He is a 1972 graduate with honors from the Army Command and General Staff College.

In 1979, he graduated from the National War College where he also served as a senior research fellow at the National Defense University.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Good Conduct Medal, the Parachutist Badge, the General Staff Identification Badge, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, and other service, unit and foreign awards.

Brig. Gen. Pfister is married to the former Gail Williams, an Oberlin College classmate. Gail is a professor of Economics with the University of Arizona, Sierra Vista Campus. The Pfisters have six children, Eric and Lori Williams, Gabriele, Catherine, Michael, and Romi Pfister, and two grandchildren, Gabriel and Randall Williams.

96R Training

One of the many restructuring moves made within career management field (CMF) 96 was the merger of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 17M (Remote Sensor Specialist) and MOS 17K (Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman), resulting in the establishment of MOS 96R (Ground Surveillance Systems Operator).

The merger of the specialties was prompted when it was learned that 17M soldiers were not being effectively utilized. MOS-associated ground sensor equipment was turned in, but it was announced that there would be delays in fielding replacements. As a result, many 17M personnel were used in jobs other than MOS 17M. Some were placed in 17K ground surveillance radar positions after a suitable period of on-the-job training. Others were used wherever they were needed.

After examining both specialties, it was determined that, although individual differences between the two specialties exist, operationally both jobs complement each other. In addition, prerequisites and qualifications for the two specialties are virtually the same.

The 96R MOS became effective March 1, 1985. Resident training for 96R, which also began in March, is conducted at the Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The six week long, skill level one course consists primarily of subjects from the former 17K course. We have also established an add-on Project Development Identifier transition course consisting of approximately two weeks of instruction on existing ground sensor equipment for selected 96R personnel who will fill former 17M positions which still use the current generation of ground sensor equipment. The Individual Training Division at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., estimates that the transition course will end during Fiscal Year 1987. At this time, a new generation of ground sensor equipment will be fielded throughout the Army. During the fielding of the new equipment, 96R soldiers will receive training on two ground surveillance systems: ground radars and ground sensors.

In the future, Fort Huachuca's Individual Training Division plans to eliminate instruction in additional skill identifier "V3," remote sensor repairer, because this function will be assigned to 26C, target acquisition/surveillance radar repairer. 96R soldiers will progress through skill level five, grade E-8. More than half of the 17M and 17K reclassifications were completed by September 1985. Skill qualification tests for 96R will be administered to former 17K and 17M soldiers upon reclassification into the 96R MOS. In summary, this merger will provide a greater flexibility for accomplishing ground surveillance systems missions, enhance job satisfaction, and hopefully increase reenlistment rates. The point of contact for more information on 96R at the U.S Army Intelligence Center and School is Sam Delajoux, ATSI-SP, Autovon 879-4671.

Language

As part of implementing the long-range portion of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Unit Language Training Program, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., is conducting a comprehensive survey and analysis of all Military Intelligence linguist positions. The survey, supervised by a contractor, will relate general language ability, as measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), to MOS job performance. The survey will determine what level of language proficiency, in terms of speaking, listening, reading, and writing, the duty position requires.

The survey is scheduled to be completed by June 1986. It will cover most MI units in Europe, the Far East, WESTCOM, Panama, and CONUS. The collected data will be represented by coding language positions, using language proficiency skills and critical types of vocabulary required for each position. Planning for this survey was based on language proficiency problem areas that for years have been discussed and/or analyzed, but never surveyed in detail.

Fort Huachuca's Intelligence Center and School expects the survey will be administered to approximately 1,400 personnel. Surveys will be mailed to personnel who are not readily accessible as well as in cases where excessive costs are involved. Time required to administer the survey is approximately 30 minutes per interview. The survey's goal is to determine the language proficiency requirements of each linguist position and then train soldiers to meet those requirements. Results will enable MILPERCEN to assign personnel who meet actual language requirements and/or select personnel for training who do not meet the actual language requirement. The point of contact for more information about the survey is Sam Delajoux, ATSI-SP, Autovon 879-4671.

Reserve BITC

In the summer of 1982, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School offered its first Basic Instructor Training Course (BITC) to Reserve personnel.

The course was developed by the Staff and Faculty Development Division and tailored to meet the special needs of Reserve instructors. The Reserve BITC, a two-week, performance-oriented program, provided newly assigned instructors with a menu of teaching methods for various classroom situations. It also provided the opportunity for Individual Ready Reserve soldiers to acquire future assignments as instructors.

Since 1982, 70 Reserve soldiers have successfully completed the BITC. Many of these BITC graduates have become instructors for Intelligence Training Army Area Schools, FORSCOM Intelligence Training Divisions, and Consolidated Training Facilities. Besides receiving a diploma, BITC graduates can also acquire the instructor Special Skill Indentifier.

In 1986, the proposed BITC schedule will consist of two sessions of two weeks during the period 5-30 May. Additional information regarding the BITC may be obtained from USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-SF, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 85613-7000, or phone commercial (602) 538-2830 or Autovon 879-2830.

CORRECTION

In the change of command article which appeared in the July-September issue under USAICS notes (p.53), Maj. Gen. Parker was incorrectly identified as having served as the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, 2d Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Parker served in that position in the 3d Armored Division.

USAISD Notes

USAISD Change of Command

Incoming commander, Col. Francis X. Toomey (left), and retiring commander, Col. Joseph F. Short, review the troops during the Change of Command ceremony. (U.S. Army photo by PFC Stephanie Warburton)

Col. Francis X. Toomey assumed command of the Intelligence School at Fort Devens (ISD), Mass., in a Sept. 4 change of command ceremony on Rogers Field at Fort Devens.

Retiring ISD commander, Col. Joseph F. Short, passed on the responsibilities and the school colors to Col. Toomey during the traditional transfer of command. Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., oversaw the colors and presented Col. Short with the Legion of Merit, first oak leaf cluster.

Col. Short retired from active duty after a distinguished career culminating in his assignment as the ISD commander. A native of Pawtucket, R.I., he entered active duty in November 1956 and received an ROTC commission from the University of Rhode Island. He also holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business

Administration from the University of Rhode Island. He received his Master of Education degree from Fitchburg State College, Mass. In addition to serving several tours within the United States, Col. Short has served in Japan, Korea, Belgium, Great Britain, and Vietnam. During 29 years of service, he has served as commander, Vint Hill Farms Station, Va.; commander of the 8th Radio Research Station in Vietnam; secretary/deputy chairman, Allied Communications Security Agency, NATO; assistant chief of staff at Headquarters, U.S. Army Security Agency at Arlington Hall Station, Va.; and as a staff planner, Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

Col. Short's awards include the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Meritorious Service Medal. He has attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College and the British War College. He is married to the former Gloria O'Hearn. Col. and Mrs. Short have three daughters: Valerie Ann Snyder, Diane M. Gonseth, and Alison K. Haase. Col. Short and his wife will be leaving Fort Devens for Virginia, where Col. Short has accepted a position with a private firm.

Col. Toomey entered the Army in 1955 as a private and received training as a communications security specialist at the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School, now ISD. He was later commissioned after attending the Infantry Officer Candidate School. Col. Toomey holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg State University, Pa. He has served overseas tours in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, France, Turkey, and the Dominican Republic. In over 29 years of service, Col. Toomey has served as commander, U.S. Army Field Station Sinop, Turkey; commander, U.S. Army Security Agency Field Station Korea; G-2, 4th Infantry Division, Mechanized; and a number of other staff and troop command positions.

Col. Toomey's awards include the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, and the Army Commendation Medal. He is a senior parachutist and holds the Vietnamese Army Parachutist Badge. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He is the first Advanced Individual Training graduate of ISD to become the commander of the school. Col. Toomey is married to the former Louann E. Davenport. The Toomeys have five children: Patrick, Michael, Sharon, Tracey, and Terence, and one granddaughter, Caitlin.

EW/C&S Combined FTX

The Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic and Security Department of the Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Mass., conducted the largest departmental Field Training Exercise in the history of the school.

The object of the exercise was to deploy a collection and jamming company manned by students from the Signal Security Specialist Course, the Noncommunication Interceptors Course, the Electronic Warfare Operators Course, the Electronic Warfare Analyst Course, and the Warrant Officer Technical Certification Course under a simulated combat mission. Deployed in tactical training areas as they would be in combat, the students practiced traffic intercept methods and relayed results to the technical control and analysis element (TCAE). The TCAE assumed responsibility for collection management and transmitted tasking messages to the collectors.

In addition to the MOS training, students participated in the establishment of the tactical site, erection of camouflage and antennas, daily preventive maintenance, combat survival skills, and reinforcement of common skills.

ISD student, Lance Cpl. Stacy Felch of EWOC, sets up antennas for the AN/TLQ-17A ECM system during the EW/C&S combined FTX. (U.S. Army photo)

Homeward Bound II

More than 200 soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division's 313th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) participated in a combined two-week training exercise from Aug. 12 to Aug. 26 at the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Mass.

The exercise, named Homeward Bound II, began with a mass parachute assault on Fort Deven's Turner Drop Zone by the 313th's airborne soldiers. At 800 feet above the drop zone, eight C-141 (Starlifter) aircraft flew over the field three times while dropping 221 airborne paratroopers. Homeward Bound II is the second exercise of its kind hosted by the Intelligence Schools. Homeward Bound 84 was conducted last summer at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., the home of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School.

The 313th MI Battalion is the only airborne-designated Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) unit. The battalion contains all of the electronic warfare assets needed to accomplish the 82d Airborne's mission. The unit is described as the "eyes and ears" of the division.

The 313th paratroopers jumped at an altitude of 800 feet. At this height, if the jumper's parachute fails to open, a paratrooper has a mere four seconds to deploy a reserve.

The field training exercise portion of Homeward Bound II followed the air drop. Soldiers from Fort Deven's Intelligence School evaluated the training and observed the battalion's tactical operations. Soldiers of the 313th engaged in weapons and proficiency training before returning to Fort Bragg, N.C., on Aug. 26.

(U.S. Army photos by Sp4 Gene Morales)

IVD Meets TACJAM

Using a light pen to indicate his selections, SFC Stephen Englebert, instructor, Tactical Theory Branch Maintenance Training Department at ISD, works through the interactive videodisc simulation for the operation and maintenance of a receiver. (U.S. Army photo)

High-tech warfare met the modern classroom at the Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., for the first time last July. Self-paced, personalized interactive videodiscs (IVD) have been teaching ISD students how to operate the AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM jammer, using the actual piece of equipment.

Experts in the New Systems Training Office at ISD think the IVD will provide greater training efficiency using less time and capital investments than traditional approaches.

Since the operating procedures for the TACJAM had never been previously taught in a formal classroom setting, the possibility of a comparison study between the new IVD approach and the traditional lecture-mode has been ruled out. However, a previous comparison, done by a major university for the Intelligence School, showed that IVD was as effective as the traditional approach to training students to maintain and repair an electronics receiver. In addition, the IVD taught the material in 30 percent less time.

As students learning how to operate TACJAM work through the material on the IVD, their mistakes and suggestions will be used to refine IVD material.

Officers Notes

A number of questions concerning the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course have come up at MI Branch recently. Topics most often mentioned are permanent change of station moves, track courses, and requests for orders.

Officers normally attend MIOAC between the third and sixth year of commissioned service, usually following the officer's first or second assignment. Recent Department of the Army decisions modified the officer advanced course program of instruction; however, the MIOAC is still considered a permanent change of station assignment. Presently, the MIOAC is a combination of courses lasting between 20 and 22 weeks, followed by assignment specific training.

MIOAC classes routinely begin in October, January, March, May, and August of each fiscal year. Requests for orders are usually issued no later than 4-6 months prior to each class start date. No later than 60 days prior to each MIOAC, MI Branch will send a letter to each officer listing a tentative follow-on assignment. When officers receive their requests for orders it is important that they complete a preference statement (DA Form 483) and forward it to MI Branch. Information provided concerning assignment preferences, plus individual and family considerations, is important in the assignment process.

The special training requirements for MI officers have resulted in an advanced course that differs slightly from the TRADOC model. The TRADOC model calls for 10 weeks of Army common subjects and 10 weeks of branch specific instruction. Each MIOAC is prefaced by a two week Tactical Intelligence Officer Orientation Course (TASIO). Next, an officer attends a six week course involving Army common subjects which are presented at every branch officer advanced course. This instruction is followed by four weeks of intense training concentrated on Military Intelligence subjects. The MIOAC students then attend a track course in their initial specialty, unless designated otherwise, relating to their follow-on assignments. MI Branch, in cooperation with the Intelligence School, determines which track course an officer will attend. This decision is based upon the officer's initial specialty, education, experience, personal desires, and Army requirements.

Career managers will normally visit each MIOAC during the second week of the course. During the visit, the MI Branch briefing is presented to the class. Additionally, individual interviews are conducted which review the officers' career to date and finalize their next assignment. All requests for orders must be issued no later than the fourth week. A copy of the request for orders is mailed to the gaining command, officially notifying the unit of the officer's assignment. Specific unit pinpoint assignments are based on experience and training, plus the gaining command's needs.

No later than the tenth week of the MIOAC, the gaining command must notify Fort Huachuca concerning the officer's specific duty assignment following the advanced course. At this point the officers are designated their track course and any follow-on training. Follow-on training is designed to present intensive instruction in subject areas relating to the officer's specific assignment at the gaining installation. The current follow-on training available during MIOAC is listed below.

Additional follow-on training is also available at other installations if requested by the gaining command. Examples include the Battalion S-1 Course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., Battalion S-4 course at Fort Lee, Va., and the Strategic Intelligence Analyst Course at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.

The mission of the MIOAC is to produce technically and tactically qualified officers who are prepared for their next assignment. The revised MIOAC will prepare officers for their future development and meet the needs and requirements of today's Army.

Special Security Officer (SSO)
2 weeks

Intelligence in Counteraction
2 weeks

Advanced Imagery Techniques
6 weeks

Collection Management
2 weeks

Installation Security Manager
2 weeks, 4 days

Enlisted Notes

After E-7 promotion boards make their selections, many staff sergeants wonder why they haven't been selected for advancement. The results of the latest E-7 Selection Board show that of the total 6,967 NCOs selected for promotion, 5,792 were selected from the primary zone. Of the total selected from the primary zone, 3,055 were considered in the primary zone for the first time, while 2,737 had previous consideration—some as many as seven times.

Two important factors influence the outcome of the selection boards—the needs of the Army and NCO qualifications.

First, the needs of the Army may change from year to year. Staff sergeants now compete only against others in their MOS. The number of projected vacancies at the next higher grade determines the number of promotions. This is called the select objective, and there is one for each MOS. With force modernization and changes to the force structure, the number needed in each MOS may vary from year to year. If the select objective increases in an MOS, chances for promotion also increase.

Second, an NCO's file may have improved. For instance, sergeants can remove any old Article 15's which were filed during the junior enlisted grades from their Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) maintained at the Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center. AR 27-10 outlines procedures for transferring Article 15's from the performance portion to the restricted portion of the OMPF. The restricted portion is not reviewed by the selection board.

When preparing to appear before a local E-5/E-6 promotion board made up of senior NCOs and officers in the command, a soldier carefully reviews his or her local personnel file for accuracy. The uniform is spotless with sharp creases, shoes are spit-shined, and ribbons are new and worn properly. The same effort should be put forth for a DA Centralized Enlisted Selection Board.

Awards and decorations, EERs, academic reports, and course completion certificates for resident and nonresident courses should be in the OMPF. Candidates should also make sure someone else's documents are not filed in their OMPF.

Eligible sergeants should also check their photographs. Stand at attention, make sure the uniform fits properly, and be sure it's the right uniform. Many female NCOs have pictures where they are wearing the skirt with oxfords instead of black pumps. Other pictures show NCOs with hair and mustaches too long, or with no brass. The photograph reflects the image a staff sergeant wants to project before the selection board.

Overweight soldiers need to lose the extra weight. Also, staff sergeants should be able to pass the APRT.

If someone fails an academic course, every effort should be made to retake it. If a resident course cannot be taken, the soldier should take it by correspondence. Study military skills and do the best you can on an SQT test. Staff sergeants should try to raise their GT scores if they are below 100. Continue with civilian education, and check to see if it is properly reflected on your PQR and OMPF.

Seek out the toughest leadership job. Be a squad leader or a platoon sergeant. If a current duty position requires supervising several soldiers, make sure the duty description and narrative portion of your EER reflect that leadership information. The "tough jobs" have a way of standing out when selection board members review assignment history. Competition for promotion is tough. There is no single item that will guarantee a promotion. Staff sergeants must be strong in all areas. Seek the tough leadership jobs for that extra plus. Keep your official records current. Remember, the opportunities for promotion are waiting.

FIELD CIRCULAR 71-4

Field Circular 71-4, Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) was published in October. FC 71-4 will provide the Army in the field with complete guidance for the development of live-fire, combined arms training. It provides the user with a thorough list of planning considerations for the integration of all members of the combined arms team. It also contains a detailed formula for resource coordination including ammunition data, target emplacement guidance and safety diagram procedures. Four sample scenarios are provided based on Gowen Field, Grafenwoehr, the generic Multi-Purpose Range Complex design, and Fort Benning, Ga. A sample letter of instruction and control plans are also included to assist the user in planning.

The proliferation of high technology weapons on the modern battlefield has been accompanied by skyrocketing operational, maintenance and training costs. Through the efficient use of sophisticated simulation devices, such as Conduct of Fire Trainers, we can conserve valuable training resources while improving a wide variety of individual and collective skills. However, no simulation can thoroughly replace the need to exercise a unit in a realistic, live fire environment, or in realistic, opposing force maneuvers. We can and must, therefore, husband ammunition, fuel and spare parts for the training events where they will provide the greatest benefit in combined arms training proficiency.

The challenge is ours to train as we will fight: on a battlefield where all members of the combined arms team must overcome electro-optical, thermal, and electro-magnetic interference, on which we must move fast and strike the enemy at his most vulnerable point in place and time, destroying his ability and will to fight. We must also be able to operate at night, in deplorable weather and in an active chemical environment. Field Circular 71-4 provides the heavy force with a method to meet that challenge.

Distribution will be made to all members of the close combat (heavy) force to battalion/squadron level. Activities desiring additional copies may obtain them through the Armor School's Army Wide Training Support Warehouse after Nov. 1, 1985. Write to Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DPT-NRT (AWTS), Fort Knox, Kentucky, 40121.

Crypto Corner

The problems below will give you a short course in elementary cryptanalysis. All you have to do is solve all three problems, which can be done with nothing more than a little ingenuity. Along the way to the solution, you will learn a lot about cryptography and cryptanalysis.

Problem 1:

t h i s
SBDR MQXKSJYQCH DR RDHKGA,

CIP CIXJIA MCI OQACF DS.

OA RTQA SJ NDGG SBA CGKBCOAS.

RTMMARR DR VBCS XJT HCFA DS.

plain: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
CIPHER: B D   R S

Problem 2:

t
RNL QLAJHT JHL CQ RJSONLP,

BSR VCRN AFSLQ LHJSON IJP ZCT.

AJGKFLRL RNL VNJFL ZFKNZBLR,

ZHT XJS AZH GZEL RNL OPZTL.

plain: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
CIPHER: R

Problem 3:

GEKYH IKEAJY

ZHSKQP YKW ZOYEK.

SPI UDYQ WLS HIYOK,

QDIK QOESJMD AYEK.

plain: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
CIPHER:

Crypto Corner Solution

1. **THIS CRYPTOGRAM IS SIMPLE,
   AND ANYONE CAN BREAK IT.
   BE SURE TO FILL THE ALPHABET,
   SUCCESS IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT.** (Keyword is **COMPANY**)

2. **THE SECOND ONE IS TOUGHER,
   BUT WITH CLUES ENOUGH TO AID.
   COMPLETE THE WHOLE ALPHABET,
   AND YOU CAN MAKE THE GRADE.** (Keyword is **BATTALION**)

3. **FINAL ENIGMA
   BLUNTS ANY BRAIN.
   USE WHAT YOU LEARN,
   THEN TRIUMPH GAIN.** (Keyword is **BRIGADE**)

Interview

as compared with Israel which is a small and beleaguered nation. Finally, what we need, in not having a policy, is practice with a lot of scenarios, a lot of technological developments, a lot of cooperation in the intelligence field with other nations, and a bunch of tools, some of which are military, some are diplomatic, and a kind of resilient and facile ability to go solve problems."

According to Kupperman, U.S. policy on terrorism should be flexible: "In some cases we anounce the theatrical success which is forcing down an Egyptian jet airliner. In other cases, we back off. Those are tactical decisions and political decisions. The worst thing the president can do, in my mind, is to place himself in the position of setting himself up for a fall—and that is what happens when we say that we will *always* retaliate. We will not always retaliate."

When retaliation is mentioned, the role of the press becomes an immediate concern. In a recent debate with some of the better known U.S. correspondents, including Tom Brokaw of NBC News and Peter Jennings of ABC News, Kupperman detailed three "no-no's" in the media business when terrorism is concerned. "First, they [the press] ought to report the news, but they ought not be talking about the motion and the location of assault forces in very delicate and diplomatic operations. Second, they ought not shove cameras in the faces of the bereaved. But I think there is something even more important. If you have ever been in a crisis center, people are extraordinarily active, then it goes dull for awhile. There are lulls because you are going to wait to see something happen. Everything doesn't happen spontaneously. What happens during these lulls is the government watches television. And it learns through fifty specials in a row that it is impotent. And the public feels this way. And government emerges as impotent . . . One of the good things, if you can say anything good about the Italian cruise liner [Achille Lauro incident], was that nobody could get pictures. Television was out of business."

This last statement is somewhat reminiscent of a line of his quoted by *TV Guide* earlier this year: "If the press could just cool it a bit, you know, terrorism would be the sound of one hand clapping."

In concluding, Kupperman stresses that we cannot win all the time. If asked if he has any advice for the president, Kupperman says, "I would advise him to ask America not to be infantile. Freedom does not involve comic strip characters. We won't win them all. We may end up killing Americans in the form of assault if we make a mistake. We may have it [terrorism] come here, although the Bureau [FBI] is very good at tracking it. Whatever, we are a great nation and I don't think we have to forego any of our civil liberties. Nor do we have to deliberately get smacked in the mouth each time it happens."

Robert Kupperman is a realist. He tends to call the shots as he sees them. In assessing the aftermath of the Achille Lauro highjacking, he notes with a certain degree of contentment, "Look, terrorism is a highly theatrical endeavor. And what was needed occurred. It was a kind of counterterrorism drama. And I think that was terrific." **Ed.**

PROFESSIONAL READER

The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development
by S.A. Tyushkevich,Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

The Air Force Translation Series provides an invaluable service to those of us who lack the ability to read Russian. Previous books in this series by Soviet authors have covered topics such as Soviet offensive operations, operational art and tactics, the military decisionmaking process, and the revolution in military affairs. These works are not merely propaganda vehicles for the Soviet world view. In spite of frequent references to V.I. Lenin and the methodologies of Marxism-Leninism, several of the books in this series contain some substantive material on the nature of modern warfare.

The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development was originally published in 1978 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The book is a mixed bag of factual information, historical inaccuracies, sound military theory, and Marxist-Leninist propaganda. In spite of its many inconsistencies, the interested American reader should not be dissuaded from perusing this book, for its true value lies in the insight one gains about what the Soviet leaders tell their people about their military.

The book is divided into four parts, each of which covers a major period of Soviet history. The chapters contain three primary topical areas: the background to changes in the structure of the armed forces (including political, economic, and historical factors), the changes made in Soviet military and naval organizations to deal with new problems, and the role of the party and political workers in the development of the Soviet military and naval forces. All of this is, not unnaturally, cast in Marxist-Leninist terminology, which frequently misconstrues the actual cause of change. There are, in fact, many sins of omission committed against the historical record by the authors. For example, Leon Trotsky, who played such an important role in molding the infant Red Army into a reliable fighting machine, is cited as a reactionary in military affairs who wished only to weaken the new regime. Stalin's purge of the party and military leadership in the late 1930s is not mentioned. However, the authors relate that not a few high ranking officers were "retired" from active duty at this time to make way for a new generation of leaders. As a final case in point, the contribution of the Western Allies to victory over Nazi Germany in World War II is recognized in one sentence: "The armies of the other states in the anti-Hitler coalition also contributed greatly to victory over the common enemy" (p. 364). So much for the second front.

Of course, one must keep in mind that what actually happened is not as important to Soviet writers as what *they* say happened. Their selective use of history supports current political and military theory, and it is contemporary military thought we get a glimpse of when reading this history of the organizational structures. The chapters dealing with postwar developments are probably the most informative. In them, the authors discuss the impact of nuclear weapons and advances in conventional weapons technology on modern war. These changes are lumped together under the rubric of the "revolution in military affairs" and they provide the basis for understanding current Soviet military thinking. The need for a sound theoretical knowledge of warfare for Soviet officers and the exposition of the classical elements of military strategy came across most strongly in the last half of the book. These are two areas in which Western military establishments can take lessons from Soviet theoretical writings. **The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development** is not recommended for those who are unfamiliar with Soviet writings. It is, however, a fine complement to other books in the Air Force Translation Series, such as A.A. Sidorenko's **The Offensive,** and V.Ye. Savkin's work, **The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics.** Along with the other volumes in the series, this book provides the student of Soviet military affairs with a valuable source for comprehending recent Soviet views of their armed forces.

Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr.
Fort Monmouth, N.J.

ENIGMA: How The German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read By The Allies In World War Two
by Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1984, $24.00.

ENIGMA fills a long open void in the history of ULTRA intelligence. Previous histories give most, if not all, of the credit for the breaking of the German Enigma cipher system to British cryptologists and only mention in passing the early Polish role. This omission is most certainly due to the compartmented aspect of this most secret of Allied intelligence successes, which allowed few to have knowledge of the background and overall workings of the ULTRA effort. Time and a long-standing lid of secrecy compound the problem a modern researcher faces when developing any definitive study on the World War II code-breaking effort.

Credit can now be fully given to those to whom it is long overdue—the Polish team of Zygalski, Rejewski, and Rozycki. This book reveals in detail the important story of these Polish cryptologists who first addressed the Enigma problem in 1927, on the direction of a Polish General Staff farsighted enough to recognize early the enemy emerging to its west. Their success was not a stroke of luck, a single burst of brilliance, or even due to the French-provided "Asche" material. No copy of the military version of the Enigma machine was stolen off the German assembly line and used as a technical base for exploitation. The breakthrough that came in December of 1932 was the result of brilliant minds and tedious work. First, the Polish mathematicians effected a theoretical reconstruction of the Enigma device itself. Simultaneously, they were able to develop methods for reconstructing the Enigma keys exclusively from intercepted German transmissions. In spite of an ever maturing German cipher system that enciphered changing machine characteristics and key generation techniques, the Poles were able to follow the most secret communications of the German command system from the days of their initial suc-

cess until the fall of Poland. **ENIGMA** reveals the techniques used by the Polish cryptologists in maintaining this continuity and provides valuable OPSEC lessons for today.

Kozaczuk traces the Polish cryptologic effort throughout the war—from Poland, to France until its fall, and then into Vichy France. There the Polish intercept and codebreaking operations diverged from the by-then healthy Enigma exploitation being conducted in the U.K. Concentration was placed on clandestine SIGINT support to the Polish military and the French underground. Here Kozaczuk's account breaks new ground for the World War II intelligence buff.

The book's only failing is in the author's patriotic effort to address, at times in great detail, other aspects of the Polish war effort. These lapses are of tolerable length and thus do not detract significantly from the overall narrative. The average reader may also find portions of the text too technical. Fortunately, most of the in-depth and complex discussions of the Polish cryptologic effort are included as appendices and thus can be tackled only when the reader is mentally prepared.

Since the Poles passed to the British (and to the French) virtually all of the techniques they had developed in breaking Enigma and in following its increasingly complex changes, it is astounding that the extent of the Polish effort has been so unheralded. From the initial gift of a reconstructed Enigma machine to numerous working aids and technical data, the British success at Bletchly Park owed as much to the few Polish mathematicians who began the cryptologic effort as to the sons of Cambridge and Oxford who developed and protected it for the duration of the war. The importance of ULTRA to the Allied war effort is now well established. Therefore, it follows that the debt owed to a handful of dedicated Poles is immense.

Maj. G. Dickson Gribble Jr.
MI Branch, MILPERCEN

Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces
by Kenneth W. Grundy, Calif.: University of California Press, 1983, 297 pages,$24.95.

Kenneth Grundy, a Political Science professor at Case Western University, has previously published **Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa, Defense Legislation and Communal Politics,** and **Ideologies of Violence.** He has borrowed the title for his new work from Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique. The full quotation reads: "A soldier without politics is an assassin."

Soldiers Without Politics is a review and analysis of the role of non-whites in the South African armed forces. After reviewing the historical involvement of non-whites in South Africa's military, Grundy devotes chapters to their contemporary role in the South African Defense Force (SADF), the South African Police, homeland armies, and in the military action in Namibia.

While examining "The Historical Roots of Black Military Service," Grundy makes numerous astute observations regarding the relationship between South African whites and non-whites in the military. This relationship, like all race relations in South Africa, is dictated within the framework of apartheid. Despite the seeming paradox of having non-whites bear arms for South Africa, "whites have regularly and will-

ingly accepted the use of blacks for military purposes." In order to maintain control, whites have traditionally been very selective in choosing individuals or groups for military service. Furthermore, groups have been played off against one another in order to keep them divided and weak. Even under these circumstances, "deployment of blacks has ordinarily been under the most controlled and modulated conditions." this tight control, characterized by the manipulation and ad hoc use of non-white military forces, has proven more difficult to maintain with the regularization and increasing professionalization of the South African Defense Forces.

Although there is much discussion concerning the role of non-whites in the SADF (to arm or not arm, compulsory service or volunteer service, etc.), all are ancillary to the central problem. The true issue revolves around the South African economy under the apartheid system versus the requirements of the SADF for white male ranks and leadership. South Africa is simply running out of a sufficient number of white males to meet both the demands of the economy and of the military. Because of the conflicting demands placed on this dwindling resource, "white opposition to blacks in the SADF has been eclipsed."

Irrespective of the new attitudes towards non-whites in the SADF, compulsory military service has not been extended to these groups. There are a number of reasons why non-whites are accepted on a volunteer basis only. Based on racial attitudes of the apartheid system, compulsory service for non-whites can be ruled out until full citizenship is accorded non-whites. Also, volunteer service can be construed as "some degree of agreement with or acquiescense to the political and economic status quo . . . ." Finally, the disastrous Rhodesian experience with compulsory service for non-whites will dissuade South Africa from following the same policy.

In conclusion, Grundy points out that within the apartheid framework, the military and paramilitary forces of South Africa are inching from being solely the tools of oppression to becoming a pragmatic force in the decisionmaking process in all facets of the state. Yet, within the apartheid system there is very little worth defending for non-whites. "The black population has not been misled into accepting the SADF as an instrument for real social change."

In the event of full mobilization against either internal or external threats, manpower shortages in the white ranks would require the extension of compulsory service to the non-white sectors of South African society. Groups which have little invested in the current system will be required to defend South Africa. This brings to mind D.E.H. Russell's study **Rebellion, Revolution, and the Armed Force**. Russell concludes, " . . . in no case of successful rebellion did the regime retain the loyalty of the armed forces." This is indeed a stirring thought for a country that controls so much of the world's natural resources.

Soldiers Without Politics is an excellent addition to the *Perspectives on South Africa* series and should be examined by all concerned about apartheid and its defenders. The research is comprehensive, readable, and the conclusions are sobering.

SFC Ted Markley, USAR
Bloomington, Ind.

Energy, Economics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union by Ed A. Hewett, Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institute, 1984, 228 pages.

The current crisis of the Soviet system has two aspects: a political one and an economic one. The publication of this work is timely and discusses many intertwining aspects of the above.

Five areas are addressed. First, there is an overview of the energy problem, Soviet performance, and the possibility of reform. Second, Soviet energy supplies are detailed. Third, Soviet energy consumption is studied within the global context. Fourth, the energy balance is discussed. And finally, the energy issue, as a whole, with its impact on Soviet foreign policy, is explored as the author attempts to predict its course into the 1990's.

There are a number of unique discussions which merit attention. Most notably, Hewett's position challenges 1977 CIA estimates of Soviet oil production. In essence, his study expands the debate to the entire spectrum of energy (oil, gas, coal, etc.), focusing on energy as a tool of foreign policy. He believes that the production and export of gas will become prominent in the future. Recent news articles tend to uphold this hypothesis, at least at this point.

The delicate balance between maintaining the priorities associated with Soviet military needs and consumer client states and those which comprise the internal requirements of the Soviet Union is highlighted. In the final analysis, Hewett concludes that the Soviets will remain a net exporter of energy, at least through the end of the decade.

The author's identification of problems, discussion of solutions, and use of graphics and charts, aid and impress the reader. According to Hewett, the prevailing and chronic problems of the labor shortage, the inadequate infrastructure, poor equipment, and inept organization remain unsolved. The status of the various gas lines being constructed, which the author cites, adequately supports the above contention.

Hewett concludes with a warning that the United States may, in the final analysis, lose the limited influence over Soviet energy development that U.S. business generated during the period of detente. He believes that all the technologies required by the Soviets are available within the Soviet Union or obtainable from Japan or Europe.

Throughout Soviet history, at each critical juncture in its development, the Kremlin has been able to improve its position by "playing off" the capitalist states against one another. Hewett's book links the export of energy, its manipulation, hard currency revenues and Soviet industrial modernization to foreign policy. In today's world of energy interdependence and competing systems, the relationship between energy, economics and foreign policy requires special attention and understanding.

Maj. Stephen P. Hallick Jr.
Fort McPherson, Ga.

The Seven Ages Of The British Army by Field Marshal Lord Carver, New York: Beaufort Books, Inc., 1984, 332 pages.

Michael Carver started his military career with the British Army in 1935 in the Royal Tank Corps. During World War II, he commanded a tank battalion and an armored brigade. After the war, he commanded an infantry division before holding important positions on the staff, including Commander-in-Chief of the Far East in 1967, Chief of the General Staff in 1971, and Chief of the Defense Staff from 1973 to 1976.

Great Britain's Army is not a "Royal" army like the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. The British Army is made up of a large number of regiments and corps. Soldiers are enlisted and officers are commissioned into these regiments. Officers do not normally transfer to other regiments. Most, but not all, of these regiments are privileged with the "Royal" prefix or have some other connection with the royal family in their title. This "tribal" organization is a source of strength because it gives the soldier a feeling of being a member of a family. It also causes problems in organization involving administrative costs and inflexibility.

The British people have a long, unbroken historical tradition which even today still generates a fascination for the pageantry of the past. Likewise, the British Army is almost obsessed by its traditions. The regiment was born out of the dispute between Parliament and the Crown over control of the finances and control of the army during the age of Cromwell and Marlborough. The regiment was conceived as a basic family within which the soldier lives, fights, and dies, if necessary.

Parliament consistently tried to ensure that the Crown did not have a permanent body of armed men at its beck and call which could be used to flaunt Parliament's wishes. Often, members of Parliament, as well as other men of social standing, were provided a sum of money, authorized to raise a regiment, and given the freedom to organize the regiment as they saw fit.

In his book, the author names seven ages after the most prominent general of each period. They are: Cromwell, 1625-1685; Marlborough, 1685-1763; Wellington, 1796-1815; Wolseley and Roberts, 1816-1902; Haig, 1902-1919; Montgomery, 1919-1945; and Templer, 1945-1982. Each age is discussed in a chapter which is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author chronicles the battles and campaigns fought by the army during that particular "age" and also discusses the relative strength of the army as compared with its opposing forces. The second half of each chapter provides the details of the army's organization, its methods of recruiting soldiers and commissioning officers, and of the soldier's general way of life.

Overall, the book presents a brief outline of the development of the British Army from the English Civil War to the present. Lord Carver does not go into any great depth or detail; however, this book is a good starting point for anyone who wants to begin studying the history of the British Army.

As the U.S. Army implements its own regimental system in an attempt to create greater unit cohesion, the system that produced a British soldier with strong motivation and a will to fight seems especially relevant: "The strongest motive seems to have been, as it has remained within the British Army ever since, the feeling of being a member of a family, in which the opinion of his fellow soldiers, of a community based on sharing common dangers and hardships exercising mutual responsibility for the lives of comrades-in-arms mattered more than any consideration of national, moral, or personal factors."

SFC James H. Ollerton
USAISD Fort Devens, Mass.

FORTIOR EX VIGILIS

SYMBOLISM

The 138th's distinctive unit crest colors are MI blue, Infantry blue and silver. Both the bolt and key are MI blue. The upper and lower triangles are Infantry blue and the left and right triangles are MI blue. The key represents knowledge. The thunderbolt represents electronic warfare. The key and the bolt crossed represent strength and symbolize the unity of ASA and MI. The battalion motto is Fortior Ex Vigilis or Stronger From Vigilance.

138th
Military Intelligence Battalion
(CEWI)

The 138th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) began its history on March 12, 1956 as the 314th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion assigned to the Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago, Ill. In May of that same year, the 314th was redesignated the 314th Army Security Agency Battalion.

The 314th's history covers two and one-half decades. Since its activation, the 314th has participated in several important missions, including the Berlin crisis. On Oct. 1, 1961, President John F. Kennedy activated the unit during the Berlin crisis and assigned it to Headquarters USASA in the First Army area at Fort Devens, Mass. The unit's mission was to support the XVIII Airborne Corps. On Aug. 6, 1962, the unit was inactivated and returned to Chicago under the 11th Army Corps.

Over the next 25 years, the unit commanded ASA and MI detachments and companies throughout the Midwest to include the 522d ASA Co., the 910th MI Co., the 121st MI Detachment, and the 232d MI Detachment in Chicago, Ill., the 523d ASA Co. in Detroit, Mich., and the 524th ASA Co. in Minneapolis, Minn. Soldiers of the 314th have supported Army electronic warfare requirements across the nation with weekend and summer missions at Fort Devens, Mass., Fort Carson, Colo., Fort Irwin, Calif., Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., Fort McCoy, Wis., and Fort Bragg, N.C. From 1967 to the present, the 314th has been a major subordinate command of the 86th USARCOM.

On Nov. 16, 1983, the traditions of the 314th ASA Battalion were passed on when the 138th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) was organized. The 138th became the first Military Intelligence battalion (CEWI) organized in the Army Reserve.

The 138th consists of Headquarters and Operations Company, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie companies. Headquarters and Operations Company contains the all source analysis center, general support counterintelligence, interrogation and signal security sections, and airborne collection and jamming assets. Alpha Company serves as the collection and jamming company and provides support to the brigades of the 38th Infantry Division. Bravo Company serves as the battalion's ground surveillance radar company and Charlie Company provides the service/support.